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1.1 Introduction  
This report is about fraud and some of the ‘justice’ systems that are used to deal with it 
beyond the criminal justice system. Fraud is a peculiar criminal act in that, unlike other 
property crimes such as theft and burglary, the responses of victims are much more diverse 
(Levi, 1987; Button et al, 2015). A theft or a burglary committed against an organisation, 
where the offender is detected, is likely to result in a prosecution in the criminal justice 
system. A fraud, however, might result in a civil case, regulatory sanction or some private 
justice, alongside or instead of a criminal prosecution (Levi, 1987; Shearing and Stenning, 
1982; and Meerts and Dorn, 1989). The project had the following key aims:  
● To map the plurality of state and private bodies determining guilt and allocating 
sanctions in fraud and corruption related cases outside the criminal justice system in 
England and Wales. 
● To secure a foundation of data on their activities in this area to enable further 
research to be identified and to commence a debate on the wider public-policy 
implications of the growing use of such private structures.  
● To provide early insights on the suitability, strengths and weaknesses of such 
arrangements and to identify areas which require further research.  
 
In addressing these questions, the project has the following specific research objectives:  
● To identify the most significant bodies (outside the criminal justice system) in 
England and Wales which determine guilt in fraud-related cases. 
● To examine their processes, their sanctions, the scale and nature of their 
contribution to the counter fraud landscape. 
● To identify some of the most important contentious issues in the administration of 
this justice which require further research and debate.   
 
This report focuses upon three of the non-criminal paths to justice which have been largely 
neglected by researchers to date, but for which there is evidence of extensive use:  
● The use of contempt of court to deal with insurance fraudsters;  
● The use of regulatory bodies to discipline persons under their jurisdiction for 
fraudulent related offences; and  
● The use of private registers of offenders to deal with a variety of fraudsters. 
 
The lack of research in the past makes it difficult to determine the extent to which these 
non-criminal measures have grown in recent years, but the evidence gathered for this 
report suggests significant usage in some areas. The report will also show there are 
thousands of people sanctioned outside the criminal justice system each year for fraud 
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related offences; indeed many more than are dealt with by the criminal justice system. The 
report will also highlight significant differences in the quality of justice. The methods used 
for this report will be set out in section 7. The report will begin by examining the extent of 
non-criminal justice for dealing with fraud related behaviours. It will then look at some of 
the bodies that ‘regulate’ fraud, before exploring the use of contempt of court. The report 
will then assess fraudster registers before concluding with some of the emerging themes, 
general discussion points and listing some of the recommendations. First, however, the 
general context of fraud in England and Wales will be examined, including definitions, 
trends and previous research linked to this area. 
 
1.2 Fraud in Context in England and Wales  
Defining fraud 
England and Wales is unique amongst many countries in having a relatively up-to-date 
codified law relating to fraud: the 2006 Fraud Act. This defines fraud into three principal 
offences (along with a number of others) which are:  
● Fraud by False Representation (this could cover the submission of false over-time 
sheets or a false invoice for services by a person).  
● Fraud by Failing to Disclose information (this could be a person is paid for 40 hours 
per week, but in fact only works 30 and fails to disclose this or a prospective 
employee is asked for certain information on the application form but doesn’t 
provide it).  
● Fraud by Abuse of Position (this is where a person in a position of trust abuses their 
position such as an accountant diverting funds to their own personal account) 
(Farrell, et al 2007).  
 
The legislation also set out a series of other offences such as:  
● Possession of articles for use in frauds and making or supplying articles for use in 
frauds (this is very wide ranging and could include catching someone at home with a 
paper or electronic copy of a false invoice which could be submitted to a company).   
● Participating in a fraudulent business (this could be a car dealership founded on 
enhancing the value of cars by turning back the mileage clocks).  
● Obtaining services dishonestly (this could be securing an insurance policy by 
providing false or inaccurate information) (Farrell et al 2007).  
 
It is also important to note that a gain or loss does not actually have to occur under the 
Fraud Act 2006, only that defendant intended this to occur. The common law offence of 
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conspiracy to defraud also still exists, along with a variety of other criminal offences which 
can also be considered species of fraud under, for example, social security, tax, intellectual 
property and company legislation. Dishonesty is central to the act of fraud, not least to 
distinguish it from mistake or negligence. The criminal law sets out a two limb, objective and 
subjective, test for dishonesty, the so called Ghosh test from the case R v Ghosh [1982]: 
1. Whether the standards of behaviour would be classed as dishonest by the standards 
of ordinary honest people; and  
2. If yes to the former (no must mean acquittal) whether the defendant knew it would 
be regarded as dishonest by ordinary honest people (Tunley et al, 2015).  
 
Fraud is also a frequently dealt with as a civil claim. There are a number of civil law claims 
which can be used in fraud cases, for example Unjust Enrichment, Conversion, Knowing 
Receipt (McGrath, 2008). The tort of deceit is the nearest equivalent to the criminal version. 
The essential features of deceit can be described as follows.  
A will have committed the tort of deceit (or fraud) in relation to B if:  
(1) He made a representation of the fact to B which was untrue; and  
(2) When he made that representation to B he did not honestly believe it was true; 
and  
(3) He intended, by making that representation to B, to induce B to act in a 
particular way; and  
(4) B was induced to act in that way by A’s representation (McBride and Bagsshaw, 
2005: 435).  
 
The dishonesty test in the civil regime has been modified in recent years from a two limb 
equivalent to Ghosh following Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley, [2002] 2 AC 164 to a solely objective 
test as a result of Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust [2006] 1 WLR 1476. However the Twinsectra 
test remains a common feature amongst regulators, most notably the lawyer regulators. 
The essence of fraud is therefore some planned act of deception which causes (or intends to 
cause) a gain to another (individual or organisation). There are a wide range of potential 
behaviours which could potentially fall under this broad definition and one of the first 
challenges many victims and investigators face is whether the act was actually a fraud. It 
might seem to meet the core elements of a criminal or even civil act, but the facts of the 
case make it murkier and more difficult to prove, particularly with the Ghosh or Twinsectra 
challenge.   
Take an employee who has transferred £1,000 from their employers account to their own 
personal account, by forging their boss’s signature, who is uncovered by auditors. This might 
seem a prima facie a case of fraud. However, what if the employee had regularly done this 
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and repaid the money? What if they claimed the boss knew and had verbally agreed to the 
loan and the employee regularly forged the signature at the manager’s behest because they 
were too busy. Suddenly the case has become much messier and the challenges to secure a 
criminal action have become harder. Alternative disciplinary or regulatory justice with a 
lower standard of proof might become more realistic options. This is a very simplistic 
example but every day investigators are confronted with cases involving losses which 
require an investigation to determine what has happened and whether it constitutes 
criminal fraud. Depending upon the status and whereabouts of the actor, what is provable 
in terms of the perpetrator’s mens rea intentions, the level and nature of dishonesty as 
likely to be judged by peers, the available evidence, the degree of harm caused and the type 
of victim are just some of the factors which influence the conclusions of both the 
investigator and the adjudicator. 
Then even if they conclude in their view the evidence suggests a criminal act of fraud a 
variety of other factors will influence what happens. Does the victim actually want a criminal 
prosecution? Do they want the associated publicity? Have they the resources to support a 
police investigation? Will the case have the support of the Crown Prosecution Service or are 
they able to fund a private prosecution? These are just some of the factors which lead to the 
very high attrition in the number of fraud cases that reach the criminal courts. This report 
will also show that the criminal justice system, as currently configured, is simply not capable 
of addressing the scale and prevalence of fraud in England and Wales. Consequently 
alternative measures are filling that gap.  
The extent of fraud  
Fraud poses more measurement challenges than other volume crimes because of the 
following factors: individuals and organisations not knowing they are victims, ambiguities 
over whether it is a fraud, reluctance to report by many victims and challenges in the 
acceptance of reports by official bodies such as Action Fraud. Official crime statistics are 
therefore largely meaningless in gauging levels of fraud. The Crime Survey for England and 
Wales is usually seen as the gold standard for accurate measurement of crime. However, 
this survey does not cover organisations (who are major victims of frauds) and until recently 
it did not even ask respondents about fraud victimisation, other than plastic card fraud. The 
lack of reliable data makes it difficult to determine with confidence the levels of fraud and 
any trends. With these caveats in mind, however, the following offer some indications on 
the level of fraud in England and Wales.  
i. Action Fraud 
 
Action Fraud has taken over the reporting function for fraud offences from the police. This 
centralisation has led to changes in reporting processes and norms, which are taking time to 
bed down. If the number of offences were tracked back to 2009, when just over 73,000 
offences were recorded, the graph in Figure 1.1 would be even steeper. Action Fraud has 
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also done more to facilitate reporting through campaigns, online reporting mechanisms and 
bulk reporting systems for organisations. It would be wrong to read too much into their 
statistics until a few more years of data have been reported.  
Figure 1.1. Fraud recorded by Action Fraud 2012-16 
 
ii. Crime survey 
 
Until the publication of a pilot in 2015, the English and Wales Crime Survey had only asked 
interviewees about their victimisation relating to plastic card fraud. In the last five years this 
has shown a range of victimisation from 4.6% to a high of 5.2% of the adult population over 
16 years old. The 2015 pilot study, which was not added to the main survey findings, 
suggested there were 2.6 million fraud victims with a loss and a further 2.4 million fraud 
victims with no loss (ONS, 2015). Added to this, just over 2 million had experienced a virus 
and 0.4 million had experienced unauthorised hacking access to their computer (Crime 
Survey for England and Wales, 2015). If these had been added to the 6.6 million crime 
incidents in the main survey crime would have more than doubled. The 2016 statistics 
provided further evidence of significant victimisation at 3.6 million (ONS, 2016). These 
statistics will be included in the surveys from 2016 onwards to provide a more cogent 
picture of individual fraud victimisation in England and Wales.  
iii. Cost 
 
There have been a number of fraud indicators published using different methods which 
have sought to gauge the cost of fraud. For instance the National Fraud Authority in last 
indicator identified the cost of fraud to be £52 billion to the UK economy annually (National 
Fraud Authority, 2014). More recent research has used a variety of sources to estimate the 
annual losses to fraud in the UK at around £193 billion in 2015 (Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies, 2016). It is clear that it is a significant sum whichever estimate is used.  
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Factors facilitating the growth of fraud  
The overwhelming evidence, however, is that fraud has been rising in the last decade, 
fuelled by a variety of factors which will now be briefly explored. One of the most significant 
influences has been the advance in technologies which has enabled mass connectivity 
through the internet, e-mail, social networking, mobile phones etc, and which has multiplied 
the opportunities to commit fraud or industrialise old frauds (Button and Cross, 
forthcoming). The impersonal at-a-distance provision of services also emboldens many more 
to take a risk with providing false information. Compare the interview with a bank manager 
to secure a loan with the distanciated online application, lacking any human contact and 
which is increasingly the norm (Duffield and Grabosky, 2001). There is also evidence from 
longitudinal research that Britons are getting more dishonest (Whitely, n.d.). Another factor 
is the inability of the state to cope with fraud which creates the realistic perception that the 
risks of detection is low (Levi, 1987; Button et al 2015). The greater marketization in the 
provision of services, particular in relation to the professions is another factor and was 
mentioned by several in this research. As a senior representative from the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal noted:  
…because they (solicitors) are being encouraged to be more like businesses; if you 
take away the professional standing, so it ceases to be a profession and becomes, 
um, something else, a service, a service rather than a profession, albeit we’re 
providing services, there is a risk that in…in order to be more entrepreneurial 
solicitors will inevitably have to bring themselves into contact with the type of 
person that they might not have come into contact with 20, 25 years ago. 
Research on fraud sanctions  
There has been relatively little research on fraud justice systems in the UK and even less on 
non-criminal sanctions. Some of the most notable research will be briefly explored. The 
most significant research to date has been conducted by Levi over several decades in a 
number of studies. Regulating Fraud, which was published in 1987 provided a 
comprehensive review of the structures and approaches to dealing with fraud at the time. It 
was the first significant criminological study to note the extensive punishment/sanction 
structures beyond the criminal justice system in the civil courts, tax and benefits system, 
Office of Fair Trading, Department for Trade and Industry and the financial services 
regulatory structures of the time. However, as this report will show those structures have 
significantly changed and expanded, new private (and public) developments have emerged 
and the role of occupational regulation to deal with fraud was not considered (Levi, 1987).  
The terrain surveyed by Levi in 1987 is significantly different to 2016. Levi has also looked 
more recently at some specific areas related to sanctions and justice, such as the potential 
role for restorative justice type techniques (Levi, 2002), the sentencing of fraud offences 
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(2006) and sanctions and justice related to tax fraud (Levi, 2010). There have been a number 
of other studies and reports that have looked at the specific arrangements for justice for 
fraud in particular sectors. Benefits and tax fraud has been considered by Cook (1989) and 
Rowlingson et al (1997). The use of the civil justice system has been examined in number of 
reports by the Fraud Advisory Panel (2012a and b). The sanctions (both criminal and non-
criminal) available to counter fraud investigators has been explored by the NHS Counter 
Fraud Service (2007) and Button et al (2015). One of the few papers to explore the use of 
professional regulators to deal with fraud related cases was by Smith (2004) in Australia.  
The literature on regulation and particularly the use of alternatives to criminal sanctions has 
also provided some significant studies which touch upon fraud related cases and non-
criminal sanctions, such as Grabosky (2013), Hampton (2005) and Macrory (2006), which 
also provide useful insights for this project. There is also a body of literature on the merits of 
different types of regulation in general and reviews and ideas for the regulation of specific 
professions (see Miller, 1962; Dingwall and Fenn, 1987; Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Seneviratne, 2000). Finally there has also been a small amount of research on private justice 
within organisation (Shearing and Stenning, 1982; Meerts and Dorn 2009). 
1.4. Conclusion 
This section has introduced the aims and objectives of this research and clearly set out what 
is meant by fraud and the wide breadth of behaviours which fall under it. Some of the 
indicators of the scale of the problem were set out along with a brief examination of some 
of the causes contributing to the growth of the problem. Finally the chapter noted some of 
the small number of studies which have explored the justice systems for dealing with it. The 
next section will now offer some statistics drawn from this study to illustrate the large 
number of fraudsters who are dealt with by justice systems beyond the criminal justice 
system.  
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2. The Extent of Non-Criminal Justice for Fraud  
2.1 Introduction  
In this section the extent of non-criminal justice sanctions for dealing with fraud related 
cases is considered. It introduces some of the criminal statistics on fraud related offences 
and then moves on to explore some of the statistics secured from this research to illustrate 
the substantial use of non-criminal justice systems to deal with fraud related offences. 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to set out the bodies which are within the scope of this 
study. 
It is important to note this study is not about regulatory justice in general. There are many 
bodies with enforcement functions which have the capability to impose or pursue sanctions 
for breaches of regulations and the law (see Lidstone, 1980; Hampton, 2005; Macrory, 
2006). Most of the breaches such bodies deal with are not fraud related. Many, however, as 
part of their wider functions, do end up dealing with various species of fraud related 
behaviours. Some of these focus upon criminal sanctions, some non-criminal whilst others 
use a mix. This study is interested in those bodies that use non-criminal sanctions and that 
deal with behaviours that clearly fall within the bounds of our definition of fraud. There is 
no clear list of them to start such a study. This research needed to first identify potential 
bodies and then determine their role (if any) in dealing with fraud cases. This required an 
investigation of their activities. For some this was relatively easy, for others it was not and 
for most it was time consuming. The researchers secured a list of bodies from a variety of 
sources (see section 7 on methodology). The bodies which deal with fraud related cases are 
drawn from state bodies such as:  
● Government regulatory bodies (government departments, agencies and quangos); 
● Specialist courts; and   
● Local government.   
 
Organisations which are not part of the state, but which through monopoly or state 
regulation/sanction have strong control over their areas of activity:  
● Industry regulatory bodies (self-regulating bodies, sporting bodies);  
● Professional regulatory bodies; and   
● Professional associations.  
 
Two types of database providers: 
● Fraudster registers and 
● Intelligence databases. 
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The time and resources available for this research led the research team to exclude the 
following from the scope of this project:  
● Bodies specific to Scotland and Northern Ireland;  
● Local authority activities on fraud related offences including Trading Standards; 
● Bodies with no public evidence of having dealt with fraud related cases or have done 
so extremely rarely (although they may have the capacity to do so); 
● Civil  courts as their purpose is to resolve disputes, not to apply sanctions; 
● Ombudsman services as their focus is on service complaints, not misconduct; and  
● Bodies dealing solely with organisations (although we have noted some of these in a 
subsidiary database of organisations). 
 
This left a large range of bodies to assess. The challenge was revealed by one of the very 
first organisations to be assessed, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). It deals with 
organisations rather than individuals, so was subsequently ruled out for deeper analysis. 
However, in the initial assessment of the ASA it became clear that it did deal with fraud 
related cases.  An example of ‘misrepresentation’ in an ASA complaint involved the selling of 
‘Christian Lars’ watches by BidTV, a television shopping channel. In this case the presenter 
claimed the price of the watch was £300 to those watching, but on the screen the price 
came up as £69.99. The presenter then claimed the on-screen price was an ‘error’, but the 
error price would be honoured, in order to induce the consumers into believing it was an 
extraordinary bargain. The complaint was upheld, with the ASA ruling:  
We considered the price claims in the ad would be understood by viewers to mean 
the watch was normally sold for between £300 and £400. We also did not consider it 
would be clear to viewers that the presenter's statements about the price error were 
fictional. Because Bid TV has not provided evidence that the product was usually sold 
for between £300 and £400 we concluded the ad was misleading. 
The ad breached BCAP Code rules 3.1 (Misleading advertising), 3.9 (Substantiation) 
and 3.18 (Prices) (Advertising Standards Authority, 2012). 
There is limited information on the case, but the bare elements would seem to include a 
deliberate attempt to deceive by seeking to inflate the value of the watch and fabricating a 
‘mistake’. Consider the core elements of a civil fraud:  
He made a representation of the fact to B which was untrue (Presenter overstated 
value of watch, which he knew was fictional); and  
When he made that representation to B he did not honestly believe it was true 
(Presenter probably knew it wasn’t true); and  
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He intended, by making that representation to B, to induce B to act in a particular 
way (The aim was to induce customers to buy watches); and  
B was induced to act in that way by A’s representation (Customers bought watches 
as a consequence).  
It is important to stress again, not all the facts are available on this case and there could be a 
strong argument put forward that this is not fraud. The higher standards and conditions of 
criminal fraud would probably be even more challenging, but clearly there is a false 
representation leading to a gain. However, this is not the point of this example. 
The point of introducing the example is to illustrate a real ASA case which could reasonably 
be considered as an act of fraud. The staff at the ASA do not have to concern themselves 
with the conceptual intersection of misleading advertising with fraud. Their remit is to 
consider the effects of advertising; they do not need to grapple with issues of dishonesty 
and intent in order to apply the ‘misleading’ label. The ASA was one of the first regulators 
examined by the researchers and therefore highlighted early in the project the fine lines 
between exaggeration, mistake, mis-selling and fraud. It illustrates how fraud can be de-
toxified by a process of ‘de-labelling’ to which this report will return. It was clear from the 
outset of the research that the examination of regulatory cases would require careful 
scrutiny that went beyond looking for the word ‘fraud’ and looked instead for its constituent 
elements.  
Scope of regulator types 
The primary scope of this study is restricted to regulators which have the capacity to 
sanction individuals for fraud related behaviours: individuals in the general public and 
members of regulated professions. Many also regulate firms but such interventions are 
infrequent and these tend to be consequences of enquiries into the behaviour of 
individuals. The statistical analysis excludes the regulators which deal with organisations 
only. However the research database includes the details of the organisation-only regulators 
assessed and they are referred to in the body of the report. The definition of regulator 
excludes the primary state controlled justice systems as organised through the police, the 
Criminal Prosecution Service, the Serious Fraud Office and the civil courts, although we will 
explore contempt of court as a particular species of fraud which results in criminal penalties 
without following the orthodox criminal justice process. Finally, as the primary purpose of 
ombudsman and other dispute resolution organisations is to resolve customer service 
complaints rather than address misconduct, they are outside the scope of the present 
research. Further research may reveal a strong intersection between service complaints 
handled by ombudsman services and fraud. The study classifies the included regulators into 
three categories according to their structure and purpose: government regulators, 
delegated regulators and self-regulators. 
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i. Government regulators 
Government regulators are executive agencies such as the HMRC, public bodies such as the 
NHS Business Services Authority and government owned public corporations, for example 
the Financial Conduct Authority, which is owned by and reports to HM Treasury. Their 
primary purpose is either to protect the interests of the public, for example the 
Gangmasters Licensing Authority, or the interests of the state, for example the DWP. They 
have a breadth of powers including conducting investigations, determining guilt and 
imposing sanctions ranging from warnings to prohibitions. The Cabinet Office maintains a 
register of staff fraudsters and the HMRC issues lists of deliberate tax defaulters1. Some, 
especially TV Licensing, the HMRC and the DWP also pursue criminal sanctions. Their 
prosecution activities are within the scope of the research. 
ii. Delegated regulators 
The primary role of delegated regulators is to set professional standards and to protect the 
interests of the public when members fail to meet those standards, either due to 
incompetency or misconduct. Delegated regulators are independent of both the 
government and the professions they supervise. They have the powers to investigate and 
sanction members, but they do not represent their members’ interests.  Interventions 
include restrictions on practice, warning, fines and professional exclusion. Some examples of 
delegated regulators include the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) which regulates 
nursing and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) and Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 
(SDT) which regulate solicitors.    
iii. Self-regulators 
Self-regulators are those organisations which are responsible for all three aspects of 
professional supervision: they are professional associations which represent the interests of 
its members, they investigate incompetency and misconduct, and they impose controls and 
sanctions. The most prominent self-regulators are the accountancy associations and 
sporting bodies.  
The statistics will also include fraudster databases, which will be considered in more depth 
in Section 5 of this report. The report has identified six databases of ‘confirmed fraudsters’ 
and another many more with intelligence on fraudsters. The statistics presented in this 
section will only relate to ‘confirmed fraudsters’ databases and only the statistics from Cifas 
will be used of the six. This is because either statistics were not available from the others or 
they were likely to duplicate the Cifas data.   
 
 
                                                          
1
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/publishing-details-of-deliberate-tax-defaulters-pddd 
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2.2 Statistics on Fraud Offenders  
Edwin Sutherland observed 75 years ago that official crime statistics are a fruitless resource 
for understanding the true prevalence of white-collar crime, partly because the response to 
such crimes are far more likely to be within the purview of administrative and regulatory 
bodies (Sutherland, 1940). This section of the report tests Sutherland’s assertion. It is a 
quantitative analysis of the fraud offending rates within a broad range of regulatory and 
administrative bodies in England and Wales. The data is based on proven outcomes 
published by the regulators. Unfortunately regulators tend not to publish the details of 
cases which are ultimately judged unproven, so reliable estimates of the total number 
handled and attrition rates through the regulators are not possible. 
There are a number of factors for very high attrition rates for fraud: victims not knowing 
they are, victims not reporting, difficulty reporting for victims and a lack of interest and 
capability of the criminal justice system to deal with fraud (Button et al 2014; Button and 
Tunley, 2015). This section will show, that another reason, for the high attrition rate in 
criminal justice is that many offenders are dealt with by other justice systems, albeit of 
varying sophistication and that some dispute they are even justice systems: the database 
providers dispute they are justice systems and this is an issue which will be addressed in 
section 5 of this report. 
To put the scale of fraud offending in perspective it would be useful to first examine the 
criminal justice offending statistics. Table 2.1 shows the total number of proven offenders 
handled by the criminal justice system of England and Wales is in 2014 and 2015 (MoJ, 
2015). The average for the two years is 1,424,688. The average number of proven fraud 
offenders is 15,708 or 1.2% of the total. This apparent offending rate does not correlate at 
all with published estimates of fraud losses. For instance if the last National Fraud Authority 
fraud indicator loss of £52 billion is divided by the 15,708, this would produce an average 
loss per fraud of £3.3 million, which is highly implausible. The level of proven offenders 
suggests a very high attrition rate for fraud. Indeed in 2015 the total number of recorded 
fraud offences was 617,618 (ONS, 2016). Three reporting bodies contribute data to the 
statistics (Table 2.2): Action Fraud which is the call handling centre for the police, Financial 
Fraud Action UK which represents the payments industry and Cifas which hosts a fraud 
offender database. Cifas also holds an equally large database of victims and persons at high 
risk of first party fraud to prevent them from further victimisation. The attrition rate 
through the criminal justice system in 2015 from 617,618 recorded frauds, through to 
15,708 proven offenders in the criminal justice system amounts to 97.5 percent.  
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Table 2.1: Proven offenders in the criminal justice system in 2014 and 2015 
 
 All offenders Fraud offenders 
Year Cautions Convictions Total Cautions Convictions Total % of all 
2014 241,229 1,187,085 1,428,314 2,686 13,395 16,081 1.1% 
2015 192,662 1,228,400 1,421,062 2,265 13,070 15,335 1.1% 
Average 216,946 1,207,743 1,424,688 2,476 13,233 15,708 1.1% 
 15% 85% 100% 16% 84% 100%  
 
 
Table 2.2: Recorded fraud 
 
Reporting body       2014       2015 
Action Fraud 224,683 224,682 
Cifas 254,843 295,525 
FFA UK 115,243 97,411 
Total 594,769 617,618 
 
 
Proven criminal offenders 
 
Table 2.3 lists the average number of proven criminal fraudsters for 2014 and 2015 broken 
down by enforcement agency. Eight agencies are known to have brought 15,708 offenders 
to justice in 2014 and 2015 for offences defined by the Home Office (2012) fraud typology: 
13,232 (84%) were convicted at court and 2,476 (16%) received police cautions. Because the 
number of successful prosecutions by other bodies, such as local authorities, and private 
prosecutions is not known, the number brought by the police may be lower. The analysis 
illustrates how the enforcement of fraud by the police / CPS justice route represents a 
minority with over half of the convictions obtained by regulators. By following the National 
Fraud Authority (2013) model typology and including 162,869 summary convictions for TV 
licence evasion (TV Licensing, u.d), the total proven offending rate jumps to 178,577, an 
eleven-fold increase. The contribution of the police to the total proven criminal offending 
statistics is then at best just 5%.  
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Table 2.3: Proven criminal fraud offenders (average of 2014-15) 
 
Enforcement body # /y % 
Police / CPS 6,387 40.7% 
DWP 6,105 38.9% 
Police cautions 2,476 15.8% 
HMRC 716 4.6% 
SFO 11 0.1% 
FCA 7 0.0% 
GLA 6 0.0% 
MCA 0.5 0.0% 
Total 15,708 100.0% 
TV Licensing 162,869  
Total 178,577  
 
 
Proven regulatory offenders 
 
The subsequent sections of this report discuss the regulatory justice systems, fraudster 
databases and contempt of court will be considered in more depth. This section, however, 
will illustrate some of the statistics on the number of cases of fraud they deal with. Large 
numbers of fraud offenders are drawn from these main areas:  
 NHS Penalty Notices - penalties issued to persons wrongly claiming exemption from 
NHS charges (606,063);2 
 HMRC Penalties - issued for deliberate understatement and deliberate 
understatement with concealment of tax returns (14,760);3 
 DWP Cautions and Penalty Notices - issued for wrongly claiming social security 
benefits (10,155: 6,163 cautions and 3,992 administrative penalties)4 
 Insolvency Service (disqualified directors) (1,122);5   
Also included are penalty notices issued by Transport for London (TfL) for fare evasion. This 
only represents London. TfL is open to FOI requests, whereas most other providers are 
private and beyond the scope of FOI. As such this represents only a fraction of this type of 
fraud offending. 
 TFL Penalty Fares - penalty fares issued for not having a valid ticket (100,113)6 
                                                          
2
 Information supplied by FOI request and uses a combination of 2015 statistics for Payment Exemption 
Checking Service of 409,894 and 2014-15 statistics for Benefit Eligibility Checking Service of 196,169.  
3
 Information supplied by FOI request and includes penalties issued for Deliberate Understatement and 
Deliberate Understatement with Concealment for 2013-14.  
4
 Department of Work and Pensions (2014; 2015)  
5
 Insolvency Service (2015) 
6
 Information supplied by FOI request and includes all penalty notices for fare evasion issued by TFL in 2013-
14.  
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The other substantial figures added are those of Cifas. This included figures from their 
national and internal databases for 2014. There are other databases but either statistics 
were not available or they were likely to duplicate with Cifas, such as the National Hunter 
database. These also therefore represent an underestimate. 
 Cifas - persons added to their databases as confirmed fraudsters (135,485).7    
There is also a very small number of persons sanctioned through contempt of court for 
insurance related fraud, which was 12 in 2015. Finally from the assessment of regulatory 
bodies for ‘professions’ for the average of the census years 2014 and 2015 another 395 
persons are added who received regulatory only sanctions for fraud related behaviours. This 
is also likely to be an under-estimate as there is an unknown number of persons handled 
privately by regulators through internal administrative processes without recourse to a 
hearing or published determination.  Another 13 offenders were prosecuted by the FCA, 
GLA and MCA and convicted in the Crown Court (Table 2.3); they are included in the criminal 
figures in Table 2.4. The research also found that the professions regulators sanction 189 
offenders each year as a consequence of prior criminal findings; they are also included in 
the criminal figures in Table 2.4. The report does not analyse this sub-set because it focuses 
on the efforts of regulators in bringing the first determination of guilt rather than secondary 
regulatory processing consequential to criminal findings. 
 Professions8 Regulators - persons publicly sanctioned for fraud related behaviour by 
regulatory body with no criminal justice system involvement (395).9 
Table 2.4 brings all this data together to show the number of proven fraudsters drawn from 
the criminal and non-criminal justice systems. The total number of fraud offenders has 
increased from 15,708 to 1,046,670, a 67 fold increase.  
Table 2.4: Total number of fraud offenders (persons) sanctioned by enforcement category 
(average of statistics for years 2014-15) 
 
Enforcement type Justice route # offenders % 
 
% 
 
Criminal 
Criminal (excl TV) 15,696 1.5% 
17.1% Criminal TV Licensing 162,869 15.6% 
Contempt of court  Civil court 12 0.0% 
Regulatory - general public 
NHS 606,063 57.9% 
70.0% 
DWP 10,155 1.0% 
HMRC 14,760 1.4% 
Insolvency Service 1,122 0.1% 
TfL 100,113 9.6% 
Regulatory – professions Professions regulators 395 0.03% 0.03% 
Database record Cifas 135,485 12.9% 12.9% 
Total 1,046,670 100.0% 100% 
                                                          
7
 Information supplied by Cifas.  
8
 Professions also includes some occupations which might not be considered as a profession.  
9
 Figures produced by analysis of publicly available cases from relevant regulators.  
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Fraudster offending rates  
 
The data also raises some interesting issues when fraudster offending rates are considered. 
With varying levels of quality and confidence, it is possible to compare the activities of 
regulators using the number of proven fraudsters per 100,000 population (#/100,000). To 
put this more simply, if profession X has 100,000 members, how many of them were proven 
as fraudsters by their regulatory body in a year? First of all there are some useful baseline 
offender rates which can be used as a comparison.  
 
 Number of criminal offenders per 100,000 is 3,061 (this is the total convicted of all 
criminal offences set against the adult population of England and Wales); 
 Number of fraud related criminal offenders including TV Licensing per 100,000 is 
604; 
 Number of fraud related criminal offenders (those convicted in a criminal court) 
excluding TV Licensing per 100,000 is 34.  
If these offending rates are then compared to the regulatory proven fraudster offending 
rates, some interesting differences begin to emerge.  
 Total number of fraud related offenders (non-criminal) per 100,000 is 1,865;  
 Total number of fraud related offenders from regulators of the general public (non-
criminal) per 100,000 is 1,573;  
 Total number of fraud related offenders from regulators of professions (non-
criminal) per 100,000 is 5;  
 Total number of fraud related offenders from confirmed fraudster databases (non-
criminal) per 100,000 is 291;  
Table 2.5: Offending rates by enforcement type (average of 2014-15) 
 
  All offences Fraud offences 
Enforcement type Population # # / 
100,000 # 
% of all 
offences 
% of 
fraud 
# / 
100,000 
Criminal 46,550,257 1,424,688 3,061 178,577 13% 17% 384 
 Criminal (excl TV Licensing) 46,550,257 1,261,819 2,711 15,696 1.2% 1.5% 34 
 TV licensing  26,980,000 162,869 604 162,869 100% 15.5% 604 
 Contempt of court 46,550,257 - - 12 - 100% 0 
Regulatory / administrative 46,550,257 870,803 1,871 868,093 99.7% 83% 1,865 
 Regulators of general public 46,550,257 732,213 1,573 732,213 100% 70.0% 1,573 
 Regulator of professions 7,976,711 3,105 39 395 13% 0.04% 5 
 Confirmed fraudster databases 46,550,257 135,485 291 135,485 100% 12.9% 291 
 46,550,257 2,295,491 4,931 1,046,670 46% 100% 2,248 
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Further drilling into the data reveals substantial differences amongst the regulators of 
professions. Before the rates are considered it is first important to note some caveats to the 
data. First, there are different opportunity structures amongst the professions. Solicitors, for 
examples, often have to look after client funds, so providing an opportunity to misuse them, 
whereas most teachers have little access to funds. Second, in some professions there is a 
duty to report any misconduct to the regulatory body. Thus a nurse who has fiddled travel 
expenses must be reported, whereas for teachers it would be at the discretion of the school. 
Third, in some regulatory bodies individuals who have resigned from the profession might 
not be publicly sanctioned. It will be tempting to think that some professions are more 
corrupt than others and that some take fraud more seriously than others. These factors 
could account for these differences. However, what is more important to take from these 
differences are clues to areas of ‘regulation’ which require more research. 
The first comparison data relates to the type of regulator. Referring to Table 2.6, over half of 
the offenders (224) are sanctioned by delegated regulators, which are mainly legal and 
medical, at a rate of 16/100,000. The calculated fraudster offender rate for government 
regulators is 11/100,000 – this includes the 13 FCA, GLA and MCA convicted offenders from 
Table 2.3. Excluding these criminal sanctions, the regulatory only sanction rate is 9/100,000 
for government regulators. The sanction rate for the self-regulated sector, dominated by 
accountancy and sports, is just 1.2/100,000. 
Table 2.6: Offending rates for regulators of professions (average of 2014-15) 
 
  All offenders Fraud offenders Fraud loss £ 
Regulator type Population # # / 
100,000 # 
% of all 
offences 
% of 
fraud 
# / 
100,000 Loss £ 
Loss / 
member £ 
Delegated 1,375,678 1,689 123 224 13% 55% 16 99,994,437 72.69 
Government 1,144,063 877 77 121 14% 30% 11 1,044,590,189 913.05 
Self-regulation 5,456,970 554 10 64 11% 16% 1.2 58,047,577 10.64 
Total 7,976,711 3,119 39 408 13% 100% 5 1,202,632,203 150.77 
 
Table 2.7 ranks the professions regulators by proven offending rate (#/100,000). Of the top 
ten, five are government regulators, four are delegated and one is a self-regulator. The 
membership levels of six the top seven regulators are relatively small, below 6,000, which 
implies fraud compliance controls are more effective with smaller groups. Two of the 
regulators are contract regulators. Phonepay Plus is the tribunal service contracted to 
Ofcom and deals with premium rate telephone providers. The National Anti-Doping Panel 
(NADP) is a brand name for the tribunal service operated by Sports Resolutions on behalf of 
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UK Anti-Doping (UKAD). This model of genuinely privatising justice is not unique: TV 
Licensing is operated by Capita Business Services Ltd. Tenth on the list is the SRA and its 
associated tribunal service, the SDT, with a detection rate of 25/100,000 and 33 offenders 
per year. The SDT deals with a further 14 convicted offenders detected by other agencies. 
The detected value of solicitor fraud is the second highest of the professions at over 
£93million/year, equivalent to £748/member, indicating a high risk mainly through the 
abuse of client funds and mortgage fraud.  
Sixteenth on the list is the FCA with a detection rate of 15/100,000, 24 members per year 
and detected fraud of £1billion/year, equivalent to £6,657/member. The measured risk in 
the financial sector is by far the highest in the sample frame. It is not surprising considering 
the nature of the scandals in just the last decade and the near collapse of the world 
economy in 2008. The substantial problems of PPI mis-selling, LIBOR and exchange rate 
fixing schemes illustrate the problems and the substantial risks. With such risks and a 
detection rate less than the police, the performance of the FCA requires greater 
consideration (which is beyond the scope of this report). 
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Table 2.7: Professions regulators ranked by detection rate (#/100,000) (average of 2014-15) 
 
   
  
All 
offenders 
Fraud offenders Total reported fraud loss / yr 
# Regulator Regulator type Population # proven # 
% of all 
offenders 
# / 
100,000 
Loss £ 
Loss / 
member £ 
1 Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) Government 989 20 6 28% 556     
2 Phonepay Plus (PP) Delegated 2,713 41 10 25% 369     
3 
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) +                       
National Anti-Doping Panel  (NADP) [Sports 
Resolutions] 
Government 17,500 21 21 100% 117     
4 Football Association (FA) Self-regulation 4,000 4 4 100% 100.00     
5 Costs Lawyers Standards Board (CLSB) Delegated 619 1 1 100% 81 0 0.00 
6 
Independent Parliamentary Standards 
Authority (IPSA) 
Government 650 1 1 100% 77 503 0.77 
7 Care Council for Wales (CCW) Government 5,547 21 2 10% 36 400 0.07 
8 Gambling Commission (GC) Government 28,091 28 9 31% 30 25,310 0.90 
9 General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) Delegated 70,000 65 18 28% 26 13,604 0.19 
10 
Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) +                                         
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal  (SDT) 
Delegated 130,000 99 33 33% 25 97,191,314 747.63 
11 
Bar Standards Board (BSB) +                 Bar 
Tribunals and Adjudication Service (BTAS) 
Delegated 15,716 31 4 11% 22 414,639 26.38 
12 Education Workforce Council (Wales) (EWC) Government 41,981 33 9 27% 21 91,200 2.17 
13 
General Medical Council (GMC)  +                                  
Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) 
Delegated 270,000 296 56 19% 21 1,120,080 4.15 
14 CILEx Regulation Delegated 20,000 10 4 37% 18 624,551 31.23 
15 General Chiropractic Council (GCC) Delegated 3,141 9 1 6% 16 0 0.00 
16 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Government 155,529 83 24 29% 15 1,035,391,521 6,657.22 
17 General Optical Council (GOC) Delegated 28,000 28 4 14% 14 23,955 0.86 
18 Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) Delegated 686,782 912 86 9% 13 28,448 0.04 
19 General Osteopathic Council (GOsC) Delegated 5,120 1 1 100% 10 0 0.00 
20 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW) 
Self-regulation 144,000 234 10 4% 7 11,480,963 79.73 
21 Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) Government 29,139 45 2 4% 7 1,350,000 46.33 
22 
National Federation of Property Professionals 
(NFoPP) 
Self-regulation 15,000 9 1 12% 7 432,500 28.83 
23 Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC) Government 330,887 529 22 4% 7 33,438 0.10 
24 General Dental Council (GDC) Delegated 106,313 306 7 2% 7 170,384 1.60 
25 Institute of Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) Self-regulation 26,762 11 2 14% 6 0 0.00 
26 
Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) 
Self-regulation 633,000 132 33 25% 5 45,471,465 71.83 
27 
National College for Teaching and Leadership 
(NCTL) 
Government 469,000 116 23 19% 5 197,817 0.42 
28 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Government 64,750 10 3 30% 5     
29 Architects Registration Board (ARB) Delegated 34,500 17 1 6% 3 407,463 11.81 
30 Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) Self-regulation 118,000 23 2 7% 1 94,219 0.80 
31 Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) Self-regulation 115,000 6 1 17% 1 395,500 3.44 
32 
Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA) 
Self-regulation 227,000 6 1 17% 0.44 2,000 0.01 
33 British Horseracing Authority (BHA) Self-regulation 3,284,455 93 10 10% 0.29 54,463 0.02 
34 Rugby Football League (RFL) Self-regulation 250,000 23 1 2% 0.20 0 0.00 
35 Rugby Football Union (RFU) Self-regulation 560,000 10 1 5% 0.09 4,320 0.01 
36 
Intellectual Property Regulation Board 
(IPReg) 
Delegated 1,984 0 0   0.00 0 0.00 
37 The Faculty Office (TFO) Delegated 790 2 0 0% 0.00 0 0.00 
38 Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Government 1,018,000 6 1 18% 0.10 7,500,000 7.37 
39 Marine Management Organisation (MMO) Government   0 0   0.00 0 0.00 
40 Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Government   5 1 11% 0.00 0 0.00 
41 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards 
(PCS) 
Government 650 5 0   0.00 0 0.00 
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All 
offenders 
Fraud offenders Total reported fraud loss / yr 
# Regulator Regulator type Population # proven # 
% of all 
offenders 
# / 
100,000 
Loss £ 
Loss / 
member £ 
42 Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) Self-regulation 37,000 3 0 0% 0.00 99,148 2.68 
43 Church of England (CoE) Self-regulation 28,285 1 0 0% 0.00 13,000 0.46 
44 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) 
Self-regulation 14,000 1 0 0% 0.00 0 0.00 
45 
Cricket Discipline Commission (CDC), 
department of England and Wales Cricket 
Board (ECB) 
Self-regulation 468 1 0   0.00 0 0.00 
46 Greyhound Board of Great Britain (GBGB) Self-regulation   17 0 0% 0.00 0 0.00 
 
 
Further down the ranking are the five accountancy regulators, the four self-supervising 
institutes ICAEW, ACCA, CIMA and CIPFA, and the government regulator, the FRC. The data 
for these regulators is summarised in Table 2.8. Considering the various roles of accountants 
the associated risks are high: audit, financial advice, acting as company secretaries for 
multiple small firms, handling client money, control of management accounts, access to 
employer’s financial systems and bank accounts, purchasing and payroll authority. The risk 
profile is evidenced by the £64.5 million/year of detected fraud, a level only surpassed by 
the SRA/SDT and the FCA. The loss/member for the ICAEW and ACCA is ranked third and 
fourth behind the solicitors and financiers. However the detection rate is just 4/100,000. 
The virtually zero detection rate for CIMA and CIPFA may reflect that their primary purpose 
is the regulation of internal management accountants, indicating less concern about 
dealings with clients and far fewer client complaints. The FRC is a government body which 
supervises the other four accountancy regulators. It rarely engages in disciplinary action 
against individuals and only intervenes for strategic or policy reasons. The key distinguishing 
characteristic of the accountancy profession is that, other than the very rare intervention of 
the FRC, it is self-regulated: the bodies which represent the interests of the profession also 
regulate and discipline their members.  
Table 2.8: Accountancy profession (average of 2014-15) 
 
  All fraud offenders Reg. detected fraud offenders Detected fraud loss / yr 
Regulator Population # % of all 
offenders 
# / 
100,000 # 
% of all 
offenders 
# / 
100,000 Loss £ 
Loss / 
member £ 
ICAEW 144,000 14 6% 9 10 4% 6.9 11,480,963 79.73 
ACCA 633,000 43 32% 7 33 25% 5.2 45,471,465 71.83 
CIMA 227,000 1 17% 0 1 17% 0.4 0 0.00 
CIPFA 14,000 0 0% 0 0 0% 0.0 0 0.00 
FRC (1,018,000) 1 0% 0 0 0% 0 7,500,000 7.37 
Total 1,018,000 58 15% 6 44 12% 4 64,452,428 63.31 
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2.3 Conclusion: The Dominance of Non-Criminal Justice 
It is evident from the data that non-criminal justice dominates the regulation of fraud. 
Sutherland. Table 2.4 showed the different categories of regulators set against statistics for 
offenders in general and for fraud dealt with through the criminal justice system. The 
section also illustrated fraudster offender rates amongst different occupations. The 
differences in fraudster offender rates between the professions clearly requires further 
research (See Recommendation 1).  The next section will now explore the regulators of 
fraud in more depth.  
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3. Regulatory Justice 
This section considers the regulatory justice systems that deal with fraud related cases. A 
careful assessment of the regulatory landscape led the research team to investigate 128 
bodies and from these identified 72 that regularly deal with fraud perpetrated by 
individuals.10 Some of these bodies also publish details of cases they deal with. These were 
assessed and all cases against individuals were added to a database, with a focus upon the 
years 2014 and 2015. A total of 720 fraud related cases were recorded for 2014-15 including 
27 cases prosecuted by the FCA, GLA and MCA. Before some of the attributes of their 
systems for dealing with fraud related cases are considered, this section will first consider 
the types of fraud related cases that are dealt with.  
3.1 Types of Fraud in the Professions 
One of the issues that attracted the researchers to this project was the possibility that 
regulatory bodies were dealing with fraud related cases that should and could be dealt with 
by the criminal justice system. There have been high profile cases in the media involving 
persons who had been sanctioned for significant frauds by regulatory bodies. For example in 
2012 the FSA published a decision in relation to a Mr. Ravi Sinha, a senior executive in a 
private equity firm. Mr. Sinha had, in the words of the FSA (2012), ‘fraudulently obtained’ 
just under £1.4 million. His punishment from the FSA was a financial penalty just short of £3 
million and an order banning him from working in financial services. There was, however, no 
criminal prosecution, raising questions of equity that the Daily Mirror (2012) summed up in 
a front page headline: ‘Call this justice? City banker steals £1.4m... no charge. Shop worker 
steals £10k... 9 months' jail’. 
Regulators do not publish offending statistic analysed by offence type. Therefore the 
determination of whether regulatory bodies are substituting the criminal justice system 
required a detailed assessment of individual judgments. 3,750 cases heard in 2014 and 2015 
were reviewed and fraudulent behaviour was evident in 720. In assessing each case the 
researchers considered the core facts of the case and whether there was a prima facie case 
for an offence under the Fraud Act, other fraud related legislation or the tort of deceit. In-
particular the researchers were conscious of comparing potential cases to those with similar 
facts which have been successfully prosecuted or pursued in the criminal courts. It is 
nevertheless important to note that the level of information available means that although 
there was enough for the researchers to identify prima facie fraud cases, the reality of the 
facts, the mens rea of the person and public interest factors in any individual case might 
mitigate against prosecution. From these cases the researchers identified 20 categories of 
fraud, based upon beneficiary, victim and the characteristics of the fraud. All of these 
categories are set out in Table 3.1. The researchers took a different path to the only 
previous work in this area by Smith (2004) who explored how Australian professions dealt 
                                                          
10
 A full list of these bodies and their functions is published with a database alongside this report.  
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with dishonest conduct, developing a continuum of 10 categories of dishonest conduct. 
These were a useful starting point, but did not reflect the diversity and the differences of 
the fraud related cases that were identified.  
Table 3.1: Professions fraud typology 
 
Beneficiary Code Victim Category Examples 
Self 
S1 Client 
Fraudulent abuse of client 
funds or assets for own / 
conspirators' benefit 
Overcharging, withdrawing money from client 
account for personal use 
S2 Client Conflict of interest against 
clients for own benefit 
Arranging deals to maximise own commission 
but not in best interest of client, engaging 
professional contractor in which have interest / 
own to detriment of client 
S3 Client 
Marketed investment fraud 
for own / conspirators' 
benefit 
Mass marketing fraud, investment scams 
S4 
Client / 
market 
Financial market 
manipulation for own / 
conspirators' benefit 
Insider dealing, market abuse by manipulating 
share dealings, LIBOR manipulation, FX 
manipulation 
S5 Client Mis-selling services Misleading advertising, exaggerated claims for 
efficacy of treatment 
S6 Supplier, 
provider 
Fraud against suppliers, 
contractors, lenders for own 
benefit 
Dishonestly failing to pay counsel or other 
professionals, insurance fraud, mortgage fraud 
S7 
Betting 
firms,  
employer 
Gambling related corruption 
Match fixing, race fixing, prohibited conflict of 
interest gambling on own matches / 
competition 
S8 Opposing 
litigant 
Dishonesty in proceedings, 
contempt of court, 
perverting course of justice, 
dishonesty at tribunal for 
own / conspirators' benefit 
Lying to the courts in applications, written or 
statements 
S9 HMG 
Fraud against HMG for own / 
conspirators' benefit 
Cheating the Revenue, tax evasion, false 
accounting, practitioner prescription / 
treatment fraud, immigration offences - false 
documents, sham marriages 
S10 Employer, 
client 
Misrepresentation to 
disguise own inadequate 
performance to maintain 
employment status, pospects 
and income 
Lying to clients, firm, court or others about 
work completed, progress of case, falsifying 
audit file, submitting client tax returns late, 
falsifying management reports, falsifying 
students' exam performance data 
S11 
Employer, 
professional 
body, client 
Professional qualification / 
status fraud for own benefit 
Falsified qualifications, exam cheating, falsified 
exam certificate, falsified professional 
membership, fabricated CV, falsified 
references, falsified institute application, 
falsified position in firm, operating regulated 
activity when prohibited or not qualified or 
authorised by regulator, falsified audit report 
using identity of genuine auditor or audit firm 
S12 
Event 
organiser, 
sporting 
body, 
competitors 
Doping to enhance sporting 
performance 
Use of proscribed drugs or treatments to 
enhance training capabilities or performance in 
competition, use of recreational proscribed 
drugs such as cocaine 
S13 Employer 
Occupational fraud or theft 
or conflict of interest against 
employer for own / 
conspirators' benefit 
Paying firm's money to self or others, sick pay, 
expense, fee, private work 
Employer E1 Client Fraud on behalf of employer Abuse of client funds 
 THE FRAUD JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
 Page 28 
 
Beneficiary Code Victim Category Examples 
E2 Client Misrepresent qualifications 
of firm 
Falsely claim audit registration 
Client 
C1 Client, other Fraudulent abuse of client 
funds to benefit other clients 
Paying a client's damages using funds from 
another client for altruistic purposes 
C2 Employer Falsifying treatment 
eligibility to benefit patients 
Falsifying prescriptions, providing or arranging 
free treatment to ineligible patients 
C3 NA Facilitating exam cheating Supplying or rehearsing answers to exam 
questions 
C4 Employer Facilitating gambling fraud 
for client's benefit 
Overpaying winnings, knowingly admitting 
banned gambler to casino 
Unrelated 
to 
profession 
N NA 
Fraud behaviour not directly 
related to regulated activity 
to benefit self or others 
Train ticket fraud, blue badge abuse, tenancy 
fraud, hiding assets in bankruptcy, handling 
proceeds of spouse's crime, benefit fraud, 
historic employee crime, personal tax evasion 
 
 
Table 3.2 below provides the statistics for the number of cases dealt with by fraud type as 
coded in table 3.1 above. The most frequent offence is S11, qualification fraud at 30 percent 
of all cases. The category includes exam cheating, falsified qualifications, dishonest CVs and 
applications to employers and professional institutes, and failure to declare adverse findings 
by other bodies including criminal. 60 of the 120 qualification fraud offenders are medics 
and 28 are accountants. This type of fraudulent behaviour could also result in serious 
physical harm, when the misrepresentations are by medical practitioners. The harm arising 
from fraud is usually measured in monetary terms, this analysis highlights that 
consequences could be more serious. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S13, employee or occupational fraud is the most frequent of the group of frauds which have 
a direct, immediate financial impact on the victim, in this case the employer. 57 of the 
offenders are medics, indicating the susceptibility of the NHS to this type of fraud. The harm 
caused by occupational fraud in the sample ranged from a pharmacist perpetrating a £57 
cash registry fraud and a teacher who falsified GP notes to claim £13,791 of sick pay to 
Kweku Adoboli, the infamous investor, who was reported to the FCA and the City of London 
Police by his employer, UBS, for defrauding the bank of £1.5 billion, and was the subject of 
Teresa Pukiello was banned from teaching after a disciplinary hearing at the 
National College for Teaching and Leadership. She had falsified her CV to state 
she had been previously been an Assistant Head of a school earning £12,000 
more than she actually earned in order to secure a higher paid position at a new 
school. She had also fabricated a reference supporting these claims (National 
Colleges for Teaching and Leadership, 2015a).   
 
 THE FRAUD JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
 Page 29 
 
co-operative, parallel regulatory and criminal enforcement (FCA, 2015, case reference 
KMA01036). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance fraud, S10, is the third biggest category. It involves the perpetration of a 
misrepresentation to disguise the offender’s inadequate performance in executing their 
duties. The majority are medics (38) followed by solicitors (4). In most cases the dishonesty 
is a consequence of mistakes, incompetence or indolence. Having recognised the problems, 
the offenders subsequently try to cover up their failures by falsifying documents. Like the 
qualification frauds, performance fraud could also lead to catastrophic consequences, such 
as in falsifying patient records to indicate drugs had been administered when they had not. 
Less hazardous, but nevertheless still serious examples are lawyers who fabricate court 
documents to create the pretence that they have progressed cases, and teachers who boost 
their performance statistics by falsifying exam statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jude Godson was employed in 2003 as the in-house accountant of a small firm of 
solicitors, Harrow Solicitors & Advocates. From 2007 he also commenced training 
as a solicitor. In 2008 the firm discovered that Godson had written out cheques to 
himself for £22,000. He was summarily dismissed from his role as the firm’s 
accountant but he was allowed to remain with the firm until July 2009 to complete 
his training contract. Subsequent investigations by the firm revealed that Godson 
had conspired with his wife and the office cleaner to defraud the firm of a total of 
£300,900 by writing out cheques to himself, his wife and the cleaner and forging 
the signatures of the firm’s partners. Godson developed an innovative scheme to 
hide the fraud. He deliberately withheld client invoices to cause the firm to run 
short of cash on the Office Account. He then issued the client invoices and advised 
the partners they were entitled to transfer money from the Client Account to the 
Office Account. He raised the cheques for the transfers but paid the money to 
himself or his conspirators. He then offered loans to the firm to cover the short 
term shortfall in cash using the firm’s own money. Once the client money had 
been received, the loan was paid back to Godson. The firm successfully sued 
Godson and his co-offenders in 2011 and reported the case to the SRA. The SDT 
struck him off the roll of solicitors in 2015. The matter was not reported to the 
police. The firm was wound up in 2014 (SDT Case No. Case No. 11276-2014). 
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Table 3.2: Fraud types detected by professions regulators (2014-15) 
 
Code Beneficiary Fraud type 
Offenders / 
yr 
% 
S11 Self Qualification fraud 120.5 29.6% 
S13 Self Employee fraud 91.0 22.3% 
S10 Self Disguise poor performance 49.0 12.0% 
S1 Self Abuse of client funds 33.5 8.2% 
S12 Self Sports doping 20.5 5.0% 
S7 Self Gambling corruption 14.5 3.6% 
C3 Client Facilitating exam cheating 13.5 3.3% 
S5 Self Mis-selling 11.0 2.7% 
S3 Self Investment fraud 9.5 2.3% 
S9 Self Defraud HMG 7.5 1.8% 
S2 Self Conflict of interest 7.0 1.7% 
N Self Not related to profession 4.5 1.1% 
S4 Self Market manipulation 4.5 1.1% 
S6 Self Fraud against suppliers 4.5 1.1% 
C2 Client Medical treatment 4.5 1.1% 
E1 Employer Abuse of client funds to fund firm 3.5 0.9% 
C4 Client Facilitating gambling fraud by client 3.0 0.7% 
S8 Self Dishonesty in proceedings 2.5 0.6% 
C1 Client 
Abuse of client funds to benefit other 
client 
1.0 0.2% 
E2 Employer Misrepresent firm's qualifications 1.0 0.2% 
U Unknown Unknown 1.0 0.2% 
  Total 408 100% 
 
 
Solicitor Joanne Coughlan was instructed by a client to represent him in a personal 
injury claim against his employer. Proceedings were issued but Coughlan failed to 
serve the required medical evidence, contrary to the Civil Procedure Rules Part 16. 
The defendant’s solicitor, HD, sought and obtained a Court Order unless the 
medical evidence was provided within twenty-one days, the complainant would be 
debarred from relying upon medical evidence in his claim. Coughlan did not 
provide the evidence by the due date. HD immediately notified Coughlan of the 
failure. Alerted to her error, the following day she prepared two letters purporting 
to serve the medical evidence with falsified dates. HD wrote to Coughlan querying 
the letters. A partner in Coughlan’s firm opened the letter and investigated the 
emerging dispute. She was dismissed and reported to the SRA which referred the 
case to the SDT. She was struck off for dishonesty. The problem would have been 
resolved by making a late submission to court. Coughlan’s employer regarded her 
as “….a hard-working and valued member of the team….staggered by what has 
happened….a one off situation” (SDT Case No. 11207-2013) 
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Table 3.3 summarises the data to clearly show that the fraudsters themselves are 
overwhelmingly the beneficiaries (92%). The principal motivation is formed out of personal 
crises, selfish needs and ambitions. For a minority, 6%, the principal beneficiaries of the 
frauds are others, either clients or employers. The definition of client for this analysis is 
broad: it includes clients of solicitors, doctors’ patients and teachers’ students. The 
fraudsters’ motivations are not homogeneous; they range from a blend of altruistic with a 
significant component of selfish purposes to highly altruistic. The frauds benefitting the 
clients take two forms: facilitation which has an increased selfish component and 
perpetration which is dominated by altruism. An example of the facilitator is the solicitor 
who assists clients’ mortgage frauds for the standard or modestly enhanced conveyancing 
fee. An example of the altruistic perpetrator is the teacher who corrects a student’s exam 
paper before submitting it to the examination board. All the frauds benefitting the employer 
in the research sample involved solicitors “borrowing” money from client accounts to 
resolve their firms’ cash flow problems.  
Table 3.3: Beneficiaries of fraud (2014-15) 
 
Beneficiary Offenders / yr % 
Self 376 92% 
Client 22 5% 
Employer 5 1% 
Unknown 6 1% 
Total 408 100% 
 
 
Another important finding is the very small number (4.5/year) of cases dealt with by 
regulators of fraud perpetrated by persons outside of their directly regulated activities, not 
dealt with by the criminal justice system, but picked up by the regulator. Indeed historically 
some regulators dealt with behaviours which would be considered well beyond professional 
areas by today’s standards, such as the case in the early Twentieth Century of a midwife 
been struck off for life for cohabiting with her lover (Miller, 1962: 538). More recently, 
however, there was a prominent case in the media in which Jonathan Burrows was found to 
have evaded rail fares worth £43,000 (The Guardian, 2014). Burrows was sued by 
Southeastern Railways and settled out of court. Although the fraud had no direct link to his 
work as an investment banker, he was banned by the FCA under the “fit and proper” test. 
Given the small number of cases, an important question is whether this is because 
regulators are less interested in such cases or such referrals are rare? The small number of 
interviews with regulators suggested there could be barriers, but some cases might be of 
interest. For instance in discussing a hypothetical case of a teacher who has engaged in 
insurance fraud, but has not been prosecuted:  
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So our trigger would be that the school had dismissed the person, which probably 
hasn’t happened in this case. The member of the public, ie the insurance firm might 
decide to notify us. They might think to themselves this teacher is so flagrant in their 
way in which they’re doing this, they’ve now sold 20 cars under an insurance scam or 
they’ve made 20 insurance claims. But I would question why they weren’t taking the 
criminal action against that, at which point we’d be very happy to be notified by 
them. I think the risk is that if they haven’t got the evidence to do that are we going 
to have the evidence? So my question would be one about evidence, and then 
proportionality, because in a way for us I think the proportion of it…because we’ve 
only got this sanction of prohibition for life, then that’s why we won’t normally 
consider cases unless the schools dismiss them because we say, well, if you haven’t 
dismissed them at school level why on earth would we think it’s right to be 
prohibiting them for life for the whole profession (National college for Teaching and 
Leadership Representative). 
If the case had been successfully dealt with under contempt of court, however, the view was 
much clearer:  
…and would be likely to fall into the “conduct likely to bring the profession into 
disrepute” (National College for Teaching and Leadership Representative).  
Indeed other regulatory decisions have greater currency amongst other regulators as was 
illustrated by another scenario of a teacher sanctioned for gambling related fraud and 
corruption by the Horse Racing Authority:  
But certainly serious offences involving gambling would be ones that we would be 
considering… I think if they notified us and they said we’ve banned this person for 
life from gambling, from attending horse races, and they happen to be a teacher, I 
think we probably would… We haven’t had a case like that (National College for 
Teaching and Leadership Representative). 
The Gambling Commission were much more open to potentially fraudulent acts, noting:  
We apply has it affected the gaming, has the offence taken place within the gaming 
environment, and if it hasn’t, unless it’s a really serious one, money laundering or 
something like that where they’ve fraudulently stolen money off a vulnerable 
person, generally speaking, no. They would have something from us, whether it be 
an ATC (Advice to Conduct) or a warning, just to make them aware that we are 
aware of what’s taken place (Gambling Commission Representative). 
Similarly a written response from the Security Industry Authority, illustrated how they might 
consider information about the integrity of a licensed person under their jurisdiction:  
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We will not normally seek out information about you that may be held by 
organisations we work with (such as the police and local authorities) which has not 
been tested in criminal courts. But if such information is offered to us, or we have 
other information from our own sources (e.g. SIA Warnings, County Court 
judgements), then we will consider it. In this context ‘information’ will normally 
mean compelling evidence of relevant criminal activity (as defined in the list of 
offences on pages 52 to 69 of this booklet), anti-social behaviour, criminal 
association or activity that is likely to bring the industry into disrepute or indicates 
that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold a licence (Personal 
Communication). 
It would seem therefore that such referrals are rare but possible, particularly if the case 
could be linked to the professional standards required of a regulator. More research is 
required to determine the appetite amongst regulatory bodies for such cases and what 
would be required to secure their interest (See Recommendation 1).  The brief examination 
of this issue in this preliminary research also highlights a hierarchy of designations of 
‘fraudster’, from criminal conviction at the top to intelligence at the bottom. This issue will 
be returned to later in this report.  
Most of the fraud types listed in Table 3.2 could be criminally prosecuted but, as the 
following examples of employee fraud, abuse of client funds and qualification fraud show, 
recourse to the criminal justice system is highly inconsistent. This means that punishment is 
unpredictable and inequitable in terms of proportionality. 
The first three examples illustrate how minor offences which cause relatively little financial 
harm can severely impact on the lives of the offenders with loss of career, a criminal record 
and imprisonment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even exaggerated qualifications to secure employment, are occasionally dealt with as 
criminal cases (see Cifas, n.d.). The following example involves a junior scientist employed 
by the NHS. 
 
Pharmacist Steven Sharra falsified till receipts to misappropriate drugs worth £20. He 
was reported to the police by his employer, convicted and received a community 
order. He was subsequently excluded by the General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC 
reference 2058880). 
Solicitor Claire Louise O'Brien falsified records to misappropriate £1,200 from a client 
which was refunded by her employer. She was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, 
struck off by the SDT and paid £1,600 in hearing costs (SDT reference 11235-2014). 
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The following three contrasting examples demonstrate that serious frauds can lead to heavy 
regulatory penalties but avoid criminalisation and imprisonment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is evident that some low value frauds are prosecuted and some high value frauds are not. 
Some minor offenders are punished twice, some egregious offenders are not. The following 
section explores some of the issues which influence the choice of justice route and 
contribute to this paradox. 
3.2 Choice of Route – Regulatory or Criminal 
Further research is required to fully understand how fraud cases come to the attention of 
professions regulators. However it is apparent that they receive referrals from consumers, 
business clients, employers, other regulators and routine audits. The SRA in particular 
discovers misconduct through its practice inspection programme. It is not clear how many 
detections arise from whistleblowers, media vigilance, court monitoring, criminal record 
checks through the Disclosure and Barring Service and the use of commercial databases 
described in Section 5. This section explores just some of the issues which contribute to this 
Finance Director Nicholas Hill abused his position to defraud his employer of 
£250,000 using carefully planned purchasing and asset sale frauds. He was not 
reported to the police but was referred to the accountancy regulator, the ICAEW. He 
was struck off, fined £25,000 and ordered to pay £33,846 in costs for the case 
hearing (ICAEW, February 2014). 
Kevin Allen was the FD of a financial firm. He defrauded his employer of £1,000,000 
by falsifying accounts records and fabricating numerous payment authorisations to a 
company he controlled. He was not prosecuted, but was barred from regulated 
activities by the FCA and fined £248,500 (FCA reference FS/2012/0019). 
Solicitor Richard Wilkes systematically defrauded clients using teeming and lading 
methods and inflated bills to the accounts of deceased clients by a factor of 20. The 
client losses claimed on the solicitors Compensation Fund totalled £1,262,473. He 
was not reported to the police but was struck off by the SDT (SDT reference 11281-
2014). 
Mohammed Ghaffar applied for promotion to Senior Biomedical Scientist at 
Pinderfields General Hospital. The post required an MSc in biomedical science. 
Ghaffar obtained an accredited certificate from a colleague, Mr Masara, forged his 
own name on the document and submitted it with his application.  The hospital 
discovered the forgery and the police were called. He received a 6 month prison 
sentence suspended for 12 months, a 200 hour community order and paid £1,000 
towards prosecution costs. The Health and Care Professions Council cautioned 
Ghaffar which remained on his file for 3 years (HCPC reference BS47173 ). 
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punishment inequity through the choice of justice route and the apparent reluctance of the 
regulators to engage with the criminal justice system. 
Regulatory body with authority, capability and willingness to deal with it 
The first determinant of whether a regulatory route can be considered is whether a 
regulator exists for the profession. Some professions have professional associations which 
represent their members’ interests. They may also have codes of practice and membership 
contracts which allow the association to impose minor disciplinary sanctions or dismissal, 
but they do not have the authority to prevent individuals from practising. Examples are 
university lecturers and engineers. The only practical alternatives in these circumstances are 
the state civil and criminal regimes. 
The regulatory body must have the capacity and capability to deal with fraud cases. The 
research encountered professions regulators for which there is no evidence of policies, 
governance structures or disciplinary cases relating to fraudulent misconduct, for example 
the Institute of Financial Accountants (IFA) and the Institute of Paralegals (IOP). Associated 
with a capable capacity is willingness. Some regulators may be unwilling to take on fraud 
cases because of negative experiences. If a regulator does not have the confidence, will or 
appropriate competencies it may refer incidents and complainants to Action Fraud. The 
large differentials in case handling between regulators in Table 2.7 suggests that these 
capacity factors are influencing the quality of regulatory oversight. 
An analysis of the Action Fraud complaints data is required to determine the volume which 
is associated with the regulated professions, the number of referrals from regulators and 
indeed the number Action Fraud refer to the regulators, if any. A concern is that complaints 
disappear into the black hole of the criminal regime, particularly if they are deemed by 
Action Fraud or the police to be within the province of regulators. More research is required 
to understand the rationale for such decisions by regulators and the police (See 
Recommendation 1).  
Regulatory is easier 
As discussed in Section 6, the judicial quality of the regulatory process is lower than the 
criminal. Because the criminal process can result in persons losing their freedom, the 
criminal process is more transparent, has more checks and balances, and demands a high 
standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt. All the regulators examined operate to lower 
standard of proof, except the SDT and BTAS which deal with lawyers. Most regulators use 
some form of hearings, but some do not, for example the Security Industry Authority and 
the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. Some, such as Phonepay Plus, hold private hearings. 
Furthermore regulators’ allegations refer to its codes, typically honesty, integrity and 
bringing the profession into disrepute. The honesty code is generally attached to fraud cases 
and is the most difficult to prove with the two limb Twinsectra test. A relevant ruling from 
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the Privy Council in Tait v Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons [2003] UKPC 34states that:  
"For all professionals, a finding of dishonesty lies at the top of the spectrum of misconduct." 
Dishonesty leads to automatic professional banishment unless there are exceptional 
circumstances. Regulators have a distinct advantage and frequently lay several charges so 
that, if the dishonesty test fails, other charges are likely to succeed. The criminal law does 
not have this lesser option. 
An NHS Fraud Investigator noted:  
there's also the likelihood of a sanction when you're looking at the balance of how 
the burden of proof, which I think is...because I had this discussion with the GMC, 
which I think it works on balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable 
doubt.  So on the face of it in terms of looking at their fitness to practice it should be 
a lot more achievable to get a sanction, which does have kind of real consequences. 
A case of a medical doctor was also illustrated by the NHS Fraud Investigator who had been 
working privately while supposed to be on sick leave. The fraud amounted to over £20,000. 
The case was pursued in the criminal courts first, but the doctor found not guilty. It was, 
however, referred to the General Medical Council too, where a fitness to practice hearing 
took place and he was found ‘guilty’ and his registration was suspended for nine months. 
Third, the capability and willingness to deal with a case often contrasts to a criminal justice 
system that is much less interested.  
…if it's a healthcare professional there's a requirement of the matter to be reported 
to them and then it's a matter for them to consider whether they're going to 
investigate it or not and nine times out of ten they will… (NHS Fraud Investigator).  
The desk research also identified several cases where the criminal process failed and the 
regulators succeeded. In one SDT case, Nasir Ilyas was struck off and received a £170,000 
penalty for his involvement in £13 million fraud (SDT case reference 10840-2011). Ilyas was 
acquitted in the SFO case because he was unfit to plead. Pharmacist Trevor Barnes 
misappropriated £4,548 worth of drugs from his employer, the police investigated and took 
no further action, the General Pharmaceutical Council removed him from their register. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alberto Micalizzi was the Chief Executive of Dynamic Decisions Capital Management, 
a hedge fund management firm which went into liquidation. He misled investors, 
lenders, the FSA and others. He deliberately hid the fund's losses to attract new 
investors by buying a bond and then artificially revaluing it to create a $400m gain. 
The FCA did not find sufficient evidence for a prosecution. The FCA banned him and 
fined him £2,700,000 (FCA reference AXM02173). 
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Penalties can be as strong as criminal justice sanctions 
The penalties available to regulators to deal with breaches are often as potent as the non-
custodial sentences handed out by the criminal justice system, if not more so. Those 
disciplined by regulators may face suspension, banishment from the profession and heavy 
fines, whereas the criminal justice system may only result in cautions, community orders or 
modest fines. Professionals tend to earn good salaries so that the indefinite loss of earnings 
is often worth more than short term penalties. The immeasurable secondary penalties 
associated with stigmatisation compound the sanction (Braithwaite, 1983). In the following 
case, had Karen Wilson been offered the choice, would she have preferred a suspended 
prison sentence or a professional life sentence? 
 
 
 
The potency of regulatory sanctions may be sufficient for minor offences, but may be 
insufficient for those in high power roles ‘City’ financial services, who will remain very 
wealthy and comfortable irrespective of regulatory sanctions. 
 
 
 
Regulatory more cost effective  
Regulatory justice is usually more cost effective than criminal prosecutions. It is almost 
certainly lower cost than civil litigation. The costs can escalate for complex, high value cases 
and the respondent appeals to the High Court. The Farrell case above took 6 years from 
investigation to appeal. However, importantly, they are low cost for complainants, whether 
organisations or individuals, who do not fund the cases. Complainants will have to invest a 
modest amount of time in supporting the allegations, providing witness statements and 
possibly appearing at a tribunal. The police and the CPS may require more support because 
they are generalists and therefore unfamiliar with the operations of accountancy practices, 
law firms and hospitals.  
As one interviewee from the NHS noted:  
I think generally in these cases there's perhaps a lesser type of organisation to invest 
in a case that's going to end up in court because at the end of the day the trust is 
Karen Wilson was a senior occupational therapist who perpetrated an expense fraud 
against her employer worth £2,788. She was not prosecuted but was removed from 
the register of the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC reference OT14127). 
 
Robin Farrell was the Chief Executive of an investment firm. He syphoned off £6 
million in secret profits from clients’ investments on one £15 million transaction. 
Farrell was investigated and, following an appeal, was fined £650,000 (FCA 2015). 
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going to have to pay for my time and everyone else's time to get that case through 
court. They may take a view that actually we've got them off our books, we've 
dismissed them, or they've resigned, we've referred them to their professional body; 
in some circumstances they might say we've actually recovered our monies, that's 
enough for us; and unless they can see some public interest factor and also from a 
trust prospective an advantage to them to say we're going to stump up and fund the 
prosecution, there's perhaps a shift in their willingness to do that now that wasn't 
there perhaps a few years ago.  I think the trusts are a lot more cash strapped these 
days and obviously I think that rationale obviously understandably impacts upon 
their decisions about where they see cases ultimately ending up (NHS Fraud 
Investigator). 
The costs of supporting a criminal prosecution may contribute to the apparent reluctance of 
regulators to refer cases to the police. Regulators have the advantage that their cases are 
predominantly under their control. All the regulators manage the investigation and the 
decisions to proceed to adjudication. Except for the BSB, GMC, SRA, and UKAD, the 
regulators also control the tribunal processes. The costs and outcomes are therefore 
relatively predictable. On the other hand, they are far less able to forecast costs and 
outcomes through the criminal process controlled by external agencies. This may explain 
why the research found only two cases of referrals to the police, both by the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority over the two years of 2014 and 2015 . One case involved a conspiracy 
to defraud the solicitors’ clients of £1 million over a 10 year period (SDT reference 11181-
2013). The other was an organised crime gang centred on a firm of solicitors which 
defrauded clients to the extent that the solicitors Compensation Fund was obliged to pay 
out over £13 million (SDT reference 10840-2011). 
Criminal justice system not interested  
The lack of interest by the police and CPS has been well documented (Attorney General, 
2006, p45, 68; Button, Lewis, Shepherd, Brooks and Wakefield, 2012). The police and CPS do 
not have the capability to deal with all the fraud related cases which are referred to them, 
therefore they have to prioritise. Research has illustrated, for example, that only around 650 
police staff are dedicated to economic crime (excluding financial investigation) which 
amounts to less than 0.3 percent of police staff (Button et al, 2015). Indeed in 2004 the 
Home Office published a circular on ‘Priorities for the Investigation of Fraud Cases’ (Home 
Office, 2004). This sets out detailed criteria for ‘priorities’ and ‘cases where a more cautious 
approach might be appropriate.’ Included in the cautious criterion are:  
Frauds more suitable for investigation by another enforcement or regulatory agency. 
Frauds that have already been investigated by the police or other enforcement 
agency or that have been the subject of regulatory proceedings, unless significant 
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new evidence has come to light or the previous investigation had a narrow remit 
that did not address all the relevant issues. 
Frauds where the likely eventual outcome, in terms of length of sentence and/or 
financial penalty, is not sufficient to justify the likely cost and effort of the 
investigation (Home Office, 2004). 
 
Thus the presence of a capable regulator acts as a ‘brake’ on police investigations prior to 
the commencement of an enquiry by the regulator, but especially afterwards. Low value 
frauds with minimal corresponding sentences are likely to fail the third of the above criteria 
unless the police department is experiencing a quiet period. The researchers issued FOI 
requests to a sample of police forces to gauge if local policies differed from the Home Office 
Circular guidance. Greater Manchester Police and West Mercia Police noted this guidance 
specifically in their responses, whilst the responses of others confirmed their criteria 
followed the same principles. Hampshire Police noted in their response:  
The police are unlikely to invest efforts into an occurrence that has already been 
investigated by a regulatory body i.e. Financial Conduct Authority/Serious Fraud 
Office. 
Similarly the Metropolitan Police noted:  
The general rule is that if a Regulatory body is investigating an allegation then there 
is unlikely to be a criminal investigation running alongside. This is to avoid 
duplication and also as the regulatory bodies have different powers to Police and 
they can look at the issue and establish if clear criminality has been identified. 
If they identify criminality they can be obliged to report this to Police for 
investigation and will then provide the evidence that they have obtained using their 
powers. It can also depend on the regulatory Body (SFO, FCA, OfQual, OFCOM, 
SRA….the list goes on). Most civil matters are prosecuted to a different standard of 
proof (on the balance of probabilities) which is a lower standard to a criminal 
prosecution (beyond a reasonable doubt), so therefore if a prosecution has failed in 
a lower court it is highly unlikely that any criminal investigation will take place. 
The police are only part of the route to a criminal prosecution. The CPS prosecutors are 
required to ensure cases meet their two stage ‘Full Code Test’ (Crown Prosecution Service, 
n.d.): evidence and public interest. If the police have not engaged in case, there will be no 
evidence. The public interest limb of the code includes three key elements which are similar 
to the police criteria: level of harm, cost of prosecution and proportionality. Thus low value 
cases are unlikely to proceed to prosecution. Cases referred to the police and CPS by 
regulators face additional hurdles. If the regulator has commenced an investigation using its 
own evidence gathering protocols to achieve the civil standard of proof, the CPS may view 
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the evidence as inadmissible in the criminal courts. If the regulator has already made a 
determination of guilt, the CPS may reject the case on its proportionality test because the 
regulatory penalty is sufficient or exceeds the Crown’s penalty. 
Survey findings  
The survey also re-enforced the issues identified above. Table 3.4 below highlights the 
reasons why counter fraud specialists pursued alternatives to criminal sanctions. 
Respondents could pick more than one. The most common reason was not enough evidence 
for a criminal prosecution, which was closely followed by lack of police interest, combined 
with CPS/SFO interest. Just over a quarter had a policy to pursue alternative routes.  
Table 3.4. Why counter fraud specialists use alternatives to criminal sanctions 
18. Generally, why did you pursue alternatives to criminal sanctions (multiple choice)? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Not enough evidence for a criminal prosecution 51.6% 63 
The police were not interested 45.1% 55 
The CPS / SFO were not interested 27.0% 33 
The policy is not to use the CJS 13.1% 16 
The policy is to use the CJS and other routes 27.9% 34 
Other (please specify) 19.7% 24 
answered question 122 
skipped question 24 
   
Maximising sanctions 
The mission of regulators is to control and modify the behaviour of its professional 
members, or remove them. From the regulator’s perspective, their objectives are satisfied 
by the processes within their control. Their concern is not the wider societal issues of 
general deterrence. For regulators engaging with the police and CPS to obtain the criminal 
label and prison sanctions is burdensome and very rare. 
Victims struggle to engage the police. Frustrated victims are increasingly turning to private 
prosecutions (Lewis et al, 2014). From the victim’s perspective, the regulatory systems are 
an alternative where there is a relevant body with the necessary capacity. They are lower 
cost, easier routes that use, in the main, a lower evidential standard than the criminal 
justice system. Their sanction capacities are limited but can be more potent than criminal 
penalties.  
Maximising sanctions is achieved by first seeking a criminal judgment, whether a police 
caution or a court conviction, because criminal findings are accepted by regulatory bodies as 
proof of misconduct and further regulatory sanctions are almost automatic, provided they 
are notified. 
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3.3 Modelling Regulatory Justice  
This section considers some of the characteristics of the regulators examined and identifies 
three models of regulatory justice. There are a significant number of occupations and 
sectors where a ‘licence’ is required to practise or operate which is contingent on 
compliance with codes of conduct. These bodies have systems of justice of varying 
sophistications that deal with transgressions of such codes. There are also some alternative 
systems of justice operating to deal with a variety of potential frauds committed by the 
public. At one extreme is what could be described as ‘Fixed Penalty Justice’, where decisions 
are made by investigators, administrators  or regulatory bodies as to whether a species of 
fraud has occurred and a relatively low level penalty is applied after no or very little 
independent evaluation of the case. Offenders are issued with penalties and can either 
accept or appeal.  
Next there is ‘Regulatory Administrative Justice’ where a body determines there has been 
‘fraudulent act’ but this process involves a degree of independent decision-making of 
varying sophistication and may allow the accused to make written and/or oral 
representations before a final decision and penalty is made. This model can also be further 
divided between private and public versions according to the publication of decisions. 
Finally there is ‘Regulatory Tribunal Justice’ where a case of fraud is considered in a tribunal 
type hearing where evidence is considered, guilt determined and penalties applied. These 
also vary in their degree of sophistication. For example at one extreme for solicitors there is 
the Law Society which is the professional association, a separate body called the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (SRA) which regulates them and deals administratively with low level 
misdemeanours. The SRA also investigates, prepares evidence and presents cases before 
another separate body, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT), which determines guilt and 
applies penalties. This compares to the British Horse Racing Authority where most of its 
disciplinary matters are dealt with by a separate section within the same organisation. 
Figure 3.1 sets out the models and the regulatory bodies which fit under each model. 
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Figure 3.1. Models of Non-Criminal Justice for Fraud 
Model of Justice Distinguishing Features Examples 
Fixed Penalty Justice  Government regulators. 
Simple and low level frauds.  
Low penalties.  
High volume.  
Outcomes focussed upon decision of 
investigators/administrators. 
Uniform penalties. 
Contested only if offender appeals. 
Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) - summary 
process  
Her Majesty's Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) - summary 
process  
NHS Business Services 
Authority (NHSBSA) - penalty 
charges for prescription fraud 
Transport for London (TfL) 
Regulatory 
Administrative Justice 
(Private) 
Government and delegated 
regulators. 
Full range of frauds.  
Low volume. 
Multiple review of decisions. 
Opportunities for offender to make 
written and/or oral representations. 
Guilt and penalties determined by 
staff separate from those 
investigating.  
Penalties tend to focus around 
suspension or revocation of licence. 
Names of persons ‘sanctioned’ are 
not publicised 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) - 
Licensing of regulated staff 
Driver and Vehicle Standards 
Agency (DVSA) 
Security Industry Authority 
(SIA) 
Bar Standards Board (BSB) 
General Medical Council 
(GMC) 
Marine Management 
Organisation (MMO) 
Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA) 
Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(SRA)  
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) 
Regulatory 
Administrative Justice 
(Public) 
Government regulators except the 
ASA. 
Predominantly focused on 
organisations. 
Full range of frauds.  
Low volume. 
Multiple review of decisions. 
Opportunities for offender to make 
written and/or oral representations. 
Guilt and penalties determined by 
staff separate from those 
investigating.  
Low to tough penalties.  
Names of persons ‘sanctioned’ are  
publicised 
Advertising Standards Agency 
(ASA) (Focus on organisations) 
Charity Commission (Focus on 
organisations) 
Claims Management 
Regulator (CMR) (Focus on 
organisations) 
Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) (Focus on 
organisations) 
Electoral Commission (Focus 
largely organisations, but 
individuals too) 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for 
Competition (Focus on 
organisations) 
Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) 
Gambling Commission  
 THE FRAUD JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
 Page 43 
 
Model of Justice Distinguishing Features Examples 
Gangmasters Licensing 
Authority (GLA) 
Insolvency Service (IS) 
Medicines and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) (Focus on 
organisations) 
OFWAT (Focus on 
organisations) 
Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Standards (PCS) 
Prudential Regulation 
Authority (Bank of England) 
(Focus on organisations) 
Regulatory Tribunal 
Justice  
Mix of government, delegated and 
self-regulation. 
Full range of frauds.  
Low volume.  
Clear distinctions between those 
responsible for investigation, 
prosecution, determination of guilt 
and allocation of penalties. 
Formal hearings where evidence 
presented/ contested and witnesses 
cross-examined. 
Low to tough penalties.  
 
Architects Registration Board 
(ARB) 
Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA) 
Bar Tribunals and Adjudication 
Service (BTAS) 
British Horseracing Authority 
(BHA) 
Civil Aviation Authority - ATOL 
(CAA) (Focus on organisations) 
Care Council for Wales (CCW) 
Chartered Institute of 
Management Accountants 
(CIMA) 
Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy 
(CIPFA) 
Chartered Insurance Institute 
(CII) 
Church of England (CoE) 
CILEx Regulation 
Civil Court 
Costs Lawyers Standards 
Board (CLSB) 
Council for Licensed 
Conveyancers (CLC) 
Cricket Discipline Commission  
Education Workforce Council 
(Wales) 
Election Court 
Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) 
Football Association (FA) 
General Chiropractic Council 
(GCC) 
General Dental Council (GDC) 
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Model of Justice Distinguishing Features Examples 
General Osteopathic Council 
(GOsC) 
General Optical Council (GOC) 
General Pharmaceutical 
Council (GPhC) 
Greyhound Board of Great 
Britain (GBGB) 
Health and Care Professions 
Council (HCPC) 
Independent Parliamentary 
Standards Authority (IPSA) 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW) 
Institute of Faculty of 
Actuaries (IFoA) 
Intellectual Property 
Regulation Board (IPReg) 
Judicial Conduct Investigations 
Office (JCIO) 
Medical Practitioners Tribunal 
Service (MPTS) 
National Anti-Doping Panel  
(NADP) [Sports Resolutions] 
National College for Teaching 
and Leadership (NCTL) 
National Federation of 
Property Professionals 
(NFoPP) 
Nursing and Midwifery Council 
(NMC) 
Phonepay Plus 
Property Ombudsman  (TPO) 
Royal College of Veterinary 
Surgeons (RCVS) 
Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors (RICS) 
Rugby Football League (RFL) 
Rugby Football Union (RFU) 
Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal  
(SDT) 
The Faculty Office 
Traffic Commissioners of 
Great Britain 
  
An example of the fixed penalty model of justice for fraud related offences are the penalties 
issued to patients for wrongly claiming financial assistance for the payment of prescriptions 
and other goods and services where there are charges. These charges were established 
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under the National Health Service (Penalty Charge) Regulations 1999. Under these 
regulations a person found to have wrongfully claimed for an exemption is liable to a charge 
up to five times the original amount to a maximum of £100. In England there are several 
categories of persons who are exempt from NHS charges including children, those 16-18 and 
in fulltime education, pregnant women and those over 60. If a person claims an exemption 
the treatment or prescription is usually given. Clearly this provides an opportunity for some 
to be dishonest and claim to fit one of the fee exempting categories. The NHS Business 
Services Authority employs investigators to detect such claims and those identified by them 
are issued with Penalty Charges and, as table 2.4 earlier illustrated, over 600,000 penalties 
were issued in the most recent year.  It is important to note that, like many other types of 
penalty notice (parking tickets for example), once the defendant is informed they have the 
right to contest the decision or pay. If they do contest, a review of the decision takes place, 
but within the NHS. The defendant also has the option to let the NHS pursue civil action to 
recover the charge and contest it in the courts. Little is known on the extent these charges 
are contested or actually paid.  
An example of Regulatory Administrative Justice: Private relates to the CAA and the 
licensing of persons under its jurisdiction. There are a variety of roles which require a licence 
to perform them, for example aircrew and engineers. Evidence of dishonesty and other 
relevant poor behaviour related to the licensing can result in the loss of a licence, 
suspension etc. Where information comes to the attention of the CAA this is investigated 
and, if proven, enforcement action is undertaken. Many uncontentious decisions are 
undertaken by the regulatory staff, but licence holders can challenge these decisions 
resulting in formal reviews, ultimately by CAA Board members. The uncontested decisions 
remain confidential but the contested are published with anonymised identities, for 
example Mr T. For instance, one case uncovered during this research surrounded a Mr H 
and his Aircraft Maintenance Licence. An anonymous report to the CAA had alleged Mr H 
had lied about his work experience in his application.  Mr H contested the allegations with 
the support of the Safety Regulation Group. The decision of the board members, however, 
was essentially to allow Mr H to reapply (CAA, 2014). The number of proven CAA cases that 
are fraud related cannot be determined because the CAA does not publish all cases, nor 
does it produce an analysis of offence types. This lack of transparency is a dominant feature 
of the other regulators within this category. 
It is important to note one slight variation on the private model. The SIA, for example, as 
illustrated earlier might revoke a licence of a person if evidence came to light of 
engagement in fraud related activities. These decisions would not be publicised. However, 
the SIA does publish a searchable register of authorised persons which includes those who 
have had their licence revoked. However, the search requires the user knows the identity of 
the person and the entry only provides information on the date of revocation, not the 
reason for it.   
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The FCA regulates the financial sector and is an example of Regulatory Administrative 
Justice: Public. Numerous financial roles require persons to have appropriate FCA 
authorisations and to abide by their rules and regulations. Financial firms also need FCA 
approval to operate. A complaint or evidence of breach of regulations leads to the 
appointment of investigators. If there is evidence of wrongdoing they produce a Preliminary 
Investigation Report which is sent to the individual or firm who have 28 days to respond. 
Should the response not satisfy the investigator’s concerns, a report is sent to the 
Regulatory Decision Committee (RDC). The RDC has practitioners and non-practitioners who 
consider the evidence independently of the investigators. If it considers there should be a 
sanction it sends out a warning notice to the firm or individual with the evidence, who then 
have 14 days to respond in writing or by oral evidence. The RDC then makes its final decision 
and a Decision/Final Notice is published on its website (http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/enforcement-information-guide). At any stage in the process there can also 
be settlement discussions.  
The National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL) is an example of Tribunal 
Regulatory Justice. The NCTL is responsible for a variety of functions related to teaching 
profession, including regulating the professional conduct of teachers in England.  Teachers 
can face disciplinary action if they engage in: unacceptable professional conduct, conduct 
that may bring the profession into disrepute or conviction for a relevant offence. 
Unacceptable professional conduct is a broad category that captures dishonesty and fraud 
behaviours including:  false expense claims, fabricating qualifications or amending pupil 
assessments to improve grades. Consideration of these offences does not require a prior 
criminal finding (National College for Teaching and Leadership, 2015b).  
The NCTL does require, however, that offenders are reported by their schools and they are 
not obliged to do so. Once the NCTL receives a case, it is assessed by their investigators. If 
there is sufficient evidence, which usually means that the allegation falls within NCTL’s 
jurisdiction and, if proven, would likely lead to a prohibition order, the case is case managed 
by solicitors. The NCTL then conducts a disciplinary panel in public. Some cases are heard in 
private because they relate to vulnerable individuals, sex and inappropriate relationships. 
Evidence is presented by the NCTL legal team, witnesses are cross-examined and the 
defendant has the opportunity to be represented and defend themselves. At the end of the 
hearing the presiding panel (three members, of which at least one lay person and one 
teacher) determine guilt and recommend a sanction. Unlike most other bodies in this 
category the Secretary of State has to endorse the decision and can (and in a very small 
number of cases does) adjust the decision. All decisions relating to misconduct are 
published on the NCTL website.     
In reviewing all the Regulatory Tribunal Justice type cases the following issues were 
identified:  
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● Significant variations in the processes between regulators means that the quality of 
justice is contingent on the sector or profession; 
● Variable standards of transparency, independence and oversight; 
● Variable standards of proof from no standard to criminal standard; 
● Variable appeals and in some cases questionable appeals processes; 
● Variable publications policies which limit transparency; 
● Variable sanction capacities; 
● Cases that have already been determined by the criminal justice system either as 
cautions or by the courts are usually automatically accepted as proof of guilt; 
● It is common for the defendant not to be present at hearings;  
● It is common for the defendant not to be represented;  
● Those that are represented use a mix of lawyers and trade union representatives;  
● In almost all cases a guilty verdict is returned; 
● Absence of analysis of offence types and therefore threats; and  
● Absence of meaningful performance, outcome and impact analyses. 
 
Many case reports show how the tribunals justify their decisions. If respondents were 
absent at hearings, the reports explain the tribunal’s justification for proceeding with the 
case. There is also evidence of tribunals going out of their way to support the defendant. For 
instance, one of the researchers observed a case at the Bar Standards Board Disciplinary 
Tribunal where the ill defendant, who represented himself, participated by Skype. There 
were many examples in the cases assessed of defendants who were unrepresented by 
professionals such as lawyers or trade union representatives. The SDT estimated about half 
the defendants were represented. Indeed legal aid is usual for such cases so defendant’s 
rely on trade union or association membership, insurance or pro bono support. It was 
suggested to the researchers while observing one hearing by a barrister that this can be 
important because respondents struggle to compete against the high quality lawyers 
engaged by the Solicitors Regulation Authority to present their cases before the Solicitors 
Disciplinary Tribunal. This suggests a further area of research to investigate, whether greater 
aid should be made available to those who have no access to representation and legal 
advice (See Recommendation 1).  
Very few of the cases assessed of any type (fraud or non-fraud) resulted in an acquittal. This 
can be partly explained by regulators not publicising the failed cases, perhaps to protect the 
reputations of the individuals. It is also reflects efficient pre-hearing processes which 
remove the weak cases and the lower, civil standard of proof used by the majority of 
regulators. Nevertheless these conjectures need to be examined with further research into 
the degree of attrition from acceptance of case through to final outcome. One contribution 
to attrition could be variance in the qualities of the regulatory processes between regulators 
and inconsistent decision-making at each stage, including the final determinations. This 
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project has not examined these performance aspects and requires further research (See 
Recommendation 1). 
 Earlier Table 2.7 profiled the activities of the 48 professions regulators. Those proving more 
than 10 offenders per year are, in descending order:  
● Nursing and Midwifery Council – 86 
● Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service  - 56 
● Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal – 33 
● Association of Chartered Certified Accountants – 33 
● Financial Conduct Authority - 24 
● National College for Teaching and Leadership – 23  
● Health and Care Professions Council - 22   
● National Anti-Doping Panel – 21  
● General Pharmaceutical Council - 18 
 
All of the other professions regulators prove 10 or fewer fraud cases each year. 
 
3.4 Sanctions  
The sanctions available to the regulatory bodies vary significantly. The Fixed Penalty Justice 
model is simple, private and includes either a warning or a modest fixed monetary penalty. 
However the other models utilise a wide variety of formal and informal penalties.  
Private shaming  
Irrespective of the nature of the sanction, being labelled as dishonest by an official body is a 
form of private shaming. Although it has very little impact on an offender’s life 
circumstances, it can stimulate reflection, conscience building and behavioural adjustments 
(Braithwaite, 1983, p69).  
Suspension and revocation of licence  
In those occupations where a license (permit or registration) is required to work or it is 
possible to be banned from working in a particular occupation, the suspension or revocation 
of a person’s licence is a very common for dealing with fraud related behaviours. In some 
bodies a person under investigation is suspended and then after the formal decision-making 
a sanction is applied. Some bodies apply a period of suspension for a period of time from a 
few months to years. There may be a requirement to apply for re-admission. The NMC 
reviews suspensions and may continue the suspension if the respondent has not gained an 
insight into their errors. If a respondent does not appear at a review hearing, they are 
permanently excluded. Conditions on practice are a form of suspension that apply controls 
 THE FRAUD JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
 Page 49 
 
or limit the responden’ts activities. They are mainly applied for competence related issues. 
Many professionals are very well paid so that losing the right to work amounts to a 
significant financial penalty. It is also important to contrast the public and private versions. 
Notifications in professional journals or publicly accessible registers (e.g. GMC) must be 
considered a more severe penalty than those who experience this privately (e.g. CAA). The 
private loss of a licence can be explained away by a career change.  
Admonishment and public shaming 
Those bodies falling under the Regulatory Administrative Justice: Private model do not 
publish cases. However publicity is intrinsic to the Regulatory Administrative Justice: Public 
and the Regulatory Tribunal Justice models. Publication policies do vary considerably both in 
the level of detail and the duration of the publication. Most bodies publicise full details of 
cases and maintain the information on their website indefinitely, for example the NCTL and 
the SRA. Others, such as the Gambling Commission only publish brief notes. Some bodies 
only maintain the information online for a short period; the NMC retains the detail for just 
three months and only maintains the de-registered status. All the policies allow for 
exceptional circumstances which prohibit publication. The NMC is singular in that the details 
of about 20% of its cases are not disclosed. 
Publicity is an important component of the sanction which involves public shaming and 
status degradation. The invention of the internet has strengthened this punishment element 
by extending its reach and duration.  
Financial penalties  
Some bodies also have the power to issue a financial penalty in addition to or instead of 
licence sanctions. Some also have the power to award costs against the respondents which 
can be substantial for complex, defended cases. The SDT almost always orders costs. The 
largest found in the research sample was £170,000 (SDT case reference 10840-2011).  It is 
important to be cognisant of the legal basis for these financial penalties. Some of the 
regulatory bodies are established by statutory provision (either primary or secondary 
legislation) and the powers to issue financial penalties are set in law; this is the case with 
the Financial Conduct Authority. However, some of the self-regulatory bodies rely on their 
monopoly position and contractual law. Thus sporting bodies like the FA fine and rely on the 
fact that if you want to play professional football you have to accept their jurisdiction. The 
following list indicates the maximum level of fines available to the regulators’ adjudicators: 
● Architects Registration Board (Fine up to £5,000) 
● Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (Fine up to £50,000 plus costs) 
● Bar Standards Board (Fine up to £1,000)  
● Bar Tribunal and Adjudication Service (Fine) 
● British Horse Racing Authority (Fine up to £50,000) 
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● Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (Fine plus costs) 
● Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (Compensation up to £5,000) 
● Chartered Insurance Institute (Fine up to £1,000) 
● CiLEX Regulation (Fine up to £100,000 plus costs) 
● Cost Lawyers Standards Board (Fine up to £5,000, costs up to £1,000) 
● Council for Licensed Conveyancers (Fine up to £250 million plus costs) 
● Cricket Discipline Commission (Unlimited Fine) 
● Financial Conduct Authority (Unlimited Fine - based on % of fraud benefit) 
● Financial Reporting Council (Fine plus costs) 
● Football Association (FA) (Fine) 
● Gambling Commission (Fine) 
● General Optical Council (Fine up to £50,000) 
● Greyhound Board of Great Britain (Fine up to £5,000) 
● Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (Fine up to £1,000 plus costs) 
● Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Fine plus costs) 
● Institute of Faculty of Actuaries (Fine plus costs) 
● Intellectual Property Regulation Board (Fine up to £5,000 plus costs) 
● Phonepay Plus (Fine up to £50,000) 
● Property Ombudsman (Fine up to £25,000) 
● Rugby Football League (Fine) 
● Rugby Football Union (Fine) 
● Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (Fine limited by means of respondent plus costs) 
● Solicitors Regulation Authority (Fine plus costs)  
● The Faculty Office (Fine up to £10,000 plus costs) 
 
The research data suggests inconsistency in the prevalence and value of financial penalties. 
However the project has not had sufficient time to consider this issue and the broader issue 
of proportionality and consistency in sanctions within regulators and between bodies. It is 
clearly another area in need of research (See Recommendation 1).  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
This section has considered the various regulatory bodies that undertake functions which 
cover fraud related behaviour. The section started with an analysis of the type of cases they 
deal with. This then moved on to consider why regulatory bodies deal with such cases and 
not the criminal justice system. A typology of regulatory bodies was then set out identifying 
three core models. These included: Fixed Penalty Justice, Regulatory Administrative Justice: 
Private and Public and finally Regulatory Tribunal Justice. Some of these bodies were 
considered in depth and then the sanctions available to them were considered.  
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4. Contempt of Court 
4.1 Introduction  
In this section the use of contempt of court by insurance companies to deal with certain 
types of fraud is considered. Contempt of court has been used by some insurers to sanction 
fraudsters, resulting in prison sentences. As this has been used via the civil route this has 
been seen as an unusual means to deal with such fraudsters. This section will start by 
considering insurance fraud in context, before considering the emergence of the use of 
contempt of court and a discussion of this approach.  
4.2 Insurance Fraud in Context  
Many insurance products are at high risk of fraud and estimates by the insurance industry 
have suggested the size of the problem amounted to over 139,000 detected dishonest 
claims each year, which costs around £1 billion, with a further £2 billion of undetected fraud 
(Association of British Insurers, 2012). Cash-for-crash insurance fraud has proved one of the 
most significant types worth £392 million per year, with 1 in 7 personal injury claims linked 
to ‘crash-for-cash’ scams, which amounts to 69,500 claims (Insurance Fraud Bureau, 2013). 
The report also noted 1 in 10 people would consider taking part in such a scam. Central to 
the ‘crash-for-cash’ fraud is a personal injury claim rooted in ‘whiplash’. Often the ‘whiplash’ 
or other injuries presented are false and used to increase the potential claim. Insurers have 
struggled to deal with the scale of this problem and have over the last decade been 
‘deepening’ their policing response, including: greater data sharing, the establishment of the 
Insurance Fraud Bureau, the funding of a dedicated police unit (Insurance Fraud 
Enforcement Directorate) and the greater use of contempt of court (Button and Brooks, 
2016).    
4.3 Contempt of Court  
There are two categories of contempt of court, criminal and civil, but they are both criminal 
offences. The criminal form is concerned with direct contempt of court involving, for 
example, interrupting Crown Court proceedings, threatening witnesses or disobeying court 
orders. Civil contempt is usually concerned with the failure to comply with court orders and 
is a means to enforce remedies such as injunctions or compensation orders. The civil form is 
quasi-criminal in nature as the penalty is up to two years imprisonment, the burden of proof 
is to the criminal standard, beyond reasonable doubt, but proceedings are held in civil 
courts before a judge without a jury. A particular species of civil contempt has been gaining 
momentum over the last few years in dealing with fraud. In these cases the litigant initiates 
the contempt proceedings and ‘prosecutes’ the action when an opposing party deceives the 
court. Contempt of court is covered by civil law procedure rules CPR 81 (Ministry of Justice, 
2016a and b). Under Rule 32.14 it states that: 
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Proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against a person if he makes, or 
causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth 
without an honest belief in its truth (Ministry of Justice, 2016b). 
Any party to litigation, whether the claimant, defendant, witness, expert witness or lawyer 
runs the risk of such proceedings if they deceive the court. Obviously the fundamental pre-
requisite is that the alleged contemnor has engaged in a judicial process. Under these 
procedures proceedings may only be brought with the permission of the court or the 
Attorney General. Civil litigants must ask the court for permission to bring committal 
proceedings for contempt of court. As 81.18 states:  
(1) A committal application in relation to a false statement of truth or disclosure 
statement in connection with proceedings in the High Court, a Divisional Court or the 
Court of Appeal, may be made only –  
(a) with the permission of the court dealing with the proceedings in which the false 
statement or disclosure statement was made; or 
(b) by the Attorney General (Ministry of Justice, 2016a). 
 
For cases arising in the County Court, the procedures are slightly different and require 
application to be made to the High Court (81.13(d)). According to Grant and McCann (2015: 
4), the applicant must prove ‘beyond reasonable doubt’:  
(1) One or more statements of fact in a one or more documents verified with a 
statement of truth was untrue; and 
(2) It / they was / were untrue in such a way that the untruth(s) interfered with the 
course of justice in a material respect; and 
(3) It was made in the knowledge by the Respondent who signed it (or on whose 
behalf his authorised legal representative signed it) that it was / they were untrue. 
Insurers have started to use contempt of court in a relatively small number of cases largely 
around exaggerated or made-up personal injuries arising from car crashes or ‘slip and trip’ 
incidents at work and elsewhere. The opportunity for pursuing the contempt approach 
crystallises when evidence emerges of clear untruths in legal documents or in testimony, 
either during the process of litigation or after a judgment has been handed down.  In 
practice, insurers do not pursue contempt allegations for false insurance claims when the 
insurers’ initial decisions are accepted by the claimants, whether denial of claim or 
settlement offer. Insurers only proceed with contempt action when claimants dispute the 
decisions so that they transition from less formal ‘insurance claims’ to more formal ‘litigious 
claims’.   As one senior fraud investigator from an insurance company who has used 
contempt proceedings noted:  
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…so it might either be…so the claimant might try to discontinue the claim and we 
decide this case is serious enough, that we want to go down the contempt route, or 
it might go through to trial and the judge decides himself that this is fraud, and we 
then apply to take it down the contempt route.  So it’s quite advanced into the claim, 
so if someone’s submitted a claim and it’s been repudiated within two months and 
they just walk away, it (contempt proceedings) wouldn’t tend to happen on that kind 
of cases. 
Notable cases  
The first notable case which opened this route for insurers was Joanne Kirk v Carol Walton 
(2009). In this case, Kirk claimed that a real accident, in which her car experienced a rear 
end shunt, had triggered health problems leading her to give up work and the inability to 
walk more than ten yards. She had claimed for £800,000 and settled for £25,000. However 
the insurers in this case, RBS, had commissioned private investigators to put her under 
surveillance and secured footage of her walking, shopping and driving. The insurers sought 
grounds to bring contempt proceedings against her on the grounds of ‘making false 
statements’ to exaggerate her injuries. The case was heard in March 2009 and she was 
found in contempt on two grounds of lying in court documents. She was fined £2,500, had 
to pay her own £125,000 legal bill and half the defendant’s legal costs (Guildhall Chambers, 
n.d.). The total legal bill far outweighed the formal punishment. 
In 2011 Acromas insurance brought a case of contempt against Graham and Susan Loveday 
who had exaggerated claims of injury as a result of a real car crash. Their claims of disability 
unravelled when placing pictures of their caravan holiday on Facebook. In this case Mr 
Loveday was jailed for nine months and his wife was given a six months suspended sentence 
(Keoghs, 2011). 
In 2012 the first case of contempt was brought which involved a completely contrived 
accident. Samina Bashir admitted making a false declaration for an accident which had 
never occurred. She was given six weeks imprisonment, which was subsequently because 
she had a young child. Her husband and parents also received suspended prison sentences 
for their involvement. They were ordered to pay £17,000 costs (Clyde and Co, 2012). 
Not all the cases have revolved around car crashes. In Airbus Operations Ltd (2) QBE 
Insurance Co (UK) Ltd V Adam Lee Roberts (2012), Roberts claimed to have twisted his back 
at work, which had subsequently restricted his ability to undertake a range of tasks. He 
received £8,000 compensation on account (with £250,000 pending), but subsequent 
surveillance by the insurers found him lifting heavy items during a house renovation. He was 
found in contempt and received 6 months custody (BBC News, 2012a).     
Another very interesting case involved Paul Gustar, who had made a £100,000 claim related 
to an injury at work. The civil claim was thrown out and Axa, the insurance company sought 
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to pursue contempt against Gustar. However this was refused on the grounds it would take 
up a disproportionate time of the High Court. Axa decided instead to pursue a private 
prosecution using offences under the Fraud Act 2006. Gustar was convicted and given a 
suspended jail sentence (Axa, 2014).   
Accident Exchange pursued contempt of court proceedings against four employees of 
Autofocus Ltd (now in liquidation) for systematically providing false Witness Statements to 
insurance companies in disputes about the costs of hire vehicles following accidents. Their 
dishonesty and the refusal of the insurers to acknowledge the dishonesty cost Accident 
Exchange several millions pounds. 
Extent of use  
Between 2009 and 2015 there have been a total of 56 persons pursued for contempt of 
court in a total of 33 cases for insurance related fraud. The graph below lists the number of 
persons and number of cases by year who have been pursued.  
Figure 4.1. Insurance fraud related contempt of court cases 2008-15 
 
It was not possible to determine the sentences in all these cases, but 37 included a custodial 
sentence, with an average of 5.3 months (range of 2 weeks to 12 months); 9 received 
suspended sentences and a further 2 solely a financial penalty. The sentence outcomes in 8 
cases is unknown.    
Anatomy of a case  
Upon discovery of false truths in a civil claim the insurer (or any other potential applicant) 
need to ensure there is a strong prima facie case capable of meeting the contempt tests. 
They then have to seek approval to pursue the action at a committal hearing in a civil court. 
If approved, the case proceeds to trial, also in a civil court before a judge sitting without a 
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jury.   King’s Lynn & Norfolk Council v. Bunning [2014] 2 All ER 1095 established that the 
defendant may apply for legal aid to cover the costs of representation. Should the claimant 
be found guilty the maximum penalty is 2 years imprisonment. Most cases in the last three 
years have resulted in a custodial sentence.   
Why has it grown? 
A small but significant group of insurers have used this tool, such as Axa, Churchill, LV, 
Motor Insurers Bureau, RBS and Royal and Sun Alliance. A small group of solicitors market 
this tool as a means to deal with insurance fraud, with Keoghs and DWF the most 
prominent. However, an important question is why the use of contempt of court grown? 
There are a number of reasons. First of all the tool must be set within a context of growing 
insurance fraud, particularly related to personal injury claims. Traditional insurer counter 
fraud measures have proved inadequate in addressing this problem. Set against this has 
been a criminal justice system completely uninterested in this type of fraud.  The ABI 
submission to the 2006 Government Fraud Review cited several case to highlight significant 
police disinterest in major organised ‘crash-for-cash’ fraud. One case illustrated in the 
submission involved 400+ staged accidents involving organised criminals, who were using 
the money to fund drug-trafficking, prostitution and gun running. The police would only 
investigate if the insurers funded it. As a result this case did not go any further (Association 
of British Insurers, n.d.).  Indeed one of the conclusions in this submission was:  
Most police forces do not have the resources to deal with fraud effectively. There is 
a shortage of experienced fraud officers, and those few with the right experience are 
frequently transferred to other duties. Even where dedicated financial crime units 
exist, their main role is to support other officers on technical issues (such as tracing 
money and asset recovery) arising from more “conventional” crimes (p 5). 
The inability to access formal sanctions associated with criminal prosecution, led some 
insurers to look for alternative measures. Contempt of court became an option to pursue a 
criminal sanction through quasi-criminal proceedings which flowed out of civil disputes. 
They could be used to deter potential fraudsters by broadcasting the message that they 
risked imprisonment if they pursued false claims.  
There was also a feeling amongst insurers and some lawyers that sections the legal 
profession were lax in the scrutiny of insurance claims. Something needed to be done to 
remind lawyers of their duties to their clients and to the courts in not facilitating fraudulent 
claims through inadequate diligence or negligence. Indeed, as one lawyer with expertise in 
this area noted the impact of the use of contempt has changed the way solicitors handle 
such cases:  
they (contempt proceedings) have really erm, changed the landscape, because 
claimant lawyers have changed all their standard form letters. If there is a letter that 
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requires a statement of truth on it, there will be a large box on the letter giving them 
a perjury warning, giving them contempt of court warning, explaining what it's all 
about. If you have a client who is of low education or has suffered an injury whereby 
you're concerned about their ability to comprehend what they're signing… then you 
will take time out to go and see them and to go through it line by line. 
Given that part of the reason for growth of this legal tool has been the lack of access to 
criminal justice, the insurance industry’s decision to fund a dedicated police unit to pursue 
criminal prosecutions might be seen as the end to this interesting legal experiment. Over its 
first three years to the end of 2015, IFED secured 207 convictions at court and 281 police 
cautions (Insurance Fraud Taskforce, 2016). However there has been no apparent decline in 
the number of contempt cases, which remains a strategic alternative for the insurance 
industry. As one senior insurance fraud investigator noted:  
Yeah, we do send a lot of cases to the police, but with the resources they have, they 
just can’t take on every case.  And so that would be a first option for us, the IFED 
route, because that’s what they’re there for and if it doesn’t bother, we fund IFED, 
we don’t have to pay on a per case basis.  So it (contempt of court) is more of an 
alternative sanction to using the police, if we can’t get them involved.   
As contempt of court is an expensive option, which is likely to cost insurers tens of 
thousands of pounds per case, they need to carefully consider its deterrence value. The 
Insurance Fraud Register, discussed later in this report is a lower cost, collective prevention 
strategy. Contempt of court is therefore unlikely to expand beyond current levels.   
4.4 Conclusion 
The initial take on this legal tool of those from a person with a healthy, sceptical and liberal 
persuasion might be that this is big corporate insurance companies abusing their power to 
use obscure civil procedures to convict and imprison impecunious citizens. However, this 
review suggests such an assessment would be unfair.  
It is not an extensively used tool: only a small number of the most ‘deserving’ cases are 
pursued, just a dozen or so persons per year. The costs of pursuing such actions, along with 
the emergence of IFED and initiatives such as the Insurance Fraud Register would suggest 
that the number of cases is unlikely to increase. The evidence required is the very highest, 
beyond reasonable doubt, and is tested at court by independent judges. Qualifying 
defendants can secure legal aid for their representation. The risks of a miscarriage of justice 
are therefore low. The contempt of court approach is not controversial as it is well-
established, independent, subject to sophisticated judicial controls and is transparent.      
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5. Fraudster Registers  
In this section the growing use of fraudster registers/databases are examined. These have 
become much more common in the counter fraud community as a tool for dealing with 
fraud. They are primarily used as preventative measures by making it more difficult for 
confirmed fraudsters or persons of high risk of being fraudsters from securing access to 
services or jobs where further fraud is likely to take place (some such as Cifas also protect a 
large number of fraud victims). The preventative work these databases do is very important 
and makes a major contribution to the fight against fraud. As was noted earlier in this report 
fraud costs the UK billions and pounds and with limited state action the fraudster registers 
contribute significantly to reducing the burden by preventing fraud. However, a 
consequence of what some of them do makes them a de facto sanction to persons who 
have engaged in fraud (designation as fraudster, denial of services, increased costs of some 
products), resulting from a basic form of private justice. This section will begin by examining 
the range of databases that exist, before examining how they work and then some of the 
issues that arise from their use.  
5.1 Registers and Intelligence Databases 
The use of registers as a form of punishment and prevention has been used for some time in 
England and Wales, with the best known example being the Violent and Sexual Offenders 
Register (ViSOR). Established under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and administered until 
recently by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA), it now sits within the National 
Crime Agency. Persons convicted of specified offences in the courts are, as part of their 
sentences, placed on the register for a period of time which relates to the nature of the 
offences. The offenders are obliged to supply identity information such as their addresses, 
bank account details and passport numbers, and to advise ViSOR of any changes and foreign 
travel plans. The police, prison service and some other official bodies have access to this 
register. ViSOR registration is likely to restrict the activities of individuals, for example, any 
professional and voluntary work involving children.  
The fraudster registers assessed in this report are distinct from ViSOR in a number of ways. 
They are not founded by statute or form part of the state (except the Cabinet Office Public 
Sector Staff Fraud Database). They do not form part of the formal sentencing of fraud 
offenders in the criminal courts. They are almost all commercial systems in that access is by 
paid subscriptions. They are owned and operated by a mix of for-profit and not-for-profit 
private bodies operating outside of the criminal justice system. Their primary role is fraud 
prevention by minimising the risks of doing business with, engaging in transactions with, or 
employing persons who have committed frauds or who have been profiled as likely 
offenders. The important question is whether these outcomes can be considered as 
community control sanctions resulting from a form of private justice. 
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Newburn (2007: 516) in his definitive text book on criminology identifies eight criteria to 
distinguish formal, judicial punishment:  
1. The involvement of an evil, and unpleasantness to the person on whom the 
punishment is inflicted.  
2. If must be for an offence, actual or supposed.  
3. It must be of an offender, actual or supposed.  
4. It must be the work of personal agencies.  
5. It must be imposed by an authority conferred through or by institutions against the 
rules of which the offence has been committed.  
6. The pain which is inflicted must be intentional, not accidental or coincidental.  
7. To interest criminologists, the punishment should be imposed in response to a 
‘criminal offence’. 
8. It should be imposed by a judicial authority.  
 
Most of these criteria are consistent with the operation and outcomes of the databases 
systems. There is unpleasantness in being labelled a fraudster and in being denied access to 
jobs or services, or having to pay a premium for services. For the fraudster registers, the 
offence and the offender are actual. For the risk profiling intelligence systems, the offence 
and the offender are actual or supposed. The unpleasantness results from the agency of the 
databases. The fraud label is conferred through or by institutions following breach of their 
rules by actual or attempted fraud, though this is questionable in respect of the activities of 
purely risk profiling analytics. There is clearly an intention to cause pain, although the pain 
only arises when submitting applications for jobs, services or commercial contracts. The 
behaviour under consideration is criminal in nature whether actual or supposed. The 
databases depart substantially from the final criterion: the punishment is not imposed by a 
judicial authority and is therefore a form of private justics. However, to restrict punishment 
to judicial authorities neglects extensive research illustrating punishment both allocated and 
administered by vigilantes, paramilitaries, companies and regulatory bodies (Johnston, 
1996; Silke, 1998; Shearing and Stenning, 1982; Meerts and Dorn, 2009). 
Placement on the databases does not lead automatically to penalising restrictions. The 
database providers do not decide whether registrants should have access to jobs, services 
and contracts. The penalising actions arise from the users who decide to deny access or 
impose cost premiums. Nevertheless the operation of these systems should not be viewed 
only in terms of fraud prevention, they are also a form of ‘grey’ justice and punishment.  
The many registers which exist also vary significantly on the sophistication of their 
mechanisms to place a person on a database. Some of these traits will be considered, but 
before they are table 5.1 below lists the main databases identified by this research. It is 
important to note there is no definitive list of databases held by any official body. The list 
has been devised through the following strategies: internet search, search of the 
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Information Commissioners Office list of data controllers using the word ‘fraud’,  databases 
identified from the survey of counter fraud professionals conducted for this research and 
the list of Specified Anti-Fraud Organisations (SAFO) listed by the Home Office. Some smaller 
databases which seek a low profile, may not have been discovered by this research (and 
some do seek low profiles).  
All of the organisations/databases listed in table hold information on individuals or 
attributes linked to individuals related to fraud (some such as National Business Crime 
Solutions, for example, focus upon all business crime, which includes fraud). The first 
important distinction to note, however, are those that hold ‘intelligence’ and those that go a 
step further as defining a person as a ‘confirmed fraudster’. Intelligence, can be defined as:  
… the end product of a process, sometimes physical, always intellectual, derived 
from information which has been collated, analysed and evaluated in order to 
prevent crime or secure the apprehension of offenders (Association of Chief Police 
Officers in England and Wales, 1975).  
The different categories of intelligence as defined under the National Intelligence Model 
(NIM) could range from intelligence that is highly reliable to information that could be false. 
For example, relating to insurance fraud and the example of the Insurance Fraud 
Investigators Group, there could be information supplied to them by an under-cover police 
officer in an organised crime group on ‘cash-for-crash’ frauds which have taken place by 
certain individuals. At the other extreme there could be a call from an anonymous individual 
that a person has submitted a fraudulent claim. So immediately it can be seen the reliability 
of intelligence does vary significantly and that information could be held against an 
individual linking them to fraud, which is unreliable and untrue. The databases which 
identify individuals as ‘confirmed fraudsters’, however, go a step further holding names of 
individuals who have been confirmed by some form of investigation as having committed 
fraud, which could be capable of been used for a criminal prosecution. It represents a form 
of designation which is below a criminal conviction, but of greater currency than the highest 
form of intelligence.  
The third part of the NIM determines who the data is sharable with and this is another 
important distinction to be made with fraudster databases. Whether the information is 
shared amongst investigators for the purposes of a potential investigation or wider to 
others who use it for preventative purposes, which means it could be used to determine 
whether there is access to services or offers of employment, amongst others.  
The resources, time available to the researchers and existing research base led the 
researchers to take the following decision, to focus the research on those registers where 
the available evidence base suggested they distinguish ‘confirmed fraudsters’, who in theory 
could be prosecuted in the courts. This narrows the registers down substantially as tables 
5.1 and 5.2 illustrate. Some of the bodies, which will be the focus of this part of the report, 
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such as Cifas were very open and transparent to the researchers, answering all questions 
and providing relevant information. Cifas was clearly engaged in the research and proud to 
demonstrate the extensive measures they have in place to minimise potential problems. 
The openness they offer to the public also means they are also more likely to be complained 
about to official bodies, in online forums and in the media than some of the many other 
bodies that keep a much lower profile. As a consequence this means much of the discussion 
will focus upon Cifas and some of the findings might be seen as critical of Cifas and some of 
the other bodies considered in depth.  
It is important to note, however, that some of the many other databases identified in this 
research offered very little information in the public domain. The standards to which they 
operate are much more opaque and it was suggested to the researchers in several 
interviews there were many more issues of concern in some of their operations. For 
instance the publication of mechanisms to pursue a subject access request or make a 
complaint is often very difficult to find for some bodies. Some don’t even have a clear web 
presence. Information on who their data is shared with and on what basis is also not always 
made clear. By contrast Cifas clearly publishes information on this.  
However, for this first study in this area with the resources available the project needed to 
be more manageable and for this and the above reasons the decision was taken to focus 
upon the ‘confirmed fraudster’ databases. To this end the researchers have probably 
focussed upon the top end in terms of quality, although as will be shown there are still some 
areas in need of reform. The other databases not considered may well raise many more 
significant issues, but this will need to be the subject of future research (See 
Recommendation 1).   
Table 5.1 below lists the full list of databases identified during this research. The very nature 
of many of these databases with low profiles means not all that exist were likely to be 
identified. For example the researchers came across a reference on the Scamalytics (a 
company specialising in reducing romance frauds) website that they ‘Tap into the dating 
industry’s largest shared scammer blacklist of profile and network data’ (Scamalytics, n.d). 
This suggests there is a database of suspected/confirmed romance fraudsters which share 
data amongst members. It was, however, not possible to confirm the basis and 
characteristics of this database and therefore list in the table below.  There are likely to be 
more databases like this. It is also important to note that the researchers have not included 
the database of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, which is hosted by the City of 
London Police.  
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Table 5.1. List of fraud related databases   
Name of Database Brief Description 
Type of 
Information Held 
SAFO 
Status 
BAe Systems Applied 
Intelligence 
 
Provide database and analytics 
connected to over 300 regulatory 
global watch lists to allow 
customers to check and screen their 
existing and prospective customers 
and their associates for sanctions 
and Politically Exposed Persons 
(PEP) status. Assists compliance 
with anti-money laundering (AML) 
and Counter Terrorist Finance (CTF) 
legislation. 
Intelligence and 
persons confirmed 
to be engaged in 
inappropriate 
activities by other 
bodies 
Yes 
Callcredit Information 
Group 
 
Provides analytics and database for 
identity verification and fraud 
checking. CallValidate system 
verifies identities, banking and fraud 
records. CallMonitor monitors 
events such as missed payments, 
significant total balance changes, 
new County Court Judgments (CCJs), 
bankruptcies and Cifas filings on a 
daily basis. Real Time Fraud Alerts 
delivered from extensive range of 
results and warnings ‘velocity’ and 
inconsistency checks. 
Database to identify 
high risk claims and 
confirmed fraudsters 
from Cifas 
Yes 
Cabinet Office Public 
Sector Staff Fraud 
Database 
 
A central database of public sector 
staff dismissed for fraud and to use 
this data for pre-employment 
screening. This will enable a ban on 
these staff from being re-employed 
for five years. It will also ensure that 
all internal fraud investigations are 
either concluded or if they are to 
cease they should be signed off by a 
permanent secretary, chief 
executive or minister depending on 
the circumstances. 
 
Confirmed 
fraudsters 
No 
Cifas: Internal Fraud 
Database 
 
Sharing of database information 
amongst members on known staff 
fraudsters. Fraudsters registered on 
database by members. Mainly 
financial services. 
Confirmed 
fraudsters 
Yes 
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Name of Database Brief Description 
Type of 
Information Held 
SAFO 
Status 
Cifas: National Fraud 
Database 
Not-for-profit cross sector fraud 
prevention organisation. Shares 
information amongst members on 
confirmed fraudsters and other 
relevant fraud prevention data – 
e.g. fake documents so that they 
cannot be used for identity fraud. 
Offers identity protection, currently 
for more than 175,000 individuals. 
Runs a free service for local 
authorities to protect vulnerable 
individuals from exploitation by 
fraudsters. Cifas systems prevented 
£1.1 billion in fraud last reported 
year. 
Confirmed 
fraudsters 
Yes 
Claims and 
Underwriting 
Exchange (CUE) 
 
Developed by CRIF Decision 
Solutions and hosted by Insurance 
Database Services Ltd (IDSL). Web-
based application that allows the 
history of motor, vehicle credit hire, 
household and personal 
injury/industrial illness 
compensation claims made by 
individuals to be validated. The 
system helps to identify instances 
where further investigation is 
required at either the 
quotation/underwriting or claims 
stage. 
Database to identify 
high risk claims 
No 
College of Policing 
Disapproved Register 
Register operated by College of 
Policing of police officers dismissed 
for gross misconduct or who 
resigned/retired while subject to 
such action. Police forces submit 
information to College of Policing.  
Confirmed persons 
engaged in 
misconduct 
(including fraud 
related behaviours)  
No 
Dun and Bradstreet - 
Critical Intelligence 
Solution 
Identity, credit and suspicious 
activity checking. 
 
Database to identify 
high risk claims 
Yes 
Elixir 2000 
 
Developed and hosted by CRIF 
Decision Solutions on behalf of 18 
leading UK life insurance companies 
for the management of data supply 
to and from the regulatory bodies 
and to enable them to share 
information. The database contains 
commercial data and a commercial 
scoring system. 
Database to identify 
high risk claims 
No 
Equifax - Fraud Identity, credit and suspicious Database to identify Yes 
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Name of Database Brief Description 
Type of 
Information Held 
SAFO 
Status 
Protector 
 
activity checking. 
 
high risk claims and 
confirmed fraudsters 
from Cifas etc 
Experian - National 
Fraud Database 
 
Identity, credit and suspicious 
activity checking. 
 
Database to identify 
high risk claims and 
Confirmed 
Fraudsters from 
Cifas etc 
Yes 
Facewatch  
 
A system that enables crimes to be 
reported direct to police and for 
members to share reports based 
upon CCTV footage.  
Circulates unidentified images of 
individuals who have engaged in 
frauds (largely retailing). 
Intelligence  No 
Fraud Intelligence 
Network (FIN) 
 
Fraud prevention through data 
sharing and intelligence tool. 
Provides real time booking analytics 
so users can reject bookings, also 
identifies fraud by rogue employees. 
Provides secure community 
exchange of information and mutual 
help. 
Intelligence  No 
Health Insurers Fraud 
Investigation 
Database  
Hosts database of 25,000+ entries of 
suspected fraudulent claims/bills 
submitted by persons and 
organisations across 13 countries. 
Intelligence  No 
Insurance Fraud 
Bureau (IFB) [see IFR] 
Hosts database, shares data and 
conducts analysis to identify high 
risk claims, amongst other 
functions. Hosts the Insurance Fraud 
Register.  
Database to identify 
high risk claims, 
hosts Insurance 
Fraud Register 
Yes 
Insurance Fraud 
Investigators Group 
(IFIG) 
 
Shares database information 
amongst members on known 
insurance fraudsters to prevent 
further fraud. Fraudsters registered 
on database by members. 
Fraudulent insurance claims. 
Provides secure community 
exchange of information and mutual 
help. 
Intelligence Yes 
Insurance Fraud 
Register (IFR) [see IFB] 
 
Hosts database of individuals who 
have made fraudulent insurance 
applications/claims confirmed in 
fraud in member organisations.                                                                     
Confirmed 
fraudsters 
Yes 
Lawyers Against Fraud  
 
Combats fraudulent personal injury 
claims and provide an effective 
communication platform for 
member firms to share fraud 
Intelligence  No 
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Name of Database Brief Description 
Type of 
Information Held 
SAFO 
Status 
information on claims management 
companies (CMC). 
National Anti-Fraud 
Network (NAFN) 
 
Tameside MBC hosts a fraudster 
database for membership 
organisations: public sector 
organisations including 90% of local 
authorities and over 40 outsourced 
service providers including 
registered social housing providers. 
Intelligence  No 
National Business 
Crime Solution 
Supported by the National Police 
Chief's Council (NPCC). Provides link 
between business and the police in 
combating crimes against retail 
businesses, a crime intelligence hub, 
analytical support and dedicated 
police liaison to ensure a more 
effective policing response to cross 
border / serious and organised 
crime. Orientation towards 
supporting police investigations and 
action. 
Intelligence  No 
National Fraud 
Initiative  
 
Supervised by the Cabinet Office 
and operated by Synectics Solutions, 
the National Fraud Initiative (NFI) is 
an exercise that matches electronic 
data within and between public and 
private sector bodies to prevent and 
detect fraud - includes local 
probation boards, police, fire and 
rescue authorities, local councils 
and some private sector bodies. 
Public and private sector 
organisations use the system for: 
payroll screening - for illegal 
workers, benefit fraudsters, workers 
claiming sick pay whilst working 
elsewhere - mortality screening, 
creditor screening - for VAT 
overpayments, duplicate payments 
and duplicate creditors - housing 
tenant screening for tenancy fraud. 
Data analysis to 
identify high risk 
fraud transactions 
Yes, via 
Synectics 
National Hunter  
 
Member organisations share data 
with Hunter relating to information 
made in financial product 
applications. Comparing the data 
identifies inaccuracies and suspect 
applications which may indicate 
fraud. Uses Experian systems. 
Intelligence and 
confirmed fraudsters 
Yes 
National SIRA SIRA is a comprehensive fraud Intelligence and Yes 
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Name of Database Brief Description 
Type of 
Information Held 
SAFO 
Status 
Database: Synectics 
Solutions  
 
prevention and detection solution 
from Synectics Solutions that is 
deployed in a large number of 
insurance and financial service 
companies throughout the world. 
Also operates Cabinet Office 
National Fraud Initiative (NFI). 
confirmed fraudsters 
Netfoil Netfoil is a claims database owned 
and operated by Hill Dickinson and 
has been developed over more than 
10 years. The database is used for 
the detection, management and 
prevention of fraudulent insurance 
claims and applications for 
insurance products. 
Intelligence  No 
Telecommunications 
United Kingdom Fraud 
Forum (TUFF) 
TUFF holds a database of fraudsters 
from the telecommunications 
sector, but it does not provide any 
public information about it.  
Confirmed 
fraudsters and 
intelligence 
Yes  
Thomson Reuters 
World Check 
Third-party risk screening for 
financial institutions, corporations, 
law enforcement, government and 
intelligence agencies. 
Monitors over 530 sanction, watch, 
and regulatory law and 
enforcement lists, local and 
international government records, 
along with hundreds of thousands 
of information sources including 
industry sources and media 
searches. 
Intelligence and 
persons confirmed 
to be engaged in 
fraud by other 
bodies 
No 
Source: The above is sourced from relevant websites and personal communication to 
researchers.  
Note:  
1. SAFO status was created under Section 68 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 to enable public 
authorities to share information with such bodies for the purposes of preventing fraud. 
   
5.2 Confirmed Fraudster Registers  
This section will concentrate on the registers that contain the identities of ‘confirmed 
fraudsters’. It excludes the credit referencing agencies, which in terms of ‘confirmed 
fraudsters’, utilise the data of Cifas or National Hunter. The BAe Systems Applied 
Intelligence database is also excluded because its focus is international and includes data 
beyond fraud. The College of Policing Disapproved Register has also been excluded because 
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of its broader remit beyond fraud related behaviours. The analysis focuses on those 
databases listed in table 5.2.  
Table 5.2. Confirmed fraudster databases 
Name of Database 
 
Brief Process Description Number of Persons 
on Database in 2014 
Cabinet Office Public 
Sector Staff Fraud 
Database 
This is a new database which has been agreed and 
which at time of writing is not yet operational. 
Not Live  
Cifas: Internal Fraud 
Database 
 
Cifas hosts a database for subscribing scheme 
members who operate to standards set by Cifas.  
 
Members who experience an internal fraud by a 
member of staff can place the offender’s identity 
on this database provided the case meets the 
Cifas standards and the employee has been 
informed. The record remains on the register for 
six years. Members can access and search the 
database. Members are largely drawn from the 
financial services sector. 
 
In order to file an Internal Fraud record, the 
information must be factually correct and 
accurate. The standard of proof is that in all cases, 
members MUST be in a position to make a formal 
complaint to the police or other relevant law 
enforcement agency. Members must have carried 
out checks of sufficient depth to satisfy this 
standard of proof and must retain a record of the 
checks. The offence must be identifiable.  
 
Any individuals who have been searched and 
matched on by a Cifas member on this database 
must be informed and given advice on how to 
challenge the information.  
736 
 
Cifas: National Fraud 
Database 
 
Cifas hosts a database for subscribing scheme 
members who operate to standards set by Cifas. 
 
Members who experience fraud by a customer 
can place the offender’s identity on this database 
provided the case meets the Cifas standards. The 
record remains on the register for six years. 
Members can access and search the database. 
Members are largely drawn from the financial 
services sector. 
 
Members are from a range of sectors, including 
telecommunications, retail, insurance, public 
sector, as well as financial services. 
134,749 
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Name of Database 
 
Brief Process Description Number of Persons 
on Database in 2014 
The database is also used to protect identity fraud 
victims by recording details of fake identities and 
repeat victims. 
Insurance Fraud 
Register  
 
The IFB hosts the IFR database members of the 
scheme who operate to standards set by IFB. 
Members who experience a fraud by a customer 
or claimant can place the offender’s identity on 
this database provided the case meets the IFB 
standards. The record remains on the register for 
six years. Members can access and search the 
database. Members are drawn from the inurance 
sector. 
‘Thousands’ but 
exact numbers not 
revealed.  
National Hunter National Hunter is a network of separate in-house 
databases operated by members. The databases 
are linked and all are searchable. Members who 
identify a fraud add identity information to their 
own databases and become visible to all network 
users. Information remains on the databases for 6 
years . Members are drawn largely from financial 
services.  
98,104 
 
TUFF Unknown  Unknown 
 
It would be worth explaining in more detail how these databases work, by using some 
examples. The section will begin with a member of the Cifas Internal Fraud Database that 
experiences an internal fraud. The member of staff is investigated and at the end of that 
investigation a file is passed to a manager to decide the next course of action. Staff 
disciplinary leading to termination of employment is likely to be first on the list, if proved. If 
there is clear evidence of a criminal act of fraud, many not familiar with fraud might think 
the case would be handed to the police with the aim of a criminal prosecution. However, 
the victim organisation might not want publicity or they may try, but the police are not 
interested. If the fraudster has assets the organisation might consider a civil action, but this 
is often not economical. As members of the Cifas scheme, however, they can also place the 
person on the database so long as it meets their standards, which are: 
Factual Accuracy and Standard of Proof 5.1 In order to file a Staff Fraud record, the 
information must be factually correct and accurate. A Member filing such 
information can only do so if it has good reason to believe it has or could have 
suffered loss, and/or it reasonably believes that it has grounds to press criminal 
charges for fraud or the commission of any other offence if a suspect were traced. 
This means that in all cases, Members MUST be prepared to make a formal 
complaint to the police or other relevant law enforcement agency. Members must 
have carried out checks of sufficient depth to satisfy this standard of proof (and must 
retain a record of the checks). The criminal offence must be identifiable (Information 
supplied by Cifas). 
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These standards show that the case does not need to have gone through the criminal 
courts, merely that they would be prepared to make such a complaint and retain the 
evidence needed to do so. Some cases which go on to the database may have been through 
the courts, but many would be as described. So for many staff fraudsters the sanction would 
be termination of employment if employed, if applying for a position rejection or 
withdrawal of offer of employment (if one has been made) and placement on the internal 
fraud database. An example of a real case added to the database is as follows.  
Employee A was considered a highly valued employee and was well thought of amongst 
her peers. A had been employed with the company for four years before she was found 
to be stealing customers’ personal claims data and passing that information to a claims 
management company in return for cash. The company was alerted to the theft by a 
data loss prevention tool. The tool monitored outgoing emails containing customers’ 
valuable personal data. The employee had sent a large number of emails with 
attachments to her personal email address. Upon investigation, it became evident that 
she had attempted to conceal customer information by embedding it in a variety of 
otherwise unrelated documents. Further investigation revealed that:  
● She admitted to stealing the data and receiving payment for it, but attempted to 
play down the length of time that the theft had gone on for, and the amount of 
money received;  
● In an email to the claims management company, she positioned herself as a 
valuable player in stealing the data by describing herself as “excellent at her job”, 
and stating she would “do what I can within my remit” and “the offer they had 
presented was too good to turn down”;  
● In the short period between the theft and its discovery, A had received cash 
payments equal to almost 50% of basic salary (an indication not only of the value 
of data but the attractiveness of the short term gain);  
● A stated that her motivation was the desire to clear her mounting debts. A 
cooperated with the investigator by giving access to her personal email account 
and providing bank statements showing receipt of payment from the contact at 
the claims management company.  
She was later dismissed and her details recorded to the Cifas Internal Fraud Database for 
unlawful obtaining and disclosure of personal data. The case was also referred to law 
enforcement for investigation and she was subsequently given a suspended sentence at 
Crown Court (Case supplied by Cifas). 
For this database employees must be told that they will be placed on the Internal Fraud 
Database and advised on how to challenge this information. Cifas rules also make clear that, 
if an application for employment is rejected on the basis of Cifas data, the applicant must be 
informed that Cifas data was used and provided with information on how to challenge the 
information. Cifas audits compliance with these requirements through member compliance 
reviews and compliance monitoring.   
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This inevitably leads to the next question, so where is the pain ie the sanction? First of all for 
some persons merely been labelled a fraudster and put on a database would be such. For 
many, however, the sanction would be the impact it is likely to have on future career 
options. In an age when many lie on CVs about their employment history and reasons for 
leaving jobs if they sought employment in another organisation who is a member or uses a 
vetting/recruitment agency which is a member, their name would be on the database and if 
they checked it, discovered the person, it is highly likely they would not secure a job offer. 
Indeed Cifas for this database has actually sought to promote a degree of deterrence by 
highlighting the risks of lying on an application (which could be fraud), noting the serious 
consequences of committing internal fraud (many of these could also apply whether the 
fraud was committed against a Cifas member or not):  
● You may destroy your chances of gaining an interview for this or any other job 
(authors’s emphasis) for a long time. 
● You’re demonstrating that you’re dishonest to a potential employer. 
● Even if you succeed in getting the job, you are at constant risk of being found out 
and dismissed at any time. 
● If you commit fraud, there is a real risk that you will be prosecuted. 
● If you are prosecuted and your case hits the headlines, it’ll become public knowledge 
and be revealed every time someone Googles your name (Cifas, n.d.) Authors’ 
emphasis (Also see Appendix for leaflet). 
● If you are not a UK national, you may risk being denied, or have taken away, your 
permission to stay in the country as a result of criminal proceedings. 
 
The use of such deterrence messages by databases is rare and this is an issue that will be 
returned to later in this section as an area more could be done and that this is a positive 
example of such deterrence tools.   
The internal database covers a variety of different types of staff fraud, which are listed in 
figure 5.1. There are 145 members of this scheme listed on their website and some of these 
also include employment agencies and specialist vetting companies, such as Reed Specialist 
Recruitment and PeopleCheck Ltd, although the largest group of members are from financial 
services. The vetting and recruitment agency members, however, illustrate the data could 
be used beyond this sector too.   
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Figure 5.1. Categories of Fraud on the Cifas Internal Fraud Database 
Employment application fraud – where an application for employment (or to provide services) 
contains serious material falsehoods. 
Unlawful obtaining or disclosure of personal/ commercial data – where personal or commercial 
data is obtained, disclosed or procured without the consent of the data owner/controller. 
Account Fraud – unauthorised activity on a customer account by a member of staff knowingly, to 
obtain a benefit for himself/herself or others. 
Dishonest action by staff obtain a benefit by theft or deception – where a person knowingly 
obtains (or attempts to obtain) a benefit for himself/herself and/ or others through dishonest 
action, and where such conduct would constitute a criminal offence. 
Cifas (2016a) 
 
The Cifas National Fraud database is much larger, with 279 members and like the internal 
database dominated by the financial services sector. In 2015, members reported £1.1 billion 
of prevented fraud through the Cifas system. Its primary focus is identity theft, with identity 
fraud cases making up 53% of the database.  Cifas records the fraudulent use of identities 
and the victims of this fraud in order to prevent the identities being used elsewhere. The 
remaining 47% of confirmed fraud cases are first party fraud cases, involving details of 
genuine identities where that individual has made fraudulent applications for credit (credit 
cards, finance, mobile phone contracts, loans, mortgage applications) or used their financial 
products for fraudulent purposes, such as money laundering. It is also important to note 
that the Cifas database also includes victim related data. It includes a list of individuals who 
have sought protective registration as a result of been victims of identity fraud, to alert 
members to these persons (as repeat victimisation is common) and to enable greater checks 
to be applied to protect the victim from further frauds. A further aspect of the database is 
the Protecting the Vulnerable Scheme, which registers the identities of vulnerable 
individuals under the care of their Local Authority who are vulnerable to abuse by 
fraudsters. Cifas work on identity theft, protecting individuals and vulnerable individuals is 
beyond the scope of this report, which focuses on first party fraud. The categories, including 
the victim related data in red, are listed in figure 5.2. 
The following is an example of a fraudster been placed on this database. An individual with a 
poor credit history applies for a credit card, but when asked to supply their previous 
addresses lies to hide this, with the intention of hiding past debts and gives false addresses 
instead, as well as offering no information on past debts. The credit card provider detects 
this through various databases they have access to and determines the application is 
fraudulent. Technically this is a criminal offence that could be prosecuted in the criminal 
courts. However, most financial providers would pursue the following action: decline the 
application and place the applicant on the Cifas database. The individual would be placed on 
the database for 6 years and it is highly likely that they will not be informed that they are 
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placed on the database. The Cifas rules, however, are clear that where Cifas data is used to 
decline an individual, the fact that fraud prevention data was used must be mentioned in 
the reasons for the decline and individuals provided with a Cifas leaflet, explaining how to 
make a Subject Access Request and find out more. This means that the opportunity to 
challenge the information usually occurs when the fraud information has resulted in a 
decline, rather than when the information is entered on the database. Such guidance is not 
as clear for other registers and databases.  
This also leads to the question is this a sanction to be placed on a database, particularly if 
you don’t even know you have been put there when the information is entered? This 
database has 273 members largely drawn from the financial services sector. A marker of 
fraud against a name of a person is likely to lead to serious consequences as those members 
check the database before offering their products to prospective clients. A place on the 
database may mean the ability to secure further financial products is not possible  or more 
expensive. Some who are placed on the database may also find the providers of existing 
products also cancel them (these implications will be explored in more depth later in this 
section). In an age where bank accounts and credit are so important this can have serious 
implications for a person. It is nevertheless important to note that organisations will use a 
range of internal and external data from Credit Reference Agencies and others (including 
other fraudster databases) to risk new business and price accordingly. Cifas rules explicitly 
state that Cifas data cannot be used in automated decision making of any kind (including 
pricing).  A match against the Cifas database cannot be used as a ‘block’ list, it merely 
indicates that the member may wish to conduct further enquiries about the accuracy of any 
application before making a decision. It is unclear, however, to what extent these sensible 
rules are used by some of the other databases noted in table 5.1 and further evidence of the 
need for greater research.  
The cancelation of accounts may also be connected to a fear by the financial institution that 
the person is possibly involved in money laundering and this could pose a regulatory risk 
(they could be fined). It could also be down to some of the other databases identified in this 
report (or others not known about). Where Cifas data is used as a reason for closing an 
account and the individual affected asks why it has been closed or reasons for decline are 
given, Cifas is clear that they must be told that fraud prevention data was used and told how 
to contact Cifas. The only exception is if the organisation has tipping off concerns and 
cannot inform them due to POCA regulations.  
Figure 5.2. National Fraud Database Categories  
Protective Registration – where the entry on the database has been made at the request of the 
person named. The entry may be requested due to the person being a victim of crime, such as 
a burglary or theft, where personal documentation has been stolen. Stolen documentation can 
be used to apply for an account, policy, service or insurance claim in the victim's name. 
Protective Registration helps to prevent this. Victims of data breaches and those at particular 
risk of identity fraud may also register with the service. 
Identity Fraud – where either a bogus identity or the identity of a genuine person is used 
without their consent, in an application for an account, policy, service or insurance claim. Also 
contained within this fraud type are the details of the victim of impersonation filed for his/her 
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own protection, which does not mean that he or she has committed fraud. 
Facility Takeover – where an existing customer's facility (e.g. bank account) is hijacked by a 
fraudster and unauthorised transactions made, for example, money is transferred out, the 
address on the account changed, or new cards requested. 
Application Fraud – where an applicant has used his/her own name but has made an 
application for an account, policy, service or insurance claim which contains a 'material 
falsehood' for example, false employment details, false income, or concealed addresses. The 
use of a false document (such as a payslip, bank statement or driving licence) when applying for 
an account, policy, service or insurance claim would also fall within this case type. 
Asset Conversion Fraud – where a customer sells goods (usually a vehicle) that he/she does not 
have title to, under a hire-purchase, conditional sale, contract hire, leasing or rental agreement. 
Misuse of Facility – Obtaining an account/policy or other facility with the deliberate intent of 
using that facility for a fraudulent purpose (for example, deliberately avoiding repayments or 
using an account to receive stolen funds or fraudulent transfers). 
Insurance Claims Fraud – where false information and/or false documentation is supplied as 
part of an insurance claim. 
Red categories relate to victims, rather than fraudsters.  
 
Cifas (2016a) 
     
Like the Internal database the requirements for addition to the database do not require an 
actual successful criminal prosecution. They are:   
In order to file a Case, the information must be factually correct and accurate so as 
to comply with the Fourth Data Protection Principle of the Data Protection Act 1998 
(see Annexe A). The Standard of Proof is that in all cases Full Members MUST be in a 
position to make a formal complaint to the police or other relevant law enforcement 
agency. Full Members must have carried out checks of sufficient depth to satisfy this 
Standard of Proof (and must retain a record of the checks). The offence must be 
identifiable. 
Like the internal staff fraud database the organisation must be prepared to make a 
complaint and retain the evidence to support this, but doesn’t have to. Cifas does, however, 
report its National Fraud Database cases to the police through the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau. Cifas also operates a clear appeals process and this will be explored 
later in this section.  
Cifas will conduct reviews of any cases where individuals do not agree that the filing by a 
member is accurate. As part of this, Cifas asks for copies of the evidence and reviews the 
case to check it meets the required standard of proofs for filings. Cifas upheld 18 complaints 
in favour of the individual last year. At the time of writing, Cifas was also recruiting a Citizen 
Advocate to its Advisory Board to add weight and scrutiny to its complaints procedures and 
other citizen services at a senior level.  
 THE FRAUD JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
 Page 73 
 
National Hunter also largely operates in the financial services sector, but pursues a slightly 
different approach to Cifas. First of all there is no central database, rather members operate 
to a set of rules and procedures and their databases are all linked together with the Hunter 
tool. The scheme sets the information that is shared. When a member searches for 
information about a prospective applicant for their services, that search goes through all the 
members’ databases. National Hunter also operates largely in financial services. If the same 
example used above of a person seeking to hide past bad debts by not revealing their true 
addresses in the last three years is used, under this system the search through databases 
would reveal the same person but with different address.  National Hunter has three 
categories: Clear, and Non-Clear Inconsistency and Non-Clear Refer. The latter is essentially 
fraud, but as the National Hunter representative noted:  
 we say refer because we don’t put fraud on the system because we tell our 
members that just because it’s a refer status, similar to Cifas, then you can’t just 
decline it on that refer status.  You have to do your own investigation to confirm that 
what you’ve been told is incorrect (National Hunter Representative). 
The representative also noted:  
So basically refer status is where you’ve got sufficient evidence to prove an element 
of fraud under the Fraud Act.  Inconsistency status is where typically there’s not 
enough information, you can’t get that information to prove it, things like, well, he’s 
told you he works for this particular employment but we can’t trace the 
employment, or we’ve asked him to provide payslips to prove his income but he 
hasn’t done that (National Hunter Representative). 
The National Hunter system is therefore is throwing up leads for members to investigate 
and determine if a product should be given. The leads could also be one item of 
information, for instance, if a mobile number had been used in a fraudulent application 
previously assessed. If a person applied and used that number on the application it would 
throw up that issue, requiring further investigation. National Hunter is therefore using a 
‘looser’ form of labelling against a person by not formally designating individuals as a 
fraudster, rather someone who has submitted a Non-Clear application which was referred 
and which required further investigation. Some members of National Hunter are also 
members of Cifas, so in those cases and if it met the Cifas criteria the application would also 
lead to the person been designated a fraudster too. Nevertheless there are still just under 
100,000 unique persons National Hunter members have designated as Non-Clear Refer.  
Like Cifas, information on Non-Clear applications linked to an individual stays on the system 
for six years and there is no requirement to inform the applicant that they are on the 
database.   
The final database is the Insurance Fraud Register, which was launched in 2015 and because 
of its recent creation is still to be completely operational. This register is run by the 
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Insurance Fraud Bureau and its aim is to include information on persons who have 
submitted fraudulent insurance claims or made fraudulent applications. Like the Cifas and 
National Hunter individuals are kept on the database for 6 years and there is no 
requirement to inform the individual.  
This section has not explored the Cabinet Office database or the TUFF. The former is in the 
process of been established. Once live and working further information on this will be 
sought. For TUFF contact with them revealed a reluctance to publicise or discuss the 
database. It was revealed there was no publicity of the database because this might lead to 
subject access requests and this was particularly a concern because the forthcoming 
European Directive will mean such requests can be secured at no cost to the applicant. It 
was suggested the small resources of TUFF would not be able to cope with such requests.   
Legal basis of databases   
The legal basis for the databases is founded in a number of important pieces of legislation 
and regulation. The 1998 Data Protection Act in Section 7A of schedule 3 specifically states 
the processing of sensitive personal data is lawful where “necessary for the purposes of 
preventing fraud” when conducted as “a member of an anti-fraud organisation”. Further the 
guiding European regulation which is due to be implemented (passed in 2016) through the 
General Data Protection Regulation under Recital 47 specifically states that “The processing 
of personal data strictly necessary for the purposes of preventing fraud also constitutes a 
legitimate interest of the data controller concerned”, demonstrating that European 
legislators clearly view the sharing of personal data for fraud prevention purposes as a 
legitimate exercise. Additionally many of the databases above also utilise contractual and/or 
employment contracts. When a person applies for a job, credit card or insurance there is a 
clause that they are agreeing data can be shared. These clauses are known as the ‘fair 
processing notices’. It is doubtful, however, that most persons read them or understand 
what sharing for fraud prevention actually means. Indeed one survey found only 7 percent 
of people read the terms and conditions when buying a product or service online (The 
Guardian, 2011). The following extract from the terms and conditions relating to a credit 
card application for HSBC is very typical.  
To prevent crime, verify your identity, recover debt and to meet our legal 
obligations, we may exchange information (both within the UK and, where 
appropriate, overseas) with other members of the HSBC Group and where 
appropriate, with fraud prevention, law enforcement, debt recovery agencies and 
other organisations including other lenders. If you give us false or inaccurate 
information and fraud is identified, details will be passed to fraud prevention 
agencies to prevent fraud and money laundering. Please refer to clause 11n in the 
credit card agreement terms for more information regarding the use of data by fraud 
prevention agencies. 
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To illustrate the point further consider an application to simply open an online account with 
First Direct, which is typical in this sector. There are four documents in pdf form listed next 
to the application. See screenshot below. If you go to the terms and conditions it is a 52 
page document and on page 46 the following relevant information is provided.  It is unlikely 
most prospective clients would read these before applying.  
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If you then click on that website identified it states:  
To prevent crime, to verify your identity and to recover debt, we may exchange information 
(both within the UK and, where appropriate, overseas) with other members of the HSBC 
Group, and, where appropriate, Debt Recovery Agencies, Fraud Prevention Agencies and 
other organisations including other lenders. 
If you provide false or inaccurate information and fraud is identified, details will be passed to 
Fraud Prevention Agencies. 
Law enforcement agencies may access and use this information. 
We and other organisations may also access and use this information to prevent fraud and 
money laundering, for example, when: 
● checking details on applications for credit and credit related accounts or other 
facilities 
● managing credit and credit related accounts or facilities 
● recovering debt 
● checking details on proposals and claims for all types of insurance 
● checking details of job applicants and employees. 
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We and other organisations may access and use from other countries the information 
recorded by Fraud Prevention Agencies (http://www1.firstdirect.com/1/2/legals/credit-
scoring). 
If you actually apply at the end of the application form before you press submit there is 
further information, set out in the screenshot below. This is more likely to be read than the 
detailed terms and conditions, but it is still not entirely clear what the implications of 
providing false information will be. Stating you details ‘will be passed to fraud prevention 
agencies to prevent fraud..’ does not convey the person is likely to be on a database for six 
years and will find it either much more difficult or expensive to secure many financial 
products.  
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Interviews with representatives from the Information Commissioners Office also suggested 
that the new European Directive that is due to be implemented would require more robust 
consent to be given:  
Well, actually, the standard of consent, at the moment, I don’t think is sufficient, but 
at the new regulations standard for consent is going to be much higher.  And, again, 
it’s going to be even less likely that organisations will be able to rely on consent as a 
condition for processing (Information Commissioners Office Representative). 
The information provided in the fair processing notices is generally not clear enough that 
individuals would know what they actually mean. Stating information provided in an 
application may be shared with fraud prevention agencies does not convey the full 
implications of what may occur and is also missing a potential strong deterrence message 
which could be utilised. However, clearly research needs to be conducted to determine this 
(See Recommendation 1 and 2).  
It would also seem that the community using such databases is also missing out on a 
significant prevention opportunity. If before completing an application a person was clearly 
warned that false information could lead them to being placed on a database and that this 
would have consequences this could acts as a strong deterrent. Clearly this would need 
collective action by all as a lone provider publicising a stiffer fraud deterrence message 
would be likely to shunned by many customers, for those offering a ‘softer’ message. It is 
also important to note the research by Shu et al (2012) and Ariely (2012) that encouraging 
honest acts before the completion of a document is more successful to deterring 
dishonesty. More information in a central hub about fraudster databases for consumers 
should also be provided so the general public become more aware of what the databases 
are and the risks of providing false information. The providers of fraudster databases should 
explore mandating members introduce more explicit warnings at the start of applications of 
the potential to be placed on a fraudster database if false information is provided (See 
Recommendation 3).  
Determination of guilt and punishment  
The first point to note, which has already been alluded to is that many individuals placed on 
registers are not informed they have been. Many are on such databases and do not know, 
others only find out when their suspicions are raised through failure to secure a financial 
product or termination of an existing one. Figure 5.3 provides some real examples of 
persons discovering they have been placed on such registers from internet forums. As the 
researchers had limited resources they had to rely on these for case studies. The quality of 
them cannot be verified and there were not large numbers of such cases to be found. Some 
of the cases noted in this and following tables date back over 10 years. They do nevertheless 
illustrate some of the potential problems and highlight the need to do more research to 
gauge the true extent of the problem. As noted earlier Cifas has clear procedures for 
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individuals to utilise if they are not satisfied and as the most long established and most 
transparent body figures in these forums receives most of the attention. There is also the 
challenge of the tipping off regulations which may make it impossible for some institutions 
to inform customers. Some of the databases, which keep a lower profile, might also be able 
to avoid public criticism of disappointed customers because they are simply not aware of 
them. It is also important to note these extracts in the following figures have not been 
verified and ideally if the researchers had had the resources they would have liked to have 
interviewed some of these individuals to secure more depth and quality information.   
Figure 5.3. Real examples of discovery of placement on fraudster registers 
NOT KNOWING WHY ENTERED ON REGISTER 
 
Example 1 
 
NatWest have recently told me they're closing my accounts (2 step & 1 savings) despite 
me having only opened them within the last 6 months, and having maintained them well. 
The only issue I had was 3 payments totalling ~£850 being taken fraudulently. The bank 
refunded the money no problem. 
 
I have never had any charges on the account, nor have I ever gone overdrawn.  
I couldn't think of any reason for them to close my account, so I checked my credit report. 
There is a Cifas marker on it from T-mobile. I have no idea what this is for, and the only 
dealings I have had with T-mobile were about 12-18 months ago. I used a mobile phone 
website to attempt to get a contract out, and when the credit check for my preferred 
network & phone was declined, the company signed me up for a SIM only contract with 
T-mobile without me knowing. When I unexpectedly received the SIM, I phoned T-Mobile, 
explained that I hadn't requested the SIM, and they cancelled the contract immediately. 
That was the last I heard until I saw this Cifas marker.  
 
Does anyone know what this marker means, and if/how I can get rid of it? 
Also, is this likely to be the reason Natwest are closing my accounts?  
Thanks in advance http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=3598183  
 
Example 2 
 
I was most surprised recently to be rejected for a bank account for a business I'm starting. 
I got hold of my credit report, and found a Cifas warning placed against me, by a company 
I had a secured loan with. 
 
The warning was something like "Fraudulent Identity, Facility Granted". 
 
I requested all information held on me by the company, but that contained no 
information relating to this. 
 
I have asked the company to remove the warning, but they have stated that they will not 
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do so as I "have supplied no evidence to question the accuracy of what we confirmed to 
be false during our investigation". 
 
The problem I've got is that I've no idea what they "confirmed to be false", or how they 
confirmed it to be false. This makes it pretty hard to provide evidence to question the 
accuracy of it! 
 
I've pointed out to them that the facility was granted, no payments were ever missed, 
and that it has now been fully repaid, including a steep early repayment charge (I was 
moving house so had to clear it). In addition, I've pointed out that I have no criminal 
record, and have at no point been contacted by the police or any authority regarding this 
matter. 
 
Does anyone know how long the warning will remain in place if I cannot force them to 
remove it? Does anyone have any tips about how I can get them to remove it? The Cifas 
website states that if they send me a final decision letter, I can have Cifas review the case. 
Does anyone have any experience of doing this? 
 
In the meantime, I cannot get a bank account opened for my business, which makes 
things fairly complicated. 
http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=380280  
 
Example 3  
Hi 
 
Just received a Cifas entry in my credit report. 
 
Category: First Party Fraud 
Name: My wife's 
Address: Our address 
 
Can someone tell me what that is, I've searched here, but cannot seem to find out if it is 
good or bad. 
It's category 6 on the Cifas website. 
 
Does it impact on my credit history, the credit report is in my name only? 
What has happened? 
 
thanks http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=568682 
 
  
It might seem strange that persons are not informed or are informed in a way that they do 
not understand what in reality has happened to them. Some interviews with the providers 
suggested that if persons are informed this could lead to the system becoming over 
burdened with people challenging and appealing against placement. It was also made clear 
that legally they do not have to as the IFR representative noted:  
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They don’t have to tell them that they’ll be placed on the IFR specifically.  We took a 
lot of advice from the Information Commissioners Office, and they were of the view 
that so long as you’re explaining to them clearly that the information is being used 
for fraud prevention purposes and will be shared with fraud prevention agencies 
that you don’t have to specifically name those.  So no, they don’t have to be told 
that they’re going on to the IFR, so insurers actually choose as part of their process 
when they write the repudiation letter, to actually say, we are now placing you on 
the Insurance Fraud Register; to give them a further opportunity to raise objections.  
But it’s not a compulsory requirement of the system. 
The basis for non-informing rests with the ‘fair processing notices’ and as we have already 
shown these do not generally offer enough detail. There is also in some cases the ‘tipping 
off’ barrier to informing. Again there is also the potential deterrence value of informing an 
individual. This clearly has to be balanced against the potential for the systems to collapse 
under real and spurious complaints. More research needs to be conducted to examine the 
potential implications of persons being informed they are to be placed upon a database 
along with the potential legal barriers in some cases through the ‘tipping off’ regulations 
(See Recommendation 1).  
The description above has already shown there is no formal body or persons independent of 
the investigators assessing the evidence, determining guilt and then applying a sentence, 
although Cifas does review whether its members filed a case correctly and will find in favour 
of the individual if the evidence is not robust enough or there are other issues with the case. 
The database holders (Cifas, National Hunter, IFR etc) do not assess the cases of members 
and determine if they should be placed on them. Rather the investigators gather evidence 
and determine guilt according to the database rules. Cifas does however audit its members 
on a regular basis and examines sample cases, as well as any complaints that come to Cifas, 
and publishes information about these activities. Member organisations may have their own 
internal review processes of the evidence involving ‘independent’ investigators, but little is 
known about this. A priority – although likely to be difficult to do – is to secure more 
information on how organisations make decisions to place persons on such databases (See 
Recommendation 1).  
Given there are no requirements for an independent body/person separate from the 
investigation to assess the evidence and come to a conclusion, it seems unlikely this 
happens (although Cifas does conduct its own reviews into complaints that are separate 
from the member investigation and quality assurance mechanisms in some of the other 
organisations). In the main the member organisations rely on their own quality control 
systems and the procedures of the organisation hosting the scheme. Some of these 
procedures are quite extensive. For example Cifas offers training to members and as part of 
its rules imposes a quality system on members which involves compliance reviews. In the 
2016 annual report it notes:  
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168 National Fraud Database compliance annual reviews were carried out in 2015, 
with 90% achieving a Pass grade, 9% graded Room for improvement and 1% 
Ungraded. For the Internal Fraud Database, 93 reviews were completed, with 80% 
achieving a Pass grade, 10% being graded Room for Improvement and a further 9% 
not yet having used the database. One organisation did not pass the review as there 
was insufficient evidence of compliance, leading to suspension from membership 
while the organisation worked to put clearer procedures in place (Cifas, 2016b). 
National Hunter and the IFR also have such procedures, but do not publish the results in the 
same way as Cifas. For all of them it is not possible to offer a view on the quality and 
effectiveness of such systems. However, it is worth juxtaposing the systems against the 
criminal justice system (see figure 5.4). The criminal justice system starts with police 
investigators operating to rules and putting a case together and if they consider it meets the 
necessary standards is handed to the CPS, an independent body, who provide an 
independent assessment and if it meets their standards is then sent to the courts. This is 
another independent decision-maker who may reject the case, before hearing it. If they do 
hear the case they may determine guilty or not guilty. Through all these hurdles there are 
thousands of not-guilty verdicts and there are still mistakes in the criminal justice system.11 
For the databases there is only the first part in the system, so given mistakes happen in the 
criminal justice system, it would seem likely mistakes also happen amongst the databases 
when there are no independent checks on decisions (other than a sample in a compliance 
review).  
Figure 5.4. Comparing checks and balances  
 
                                                          
11
 Research in the USA on death penalty cases where scrutiny is much higher has estimated an error rate of 4.1 
percent (Gross et al, 2014).    
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However, it could be argued that the database systems have more in common with the fixed 
penalty system of justice. Here police officers detecting criminal behaviour (drunkenness, 
speeding etc) issue a fixed penalty notice, with no reference to prosecutors or courts. There 
is some credence to this argument, but there are some important distinctions. First a person 
knows they have been issued with a fixed penalty notice, for lots of persons going on to 
databases this is not the case. Second, the notice is usually issued after clear observable 
behaviour which has breached the law, where as many fraud cases dealt with by databases 
are more complex, open to contention, with impersonation also common. Third, a fixed 
penalty notice is ‘conditional’ and the recipient could seek a court hearing (although risking 
a higher penalty if found guilty), this is not a formal option on the fraud databases, although 
it is possible to appeal after designation, if the individual knows, to the database 
administrator (although the quality and information available on this does vary from very 
extensive and transparent procedures of Cifas, to those where there is little public 
information available on) or the Financial Ombudsman. Third, being designated a fraudster 
for many people could have wider implications given this designation is shared amongst a 
wide range of organisations.  For these reasons such comparisons are not completely 
appropriate.  
The other important issue to note is the actual punishment. The punishment forms two 
parts the formal designation and placement on the registers for a specified period of time 
and the informal implications. In terms of the former in Cifas, National Hunter and the IFR 
placement lasts for 6 years, no matter what the seriousness of the fraud or the 
circumstances of the person. Thus an organised criminal pursuing fraud as a living who 
made multiple attempts (and might even have been successful) receives the same period on 
the database as a person who in desperate circumstances has made a one off attempt  at 
securing a loan using false information. There is not differentiation between success or 
failed attempt (although the former might be more likely to lead to criminal prosecution) or 
the size of the potential fraud. Most importantly there is no consideration of circumstances. 
A person could have had a mental breakdown, yet is treated the same as sane organised 
fraudster (although Cifas do have provisions in their rules to take account of this). Greater 
diversity in lengths on the databases would involve more complexity and probably therefore 
more costs.  
It is also informative to juxtapose the length of time on the database against the periods of 
time it takes for a conviction to be spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (ROA) 
1974. If one considers that most of the acts of fraud dealt with by the databases would be 
unlikely to result in a custodial sentence and if it does a sentence of six months or under 
would be likely, the six years of the databases does significantly contrast with the ROA 
where two years and below would be the norm.  
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Table 5.3. Periods for convictions to be spent under the ROA for adults.  
Sentence/disposal Buffer period for adults 
(18 and over at the time of 
conviction or the time the disposal is 
administered). 
This applies from the end date of the 
sentence (including the licence 
period). 
Custodial sentence* of over 4 years, or a 
public protection sentence  
Never spent  
Custodial sentence of over 30 months (2 ½ 
years) and up to and including 48 months (4 
years)  
7 years  
Custodial sentence of over 6 months and up 
to and including 30 months (2 ½ years)  
4 years  
Custodial sentence of 6 months or less  2 years  
Community order or youth rehabilitation 
order**  
1 year  
Fine  1 year  
Conditional discharge,  Period of the order  
Absolute discharge  None  
Conditional caution and youth conditional 
caution  
3 months or when the caution ceases 
to have effect if earlier  
Simple caution, youth caution  Spent immediately  
Compensation order*  On the discharge of the order  
(i.e. when it is paid in full)  
Binding over order  Period of the order  
Attendance centre order  Period of the order  
Hospital order (with or without a restriction 
order)  
Period of the order  
Adapted from Home Office (2014) 
This is an area which requires more consideration and research as to the feasibility of 
different periods on the database (See Recommendation 4).  
The other aspect to punishment is what organisations do in possession of the knowledge 
someone is on a fraudsters register. The evidence would suggest at the very least a greater 
premium to purchase products and for some no access to them. Clearly any organisation 
has the right not to offer services for a particular person and to charge a higher costs for a 
person who is a greater risk. However, if organisations are simply ‘blacklisting’ persons on a 
fraudster database for that reason this is more concerning, particularly as the expectation of 
these schemes is that ‘blacklisting’ should not occur. Interviews with Cifas, National Hunter 
and the Insurance Fraud Register confirmed that a fraud marker should not be treated as an 
‘automatic blacklist’ and that it should be used to inform decision-making amongst a 
number of sources of information. There is also the added dimension of some of the other 
databases not considered in depth in this section, which might be providing information 
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which inform decisions. It is difficult to determine what bodies actually do with the 
information. Some of the evidence from the forums suggests a marker does make securing 
bank accounts, credit etc virtually impossible, but there might be other factors alongside the 
marker at play as noted earlier. There was some evidence, however, which was concerning 
from one forum of a former worker who stated:  
I was a processor for a credit institution albeit back in the late 90s and at the end of 
an application there was a code for Cifas marker present. In the company I worked 
for this would result in a decline. In-house policy possibly due to the extra work 
involved maybe - and could of course be handled differently now. 
http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=4800991  
This is of course an unverified post from 20 years ago. Cifas rules now would clearly not 
allow this and their auditing procedures if identified would result in disciplinary action. 
There could also be lots of people with markers against their name still with bank accounts 
and securing credit, but because there has been no impact are not complaining on online 
forums. It would be interesting to secure statistics from financial institutions of the 
percentage of those with fraud markers who are offered bank accounts, credit etc. It is also 
unclear what institutions who use some of the other databases not considered in depth 
here do with their information. It is clear more research needs to be done to determine 
what impact the markers have on institutions decisions regarding potential clients. This, 
however, would be likely to be a very difficult area to secure access and information. More 
research needs to be undertaken to determine what organisations do and simple statistics 
like the percentage of applications with a fraud marker were offered a product would offer 
greater insight (See Recommendation 1).  
Appeals  
There is evidence that some who do find themselves entered on fraud registers dispute the 
entry. Figure 5.4 below provides a few examples from internet forums of individuals publicly 
disputing there placement on a register (Again please note it was not possible to verify the 
account of the person posting on the forum).  
Figure 5.4. Real examples of persons disputing entry on register 
DISPUTING AN ENTRY 
 
Example 1 
 
Hi All, 
 
I wondered if anybody could shed some light on some things. 
 
After a SAR request to Cifas, I have discovered that Barclaycard have registered an entry 
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against me for Application Fraud - non-disclosure of address with adverse history. 
 
This is incorrect as the address in question was from at least 8 years prior. I was also not 
aware that there was anything registered there anymore (adverse or otherwise). If I 
haven't lived there for 8 (or more) years, there is no requirement to put it on the form. I 
cannot imagine what information they have found which makes them believe that I was 
living there in the 3 years previous to my application. 
http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=4047479  
 
Example 2  
 
Lloyds sent me a letter out of the blue stating that they were closing all bank accounts I 
have with them in 60 days. After much investigation it seems that I have found the 
problem. 
 
I was a company Director and Shareholder until June 2013. I resigned and sold the 
company on the stock change and was acquired by someone else. I had no interest in the 
bank account. 
 
The company was recently involved in what Lloyds describe as fraudulent activity with a 
PayPal account which has been left at a large negative balance. 
 
Lloyds have put a marker on me after being contacted by PayPal and Lloyds having me 
listed still as a Director and Shareholder. I have explained I am not which can be verified 
by checking Companies House but they have said the answer is full and final and are 
persistence that I am the Director and Owner and are not going to reverse any decision. 
 
I have written to Lloyds but they have stated they are sticking to their guns. It appears as 
though after resigning my name was left on the bank account and this is why I have been 
reported to Cifas. 
 
What can I do to try and get this removed as Lloyds have said there is no chance of 
getting it removed! 
 
Thanks and sorry for such a bummer of a first post. http://forums.all-about-
debt.co.uk/showthread.php?18506-Lloyds-whacked-a-CIFAS-Cat-6-no-one-will-let-me-
have-an-account  
 
Example 3 
 
Please could someone give advice. Nat West Bank have closed daughters bank account -
we think a third party paid cheques into her account without her knowledge approx 11k 
as this showed on her statement. we assume bank stopped cheques. They have refused 
to discuss reason. We have written to them but they have come back and said will not 
change decision. We think someone has hacked into her account. Natwest  have 
placed a record with Cifas against her saying 1st party fraud. At no time has bank 
contacted her to discuss. You are treated as guilty without having any opportunity to 
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discuss. How can we reverse this Cifas  listing. We have spoken to the 
Financial Ombudsman  but that is going to take weeks. What affect will this Cifas listing 
have against her name/ future credit/ employer searches etc. Very worried-could anyone 
help please. http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/showthread.php?333740-
Natwest-closed-account-defamation-of-character  
 
 
Note: An appeal to Cifas in some of these cases would have been possible and may even 
have been pursued, but it is not possible to verify this.  
Individuals placed on fraudster databases disputing their placement have a variety of 
options to appeal the decision. However, the first thing they need to do is to determine if 
they are on such a database and if so who placed them there. As has already been noted in 
most of these schemes it is not the practice to inform the person when placed on the 
register apart from the case of employees and the Cifas Internal Fraud Database, where 
they must be informed. The first stage for most is therefore using a subject access request 
under the Data Protection legislation, which they have to pay for (although Cifas plans to 
make its Subject Access Requests free from 2017) to determine if there is a fraud marker 
against their name and who might have put it there. Once they have determined this the 
next stage is to appeal to the organisation that placed them there. If that fails they can then 
in most instances appeal to the provider of the fraudster database. Cifas openly publish this 
information, which others do not. In 2015, Cifas returned 1,242 Subject Access Requests 
with data on individuals. Of these there were 88 requests for Cifas to investigate. They 
conducted 88 independent investigations into cases on behalf of members of the public, 
upholding 18 cases in favour of the individual, overturning members’ decisions to file a case. 
This must be put into context of the nearly 300,000 new cases filed to the database by 
members in the same year. In the financial services sector for consumer related appeals 
there is an additional level of appeal to the Financial Ombudsman and other equivalent 
schemes for other sectors. 
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Figure 5.6. Appeals procedures  
Cifas Internal Staff 
Fraud Database 
Cifas National Fraud 
Database 
National Hunter Insurance Fraud 
Register 
Need to appeal to 
organisation that 
placed them on 
register and if that is 
unsuccessful can 
then appeal to Cifas. 
If that is 
unsuccessful, 
individuals can then 
appeal to the 
Information 
Commissioners 
Office. 
Need to appeal to 
organisation that 
placed them on 
register and if that is 
unsuccessful can 
then appeal to Cifas. 
If that is 
unsuccessful can 
appeal to Financial 
Ombudsman. 
Need to appeal to 
the organisation 
that made them 
Non-Clear Refer 
status. If that is 
unsuccessful can 
appeal to Financial 
Ombudsman. 
Need to appeal to 
organisation that 
placed them on 
register and if that is 
unsuccessful can 
then appeal to IFR. 
If that is 
unsuccessful can 
appeal to Financial 
Ombudsman. 
 
The Financial Ombudsman has effectively become the de facto last stage in appeals relating 
to placement on fraudster registers. Under the scheme the complainant has to go to the 
organisation they are complaining about first. If after 8 weeks there has been no response 
or the person is not satisfied with the complaint the Ombudsman can deal with it. There is 
an initial screening to see if the complaint can be resolved quickly or mediation is not 
possible an investigation occurs. An Adjudicator will write a report with recommendations, 
but if the complainant is still not happy they can ask for a review by the Ombudsman. The 
Financial Ombudsman publishes the cases it has considered. As the description before 
reveals these represent the last stage in their processes and some related to fraudster 
databases may have been resolved before this stage. Those cases for 2015 were assessed 
which involved a fraudster database where a person disputed been placed on it (cases 
related to victims and protective registration were excluded). Table 5.4 presents the analysis 
for 2015. The complaints nearly all relate to financial provider who placed the person on the 
register, but it is possible to determine from the complaint which database they relate to. 
Unsurprisingly as the database with the highest profile Cifas had the biggest count at 15 and 
of those complaints 5 were upheld by the Ombudsman and 10 were rejected. Of the 5 that 
were upheld 2 related to decisions which had already been upheld by the Adjudicator, but 
the compensation offered was not enough so they continued with their case. The Insurance 
Fraud Register had one case and National Hunter one too.  
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Table 5.4. Financial ombudsman consideration of fraud register related cases in 2015 
Organisation Cases Upheld Cases Rejected 
Total Number 
of Cases 
Cifas 5 10 15 
Insurance Fraud Register  0 1 1 
National Hunter  1 0 1 
 
It is worth briefly illustrating some of the cases. In the first case which was rejected by the 
Ombudsman involved a complaint to Santander from a customer who had applied for a 
mortgage and at the checking stage had been identified as fraudulent and a marker was 
placed on Cifas as a consequence. The consequences of this were that Mr M was having 
difficulty securing a mortgage. The checks by the bank revealed that the documentation to 
support his claims of income was invalid. The Ombudsman rejected his complaint and 
noted:  
Santander, like any other lender, is entitled to carry out credit checks and research 
on the circumstances of any consumer who wishes to borrow money. 
If it finds anomalies, or has concerns, it may decline the credit. It is also required, by 
law, to place a marker on any reference or fraud agencies as a result. Lenders may 
decline credit without giving any reasons to the consumer, and this is what has 
happened in this case. 
They also noted:  
But each lender makes its own decisions on whether to give credit to a consumer. 
Remarks from one supplier on the Cifas record are not an automatic bar to other 
lenders providing funds (Financial Ombudsman, 2015a). 
 
The next case relates to the Insurance Fraud Register and involves a claim by Mr F that 
Sabre Insurance unfairly placed him on the Insurance Fraud Register. Mr F had reported a 
burglary and that his car keys had been stolen and subsequently his car was found 
abandoned and damaged. This had been reported to Sabre Insurance for a claim. As a result 
of a police investigation he was charged and convicted of wasting police time, but fraud 
charges were dropped. Mr F wanted his claim dealt with and removal from the register. He 
claimed he had comprehensive insurance and as such the claim should be settled and that 
as he was not charged with fraud, should not be placed on the register. However, the 
Ombudsman concluded Mr F had admitted to misleading the insurer and as such a policy 
exclusion applied on settling the claim were entitled not do so and to add him to the 
register (Financial Ombudsman, 2015b).   
The final case involves the Ombudsman overturning a decision relating to Mr K who was 
placed on CIFAS for making a fraudulent mortgage application. Mr K had made a mortgage 
application and in that was asked whether he had any other mortgages on other properties, 
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to which he answered no. Checks revealed he did and his application was rejected. He only 
became aware of this 18 months later when he applied for another loan and was turned 
down. The Ombudsman investigation revealed a number of anomalies in this case and 
noted:   
I hadn’t seen anything signed by Mr K to confirm that the information recorded on 
the “Application Summary Report” was accurate. And there was no evidence, except 
for the typed “No”, that Mr K falsely told the bank he did not have another 
mortgage. Mr K’s employment was not recorded – but his only source of income was 
property rental income and he provided evidence of this in the form of signed 
statements from his accountant. Although the income statements themselves did 
not provide evidence that Mr K had other mortgages, Mr K’s actions in providing 
these statements did not suggest to me that he was deliberately trying to conceal 
information about mortgages on other properties from Santander. So I thought 
Santander should have considered all the circumstances of this application before it 
recorded a fraudulent application with Cifas (Financial Ombudsman, 2015c).  
 
The case was upheld with a recommendation of £100 compensation and removal from the 
register.  
 
Miscarriages and other problems 
It was noted earlier that with all the checks and balances the criminal justice system makes 
mistakes. With the more streamlined structures amongst the fraudster databases and lesser 
checks and balances it would seem likely that mistakes also occur amongst the databases. 
Some of the cases from the Financial Ombudsman have already revealed some of the 
problems that occur. There is also further evidence from the media and online forums of 
problems in decision-making.  
In 2012 the BBC’s Money Box programme highlighted the case of a student who had been 
placed on the Cifas fraudster database for ‘first party fraud’ by mistake, and who as a 
consequence had his existing bank accounts closed and was unable to open another 
account. The student complained, ‘I was made to go to the counter and clear my account in 
cash. You feel like a criminal when you're marched over and marched out the door without 
being given any reason as to why your account is being closed’ (BBC News, 2012b). Only his 
father’s intervention and investigation skills saved him as he was able to prove it was the 
bank’s mistake. The Chair of the then Financial Services Authority’s Consumer Panel, 
commented upon the case, ‘You cannot find out what you're accused of, you cannot plead 
your case and you find yourself unable to open a bank account and nothing can be done 
about it. What's happening goes absolutely against the rules of natural justice’ (BBC News, 
2012b).  
 
In 2014 another case was highlighted in the Sunday Times, when a man who failed to notify 
his mortgage lender that he was renting some of his spare rooms was as a consequence 
placed on the Cifas fraudster database, on the grounds of ‘application fraud and mortgage 
property misuse’ (Mikhailova, 2014). In another case, not related to Cifas, highlighted by 
This Is Money a merchant navy officer (Mrs Larkin), after been encouraged by her bank to 
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open multiple savings accounts had her account frozen and was told she was being 
investigated for fraud and eventually that the accounts would be closed for good. Mrs Larkin 
claimed, ‘I was branded a criminal. When I rang up, I felt as though they were taking delight 
in listening to me beg and plead with them for information about what was going on.’ 
Weeks later the mistake was realised and she was told the reason it had happened was 
because she had opened too many accounts (Lythe, 2012). This research also identified 
from internet forums some further cases illustrating the impact of being placed on a 
register. These cases cannot be verified and they may well have been guilty. The purpose is 
purely to illustrate the impact.  
 
Figure 5.5. Case studies of impact of being placed on register (again these cases 
cannot be verified) 
  
IMPACT 
 
Example 1 
 
So to cut a very long story short, I have a Cifas cat 4 marker against my name. I wont bore 
you with the details but it has been on for 3'years and causing me servere stress. I keep 
getting declined for even something as basic as a basic bank account.  
 
Does anyone know if and who will give me some form of credit to help build my credit 
file, and to help my finances look better? 
 
Please note my credit score is 900, never missed any payments, have a credit card, bank 
account and mobile phone accounts etc (all opened before the Cifas) 
 
Anyone else in the same boat that can shed some 
light?! http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=5210201  
 
 
Example 2 
 
I am in a big mess and would like an advise on how to move forward. 
 
I happen to move to UK in 2011 to study and i opened some bank accounts then. I was a 
paying international student and because i needed help to complete my school fees, i 
applied to various loan companies not really knowing how things work in UK. I got 
different offers but there was this loan company called Leads Valley which i got a 
response from and we went through the process they told me and i was even asked to 
pay a £50 refundable registration fee which i paid before knowing it was a scam.  
 
Some days after i had paid the money, A transaction came into my account and i was 
thinking it was the money from the loan company so i wanted to go withdraw it from the 
cash machine but my card was seized so i went into the bank to complain and i was asked 
where the money was from and i explained what had been doing but to my surprise,I was 
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asked to come and collect my monies from the bank without the transaction i thought 
was from the loan company because my account was going to be closed without any 
reason given. 
 
To cut the long story short, i didn't attach too much importance to what happened as i 
was new in the system and didn't know it will come back to hunt me. So i deposited my 
money into my other account which was a savings account and after some years, i 
wanted to upgrade to a current account but to my surprise the samething experienced 
some years back happened where i had to take my money out and the account closed.  
 
Since then i have been trying to see what exactly is the problem and it was during this 
time i knew about credit file. I was asked to go check which i did and found nothing 
incriminating on it and after about a year of my account being closed, i went back to see if 
i can re-open it but still couldn't and one of the banks now told me to go check the fraud 
database and when i did, i was shocked to see that a first party fraud was recorded 
against me by Lloyds Bank Plc who where the bank that first closed my account due to 
what they suspect was a fraud. 
 
My question now is, can i take this up with them as i know nothing about the transfer 
which i am being punished for now and putting a stamp against my name has really 
affected me ,it's limited my job prospects, i can't apply for any credit facility.  
 
Also, i can provide correspondences between myself and the loan company with some 
other loan companies i applied to at the same time. 
 
Kindly advise! http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=5383015  
 
Example 3  
 
Hi There,  
I have been reported to CIFAS recently by Lloyds Bank, they also have closed my bank 
account thats the only one i have. Now when i tried to open a new bank account almost 
every bank is rejecting my application.  
My credit score is 840+ but still dont understand whats going on.  
 
IS any one have the same situation ? 
http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/showthread.php?t=5282150  
 
Example 4  
 
Can anyone please help? 
 
I applied for a mortgage in January of this year via a broker, as part of the application I 
foolishly falsified my bank statement to increase my level of borrowing, the application 
was duly declined and I can no longer get any credit. Before people begin with the 
criticism I realise this was bloody stupid and that I deserve to be in the position I am in 
now, however I need to by a house for me and my kids so I'm keen to understand if there 
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is anything I can do. 
 
This is even more frustrating as I didn't actually need to inflate my salary to get the house 
I wanted to buy!!! God knows why I did it. 
 
To cut a long story short I now have a Cifas marker against my name for Fraud - falsifying 
documents. I understand this will now remain for 6 years from the date of issue. 
 
My question is are there any lenders who do not check Cifas, I have seen some threads 
where people mention Chorley Building Society, is this the case and is anyone aware of 
any others? 
 
Not sure if it will make any difference but I would be looking at a house for around $700k 
with a deposit of £250k. My credit file is impeccable with the exception of the Cifas. 
 
Any light anyone can she would be gratefully received. 
 
 
5.3 Standards and Regulation  
Cifas, National Hunter and the IFR all have detailed rules of operating that have been 
developed in consultation with the Information Commissioner’s Office. The transparency 
and quality of these, particularly Cifas, are very good. However, for others and particularly 
some of those not considered in depth their standards are more difficult to judge, 
particularly as they are in lots of cases not in the public domain. It is surprising given the 
activities of fraudster databases that there are no special codes of practice, standards or 
regulations. Like any organisation that processes data the databases must meet the 
standards set by the Information Commissioners Office regarding the retention, processing 
and sharing of data. For those organisations which are SAFO there is also a Home Office 
Code of Practice on Data Sharing for the Prevention of Fraud (Home Office, 2015). This, 
however, is much more geared around standards and issues related to public bodies sharing 
information with private bodies recognised as SAFO.  
This research has shown that the fraudster databases have emerged as rudimentary private 
systems of justice and are designating persons as ‘criminals’. In the short-term the new 
European Directive on data protection is also likely to stimulate further and new controls on 
such databases12 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). It is also interesting to 
debate whether Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ‘Right to a Fair 
Trial’, could apply given the designation of a person with a criminal label? This is beyond the 
scope of this project, but would be another interesting area to explore.   
                                                          
12
 The UK decision to Brexit may, however, change this.  
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The importance and areas of concern that fraudster databases raise, strongly point to the 
need for a set of basic standards that go beyond the basic data protection regulations, 
which all bodies working in this area should work to. Some of the areas where common 
minimum standards should be considered, include:  
● The wording and communication of fair processing notices.   
● The communication of consequences of engaging in fraud.  
● Standards of evidence required to provide a fraud marker.  
● Standards regarding the decision-making process that lead to a fraud marker.   
● Standards of training regarding staff who make such decisions.   
● Standards regarding the quality control of decisions to place a fraud marker.  
● Standards regarding the inspection of bodies that use fraudster databases.  
 
It was clear from the bodies interviewed, Cifas, IFR and National Hunter, that they already 
had many standards and were actively considering more. However, what other bodies are 
doing, particularly the databases not considered in this section noted in table 5.1 is much 
less clear. Therefore it would seem to be in the interests of the best and those who are 
already significantly more transparent and visible, such as Cifas, to come together to 
develop common standards, which others would then be pressured to follow. This 
preliminary research has not secured enough evidence to suggest what form these 
standards should take either a voluntary code of practice or more binding standards. It is 
clear, however, from the findings from this study that standards are required and the sector 
should consider establishing a group drawing in the interests of the counter fraud 
community, regulators and consumers to develop a code of practice for this sector (See 
Recommendation 5).   
5.5 Conclusion: Balancing Justice Against Effectively Countering Fraud  
This section has identified the growing number of databases used to deal with fraud and 
provided more depth findings on some of the fraudster registers. The development of these 
private and rudimentary forms of justice do raise some important issues. Their role in the 
absence of state interest to deal with this problem is central to preventing and deterring 
fraud. However, this study has identified a series of issues that require further research and 
potential reforms to enhance their effectiveness and most importantly to ensure quality and 
just decision-making for all. Many of the bodies could do more to emulate the already high 
standards of Cifas, which is also seeking to already improve further.  
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6. Emerging Themes, Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this section some of the key emerging themes from this project will be outlined. It will 
start with the themes related to the dominance of the non-criminal justice system. It will 
then move on to consider the quality of justice, before considering the opportunities for 
victims. Overall conclusions will then be made before considering all the recommendations 
from this report.  
6.1 Dominance of the Non-Criminal Justice System  
This report has shown the dominance of non-criminal related justice for fraud related 
behaviours. It is, however, important to note the dominance is largely explained by a 
handful of ‘niche’ areas: NHS charge fraud, fare evasion, tax understatement, benefits fraud 
and financial product application fraud. The report has noted, however, a small but 
significant number of fraudsters dealt solely by regulatory bodies (circa 400 per year). This 
use of non-criminal justice raises a number of themes.   
Decriminalisation. Many volume low level and attempted frauds have effectively 
become decriminalised into regulatory penalties (this might be welcome to some, 
but does raise consistency issues as some ‘comparable’ frauds are dealt with very 
differently).   
De-labelling. Many fraud related behaviours are de-labelled using a variety of other 
types of label, some identified during this research include: ‘deliberate 
understatement’, ‘deliberate understatement with concealment’, ‘dishonest 
disclosures’, ‘cheating’, ‘misconduct’, ‘dishonestly conducted unauthorised 
activities’, ‘prejudicing clients for own interest’, ‘unprofessional conduct’.       
Currency of labels. The use of non-criminal sanctions creates a hierarchy of fraudster 
designations, which can be compared to different currencies. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
these, starting with the ‘reserve currencies’ of criminal convictions and police 
cautions, which have a very high status and are automatically accepted by other 
bodies. Though criminal convictions and cautions are in the public domain, they tend 
only to be in the public view if they have been reported by the media or are 
volunteered by the offenders. They also appear when employment is contingent on 
disclosures through the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS). They are therefore a 
high quality ‘currency’ that not all have access to. 
Moving down the scale, civil court decisions and regulatory findings have high status, 
but are lower than the criminal convictions and cautions, and are widely accepted. 
The civil court decisions are in the public domain, but many regulatory decisions 
remain confidential, and are in the public domain.  
 THE FRAUD JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
 Page 96 
 
Then there is the new currency category created by fraudster registers of ‘confirmed 
fraudster’, which has lower status, variable quality and, most significantly, is only 
exchanged between members. They are not in the public domain and are only 
accessible to affected members of the public via subject access requests to obtain 
copies of their own entries. It has a higher status than ‘intelligence’ because there is 
an expectation the evidence could be used for a criminal prosecution if the victims 
wanted to.   
Finally there is intelligence database category, which has the lowest status, also 
varies in its quality and exchange is restricted to its membership. This could be 
simply suspicions about a particular person through to very high quality information 
that a person has committed a fraud.  
 
Figure 6.1. The hierarchy of fraud designation  
 
 
6.2 Quality of Justice  
This report highlights three  sanction orientated justice systems which deal with fraud 
related cases outside of the criminal justice system and models linked to them:  
Contempt of Court in Civil Courts  
Regulatory Bodies:  
 Regulatory Tribunal Justice 
 
 Intelligence 
 
Confirmed Fraudster on Register 
 
Public Regulatory Decision 
 
Contempt of Court/Civil Finding 
 
Police Caution 
 
Criminal Conviction 
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 Regulatory Administrative Justice: Private and Public  
Fixed Penalty Justice  
Fraudster Registers   
What is quality in justice is a subject likely to yield much debate and many indicators. For 
the purposes of this report the criminal justice system is taken as the baseline quality 
standard. This is because of the independence of the judiciary (and juries) determining guilt 
and penalty; the separation of investigation and prosecution processes, the robust rules on 
evidence gathering and procedure; the opportunities to be represented in court by qualified 
lawyers and for evidence and testimony to be contested; and the independent 
opportunities to appeal to name some of the most important. This is not to say this system 
is perfect, because there are clearly many areas that are still the subject of critique, but the 
previous mentioned ‘ingredients’ provide for a system that reduces the risks of mistakes and 
unfair treatment. As Figure 2 below illustrates many of the systems explored in this report 
vary in the level of quality by vertically plotting the quality of justice from the top, the 
criminal justice system, downwards to those that increasingly lack the same key attributes. 
Secondly by horizontally plotting the increasing severity of punishment: 
Private shaming – unpublished sanctions 
- fixed penalty notices 
- loss of licence, warnings, fines 
Public shaming - public hearings or publication of sanctions 
- loss of licence, warnings, fines 
Non-custodial penalties (fines)  
Custodial sentences (suspended terms, imprisonment) 
 
Only the contempt of court procedure has the custody option with the associated 
stigmatisation risk; although the proceedings take place in non-jury civil courts, the quality 
of justice is still high with independent judges presiding over the case; the defendants have 
access to legal aid and representation; the adjudicator is entirely independent of the 
prosecutor. The absence of a jury and the maximum of 2 years in prison, however, means 
the severity of punishment and quality of justice are not to the standard of the criminal 
justice system.  
Moving further down the figure, the quality of Tribunal Regulatory Justice is high as it uses 
formal hearings, independent adjudicators, defence rights and cross-examination and it can 
administer a wide range of non-custodial sanctions, including professional banishment with 
the associated public shaming. Regulatory Administrative Justice: Public has similar sanction 
capacity to the Tribunal model, but the quality is reduced without the sophisticated level of 
scrutiny, checks and balances. Then there is Regulatory Administrative Justice: Private, 
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which is similar to the Public version but, because it remains confidential, omits the wider 
public shaming implications.  
Fixed Penalty Justice is a low quality system based on the perceptions and discretion of 
authorised individuals, where the severity of punishment is a small fine and or warning and 
private shaming (such is the low level of the financial penalties this has not been mapped to 
link with financial penalties on the increasing severity scale). Finally, the quality of justice in 
fraudster registers is the weakest (although as some would dispute they are justice systems 
this is not surprising), with no separation of allocation and administration of justice, lack of 
transparency and citizens entirely unaware they have been implicated. The punishment is 
the weakest in the formal sense, but potentially severe in its unpredictable disruptive 
effects.  
Figure 6.2. Quality of justice versus severity of punishment 
 
Consistency of sanctions  
This research has illustrated the wide range of sanctions available. It has not analysed the 
consistency in application of sanctions. Clearly the regulators have different standards and 
this might be logical and justifiable. Variations within a single sanction framework might also 
be justifiable. However, it is an area in need of further research: first to determine the 
whether there is inconsistency, then to explore if it is a problem and, if it is, how to rectify it 
(recommendation 6).   
6.3 Opportunities for Justice for Victims  
There is often frustration from victims at the lack of interest of the criminal justice system. 
Organisational victims particularly through the in-house and contracted fraud investigators 
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are often very dissatisfied. Though this research has exposed alternative avenues of justice, 
the evidence indicates that the criminal justice system remains the dominant tool beyond 
internal disciplinary measures for many counter-fraud specialists at the ‘coal face’; the other 
routes to justice are rarely used. The survey produced 146 usable responses. Though the 
sample frame is not representative of the counter-fraud community, it nevertheless 
provides a large snapshot of the experiences of counter fraud specialists. It found evidence 
of the lack of faith in the criminal justice system and the low usage of alternative sanctions.   
● Only 12.5 percent rated the criminal justice system as effective (n=136). 
● 67.9 percent had never or rarely used the civil justice system (n=140). 
● Over 90 percent had never or rarely used contempt of court (n=141). 
● 54.2 percent had never or rarely used regulatory bodies to deal with fraudsters 
(n=140). 
● 74.4 percent had never or rarely used fraudster databases to deal with fraudsters 
(n=141). 
Respondents were also able to offer reasons for the non-use of alternative sanctions and 
could identify more than one reason. Table 6.1 shows just under a quarter lacking the skills 
and knowledge to pursue them and just over a quarter with an organisational policy not to 
use them. Just under 10 percent did not know it was possible. These are small numbers, but 
given the lack of information and training in this area it does highlight the need for more 
research, guidance and training provision in the use of alternative sanctions.   
Table 6.1. Reasons for not pursuing alternative sanctions 
 If you have not pursued alternative sanctions before, could you state why? 
Answer Options Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
No relevant regulator 9.2% 7 
Regulator not interested 18.4% 14 
I did not know it was possible 9.2% 7 
Alternative sanctions are too weak 21.1% 16 
I did not think it was appropriate 23.7% 18 
I lack the knowledge / skills to pursue them 22.4% 17 
I would like to but it is the policy of my organisation not 
to 
27.6% 21 
Other (please specify) 19.7% 15 
answered question 76 
skipped question 70 
 
Non-criminal justice sanctions provide another route to justice in some cases of fraud for 
the victim in parallel or instead of criminal justice sanctions. However, more needs to be 
done to raise awareness of them and to train staff in their use (See Recommendation 6).  
6.4 Overall Conclusions  
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This research highlights the significant use of non-criminal justice sanctions for fraud related 
behaviours. In recent years influential reports on the broader regulatory landscape have 
advocated using criminal sanctions as a last resort (Hampton, 2005; Macrory, 2006). From 
this body of research and the present study, the advantages and disadvantages of non-
criminal routes can be summarised as follows: 
 
Advantages of non-criminal sanctions  
● Usually lower standard of proof; 
● Less bureaucracy;  
● Usually less time consuming; 
● Flexibility; 
● Wider range of sanctions tailored to sectors; 
● Some regulators apply tougher penalties than the criminal justice system; 
● Usually quicker than the criminal justice system; 
● Lower cost than the criminal justice system;  
● Sector expertise not available in the criminal justice system; 
● Criminal courts might not understand cases; 
● Criminal sanction may be disproportionately high; 
● Many criminal cases usually lead to regulatory anyway. 
 
Disadvantages of non-criminal sanctions  
● Effectively decriminalises certain criminal behaviours; 
● Lower quality of justice processes; 
● Greater possibility of mistakes; 
● Inadequate penalties for more egregious offences; 
● Reduced deterrent effect; and  
● Victims might not be as satisfied 
 
6.5 Recommendations  
The report identifies six recommendations. The first recommendation relates to expanding 
the evidence base in this area through further research and the other five are policy related 
recommendations for organisations with regulatory responsibility or who operate in this 
area.   
Recommendation 1. The knowledge base relating to fraud and justice beyond the criminal 
justice system is relatively small and as this report has illustrated the non-criminal justice 
routes for dealing with fraud are the most common by far. There are also numerous gaps in 
knowledge, a variety of potential areas of concern and areas which likely require further 
improvement in these non-criminal justice systems. Future research should be funded and 
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directed to filling these gaps and our views based upon this research are the following 
should be priority areas:    
 Understanding the significant differences in fraudster offending rates between 
professions.  
 Gauging the appetite of regulatory bodies to deal with fraud related cases and the 
reasons for accepting and declining fraud related cases.     
 Whether greater aid should be made available to those undergoing disciplinary 
hearings, who have no access to representation and legal advice.  
 The extent of and reasons for attrition of regulatory cases from report to successful 
completion.   
 The quality of justice, consistency and proportionality of sanctions for persons 
disciplined for fraud related behaviours by regulatory bodies.  
 The workings of databases that hold fraud related intelligence (as opposed to 
confirmed fraudsters) on individuals which have only be considered in part in this 
report.  
 The personal consequences and the wider potential implications of persons being 
placed on a fraudster register.  
 Finding more information on how organisations make decisions and the quality of 
such decisions to place persons on such databases and then following on from that 
how organisations use the information from fraudster registers/databases to make 
decisions on the provision of services/offers of employment.  
Recommendation 2. Organisations which use fraudster registers should provide clearer and 
more concise information to customers/employees on what they do with fraud related 
information (ie clearly stating that a fraudulent statement will lead to placement on 
database for 6 years which will be shared amongst the members of that database).  
Fraudster databases should consider developing standards relating to this and such 
guidance should also be included in any industry standards which might evolve.   
Recommendation 3. The providers of fraudster databases should explore mandating 
member organisations provide more explicit warnings on the start of application forms of 
the potential to be placed on a fraudster database if false information is provided. 
Recommendation 4. Database providers should consider  whether the period of registration 
on databases should be varied, contingent the nature and circumstances of the fraud 
related behaviour.   
Recommendation 5. It is clear from the findings of this study that common standards are 
required and the sector – steered by the Information Commissioners Office and leading 
database providers such as Cifas - should consider establishing a group, which draws on the 
interests of the counter-fraud community, regulators and consumers, to develop a code of 
practice for fraudster databases and registers.   
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Recommendation 6. Bodies employing fraud investigators, such as the police, should 
consider developing and commissioning more training and education in alternative 
sanctions.   
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7. Methods Used  
The researchers used the following data collection methods for this research.  
 
Desk Based Research 
 
The first step involved extensive searches to assemble a database of state and non-state 
regulatory bodies which deal with fraud related cases outside of the criminal justice system. 
A search was also undertaken for fraud related. The research database accompanies this 
report. The state bodies are drawn from:  
 
● Central government (government departments, agencies and quangos); 
● Specialist courts; and   
● Local government.   
 
Organisations which are not part of the state, but which have strong control over their areas 
of activity through monopoly or with the explicit authority of the state:  
● Industry regulatory bodies (self-regulating bodies, sporting bodies);  
● Professional regulatory bodies; and   
● Professional associations.  
 
Two types of database providers: 
● Confirmed fraudster registers and 
● Intelligence databases 
 
The time and resources available for this research led the research team to exclude the 
following from the scope of this project:  
● Bodies specific to Scotland and Northern Ireland;  
● Local authority activities on fraud related offences including Trading Standards; 
● Bodies with no public evidence of having dealt with fraud related cases or have done 
so extremely rarely (although they may have the capacity to do so); 
● Civil  courts as their purpose is to resolve disputes, not to apply sanctions; 
● Ombudsman services as their focus is on service complaints, not misconduct; and 
● Bodies dealing solely with organisations (although we have noted some of these in a 
subsidiary schedule of organisations).  
 
The researchers assessed 128 regulatory bodies and identified 71 which deal with fraud 
behaviour. The research database includes details of 71 regulatory bodies which deal with 
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fraud behaviour and 25 fraud related databases. Table 7.1 provides a breakdown by type. 
Information on the structure and methods used by each regulator was added to the 
database, for example, the type of type regulator, the type of hearings (if any) and the 
standard of proof. This descriptive data was sourced from on-line web pages, reports and 
guides produced by the regulators. Performance and offending statistics were obtained 
from various sources, including:  
 
 Performance reports; 
 Financial reports; 
 Published judgments; 
 Web pages; and  
 Freedom of Information requests.  
 
Table 7.1: Composition of research database 
 
 Number identified Offending statistics 
Regulators of general public 6 6 
Regulators of professions 56 46 
Regulators of organisations 9 - 
Databases 25 3 
Total 96 55 
 
 
 
Criminal justice offending statistics were sourced from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ, 2015). 
Proven offending statistics were collected for 46 regulatory bodies and 3 databases as 
indicated in Table 7.1. The statistics provided by one of the database providers (National 
Hunter) were not used in the subsequent analysis because they probably duplicated the 
Cifas data. Although some bodies produce summary enforcement statistics, most do not. 
There is also a general absence of analysis by regulators of the types of misconduct they 
address. Such analyses would inform the regulators, the sectors they oversee and the public 
of present and emerging threats, whether they are matters of competence or criminality. As 
a result, the only way to develop a representative estimate of fraud offending was to 
examine a large sample of published judgments within the two year sample time frame 
from 2014 to 2015. This amounted to a total of approximately 3,750 cases. The sample time 
frame was the full 2 years for 41 of the professions regulators, but 12 months or less for 
those with restricted publication policies. Consequently the data had to be extrapolated for 
the Care Council for Wales, EWC, GPhC, MPTS and the NMC. 
 
An important gap in the analysis of offending rates arises from the secrecy of private 
Regulatory Administrative Justice. As a result the number of fraudulent cases is likely to be 
an underestimate. Further research is required to quantify the scale of secret regulatory 
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justice. The research did not capture those cases which did not proceed to full hearings with 
accompanying published judgments because, for example, the regulators achieved their 
desired outcomes by expedient private administrative means with the consent of the 
respondents. The SRA, the BSB and the GMC deal with many cases using this private 
Regulatory Administrative Justice model. Only judgments by their respective tribunal 
services (SDT, BTAS and MPTS) are subject to full public scrutiny. A further problem revealed 
by the research is the variable level of supporting detail in the published findings. With 
transparency and public scrutiny in mind, the SDT produces extensive narratives to justify its 
determinations. On the other hand, the NMC is less transparent: in about 20% of its 
judgments it publishes only the sentence and omits the causes of action and reasons for the 
decisions. 
 
Similarly the research method was unable to capture events which may have started out 
with a fraudulent purpose but were subsequently diverted by the intervention of the 
regulators. The HMRC, for example, focuses on its primary mission of collecting taxes. It 
uses administrative means including penalty charges to pursue outstanding tax liabilities 
irrespective of whether the cause of the default is insufficient funds, mistake, 
misunderstanding or a fraudulent intent. It only pursues criminal charges in extremis. Those 
with a mens rea intent who subsequently see the error of their ways before charges are laid 
do not attract the fraud label. 
A particular issue encountered in the examination of judgments is that they very rarely use 
the fraud label. Indeed the word only appears when fraud has previously been the finding of 
a criminal court. In these cases regulators invariably regard the criminal finding as a cause of 
action and proof of misconduct. Consequently every available judgment had to be examined 
carefully to identify cases which displayed fraud behaviour. The apparent reluctance to use 
the fraud label is a phenomenon characterised as immoral phlegmatism by Button and 
Tunley (2015). This labelling problem is also inherent in cases pursued through the civil 
courts. An examination of the BAILII and Westlaw databases revealed that the fraud label 
and the civil law equivalent, deceit, rarely appear. Lawyers prefer claims under other torts 
and equity remedies because they are easier to litigate (McGrath, 2008). Because the effort 
required to identify civil cases involving fraudulent behaviour proved unproductive, and 
because the civil regime primarily resolves disputes rather than attaches guilt and sanctions, 
the civil justice route is excluded from the research scope. 
Internet searches were undertaken to provide additional details of the offending and proved 
particularly useful in finding the value of individual frauds. It is frustrating that too often 
regulators’ judgments do not describe important aspects of the fraud scripts including, 
whenever measurable, the financial gains or losses.  The purpose of collecting the value 
data was not to estimate the aggregate level of annual losses to fraud associated with each 
sector, but rather to gauge the relative levels of financial harm. In many cases there is no 
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direct, measurable financial impact, for example in falsifying qualifications. Often regulators 
do not publish or even enquire into the level of damage; their principal focus is on the 
nature of the misconduct and appropriate intervention outcomes to prevent further harm. 
Summary details of each of the 720 fraud cases identified in the 48 professions regulators 
were recorded in the research database. The involvement of law enforcement and criminal 
prosecutors were also noted against each case, whether before, during or after the 
regulatory investigation. Each case was coded according to the fraud typology which 
emerged from the research and is set out in Table 3.1. The coding carefully differentiates 
between professional offences, those committed in the performance of the offenders’ 
professional duties, and “unregulated” offences, those committed during the course of the 
offenders’ private lives. The coding also distinguishes between motivations in respect of the 
beneficiary types: offences committed for the offenders’ own benefit, offences committed 
on behalf of their employers and those committed on behalf of others. In a number of cases 
the beneficiaries were both the offenders and their employers. This is a problem 
encountered by Free and Murphy (2015) in their examination of co-offending, but as they 
observed, one motivation is more salient and should be recorded as the index offence. 
Multiple charges were also evident in many cases, often involving fraud and competency 
allegations. Multiple charges are laid not just because offenders committed multiple 
offences; they also provide the regulators with alternatives if primary dishonesty allegations 
fail to hold up at hearings. The data collection only recorded the dishonesty allegation. 
Interviews  
Informed by the first stage, the researchers then undertook semi-structured interviews with 
10 key stakeholders. The aim of these interviews were to clarify certain issues which were 
not clear from publicly available sources as well as to draw out more depth views on some 
of the issues uncovered in the first stage of the research. The interviewees included the 
following:  
● Senior Representative of the Insurance Fraud Register;  
● Senior Representative of the Cifas; 
● Senior Representative from National Hunter;  
● Senior Lawyer specialising in Contempt of Court;  
● Senior Investigator from Insurance Company with experience of Contempt of Court; 
● Senior Investigator from NHS with experience of regulatory bodies; 
● Senior Representative of Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal;  
● Senior Representative from Gambling Commission;  
● Senior Representative from National College of Teaching and Leadership; and   
● Two Senior Representatives from Information Commissioners Office. 
 
It is also interesting to note for future researchers that interviews were not straightforward 
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to achieve. None of the key accountancy bodies wished to be interviewed, including the 
Financial Conduct Authority or the Financial Ombudsman. It was illuminating that the case 
activity levels of some of these bodies, and the accountancy profession in particular, were 
relatively low. Given some of the issues with the databases, it is notable that Citizens Advice 
were also not interested. The researchers were also keen to interview financial institutions 
about the decision-making processes for placing persons on the fraudster databases. Several 
were contacted where the researchers already had mature contacts but they all declined. 
This is an area where researchers must be aware there will be challenges to securing access. 
Observation  
The researchers observed three hearings related to a case with fraud related behaviour. 
These were all public hearings and were at:  
● Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service;  
● Nursing and Midwifery Council; and   
● Health and Care Professions Council.  
 
Survey  
Finally the researchers conducted a survey of counter fraud specialists. The survey was 
placed on Survey Monkey and was distributed to the following groups:   
● Centre for Counter Fraud Studies distribution list;  
● West Midlands Fraud Forum distribution list;  
● ASIS UK distribution list; and   
● PKF Littlejohn counter fraud distribution list.    
 
A total of 145 responses were received from the sectors indicated in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Survey sector profile 
Sector Respondents 
Public sector 77 
Private sector 62 
Charity sector   6 
Total 145 
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